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FROM WOLVES, LAMBS (PART I): THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
CASE FOR GRADUAL ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
Kevin Barry* 
Abstract 
This spring, the Connecticut Supreme Court will take up a novel 
question, unprecedented in modern death penalty jurisprudence: Can a 
state gradually abolish its death penalty? Restated, can it leave the 
sentences of those currently on death row in place but abolish the death 
penalty going forward? This Article argues that it can. On simple statutory 
construction grounds, “prospective-only” repeals of death penalty 
legislation are not given retroactive effect. Although the constitutional 
considerations are admittedly less straightforward, prospective-only repeals 
do not offend the Constitution. The death penalty remains constitutional 
per se under the Eighth Amendment, and “as-applied” challenges under 
Atkins and Furman fare no better. 
Apart from the thorny legal question before the Connecticut Supreme 
Court, prospective-only repeal gives rise to two other difficult questions. 
The first is a pragmatic one: From the perspective of the abolition 
movement, is prospective-only abolishment of death-penalty legislation 
wise? The second is a moral one: Is it right to leave those who committed 
murder on day one on death row, while eliminating the death penalty for 
those who commit murder on day two? This Article answers both questions 
in the affirmative. Prospective-only death penalty repeal offers both 
retraction of the death penalty and preservation of the status quo. It is 
therefore a useful tool for winning states with inmates on death row to the 
cause of abolition. Furthermore, by retaining the death penalty for some so 
that no others will ever face a similar fate, legislators transform an immoral 
punishment into an arguably moral sacrifice. This is the uneasy morality of 
gradual abolition; from wolves, lambs. 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor, Quinnipiac University School of Law. This Article is adapted from the written 
and oral testimony of Quinnipiac University School of Law’s Civil Justice Clinic in support of 
prospective-only legislation that abolished Connecticut’s death penalty in 2012. See Testimony of 
Quinnipiac University School of Law Civil Justice Clinic in Support of Raised Bill No. 280, 
Judiciary Comm., 2012 Gen. Assemb. (Conn. March 14, 2012), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/
JUDdata/Tmy/2012SB-00280-R000314-Christine%20Gertsch-%20Quinnipiac%20University%
20School%20of%20Law-TMY.PDF; JUD Committee Hearing Transcript for March 14, 2012 Gen. 
Assemb. (Conn. 2012), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/JUDdata/chr/2012JUD00314-R001100-
CHR.htm. Thanks to the Connecticut Office of the Chief Public Defender and the Connecticut 
Office of the Chief State’s Attorney for their outstanding advocacy and thoughtful consideration of 
an earlier draft of this Article. Thanks also to: participants at the Faculty Forum at Quinnipiac 
University School of Law for helpful conversations; the Florida Law Review staff for excellent 
editorial assistance; and Andrea Dupre, Christine Gertsch, and Trevor Bradley for their research 
assistance. 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
This is an important time for death penalty abolition. The past five 
years have witnessed the dawning of a new trend in the abolition 
movement, that of gradual abolition, by which states eliminate the death 
penalty for all future crimes while preserving it for crimes already 
committed. Two factors define the trend: (1) state legislatures’ use of 
“prospective-only” language—language limiting repeal to crimes 
committed on or after the effective date of the statute; and (2) the 
executive’s refusal or inability to commute existing death sentences after 
repeal. In spring 2014, the Connecticut Supreme Court will address the 
legality of this approach, which is a novel question unprecedented in 
modern death penalty jurisprudence.  
Importantly, the novelty of gradual abolition does not lie in the 
prospective-only nature of the death penalty repeal. Over the years, many 
states have enacted prospective-only legislation altering death penalty 
procedures or repealing the death penalty for certain crimes and certain 
types of offenders. Courts have generally upheld such repeals. Other states 
have enacted prospective-only legislation—like Connecticut’s—abolishing 
the death penalty for all future crimes. Unlike in Connecticut, however, 
executive branches in these states have commuted the sentences of those 
on death row immediately prior to or after such repeals, so no one 
remained on death row to challenge such repeals. As a result, courts have 
generally not had occasion to address the legality of such repeals.1 
The novelty of the issue before the Connecticut Supreme Court thus 
arises from the fact that the Connecticut General Assembly abolished the 
death penalty for all future crimes,2 and Connecticut’s executive did not 
commute the sentences of those remaining on death row. New Mexico and 
                                                                                                                     
 1. In 1908 and 1918, the supreme courts of Kansas and Missouri, respectively, refused to 
give retroactive effect to prospective-only legislation repealing their death penalties in toto. See 
State v. Lewis, 201 S.W. 80, 85–86 (Mo. 1918); In re Schneck, 96 P. 43, 44–45 (Kan. 1908). Since 
that time, no court appears to have addressed this issue. Because many states enacted prospective-
only legislation abolishing their death penalties after 1918, the dearth of case law addressing 
challenges to those repeals suggests that either there was no one on death row at the time of 
prospective-only repeal or the executive commuted the sentence of anyone on death row at the time 
of such repeal. For an excellent summary of statutes abolishing the death penalty, see generally 
Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians & Scholars, State v. Santiago, 9 A.3d 566 (Conn. 2012) 
(No. SC17413) [hereinafter Historians Brief], available at http://ctbriefsonline.com/Briefs/
SC17413ac5.pdf; see also Kevin Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II): The Fourteenth Amendment 
Case for Gradual Abolition of the Death Penalty, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) 
[hereinafter Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II)] (discussing the history of prospective-only death 
penalty repeal). 
 2. An Act Revising the Penalty for Capital Felonies, Pub. Act No. 12-5, § 1, 2012 Conn. 
Acts 13, 14 (Reg. Sess.), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/ACT/PA/2012PA-00005-R00SB-
00280-PA.htm (“(Effective from passage and applicable to crimes committed on or after said 
date): . . . .”). 
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Maryland appear to be the only other states to have done the same in nearly 
a century.3 Together, these three states retain eighteen men on death row 
after prospective-only repeal of the death penalty.4 
To understand the exceptional events taking place in New Mexico, 
Connecticut, and Maryland, it helps to understand the context from which 
they emerged. On November 5, 2005, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 
                                                                                                                     
 3. See An Act Concerning Death Penalty Repeal—Substitution of Life Without the 
Possibility of Parole, ch. 156, § 3, 2013 Md. Laws 5, available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/
2013RS/chapters_noln/Ch_156_sb0276T.pdf (stating that, after effective date of repeal, governor 
may “change a sentence of death into a sentence of life without the possibility of parole”); An Act 
Relating to Capital Felony Sentencing; Abolishing the Death Penalty; Providing for Life 
Imprisonment Without Possibility of Release or Parole, ch. 11, § 6, 2009 N.M. Laws 133, 141, 
available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/09%20Regular/final/HB0285.pdf (“The provisions of 
this act apply to crimes committed on or after July 1, 2009.”).  
On November 1, 2010, a New Mexico trial court denied a “Motion to Dismiss the Death 
Penalty” in the case of Michael Astorga, who committed his crime before that state’s 2009 
prospective-only repeal but was convicted after repeal and was awaiting sentencing. See Response 
to Petition for Writ of Superintending Control at 2, Astorga v. Candelaria, No. 32,744 (N.M. Jan. 
26, 2011) [hereinafter NM’s January 2011 Response]; Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Death 
Penalty with Memorandum of Law at 2, State v. Astorga, CR-2006-1670 (N.M. Dist. Nov. 1, 2010) 
[hereinafter Def.’s Motion to Dismiss]. “I don’t find anything about [prospective-only repeal] 
unconstitutional,” Judge Candelaria stated at the close of arguments. Scott Sandlin, Astorga Death 
Penalty Trial Can Proceed, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.abqjournal.com/news/  
metro/032332537958newsmetro12-03-10.htm (internal quotation marks omitted). “It’s the 
Legislature’s prerogative to make a law prospective or retroactive.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
Astorga filed an Emergency Petition for Writ of Superintending Control with the New Mexico 
Supreme Court, arguing that it was unconstitutional for the state to pursue the death penalty against 
him given New Mexico’s prospective-only repeal. See NM’s January 2011 Response, supra, at 2; 
Emergency Petition for Writ of Superintending Control at 3–11, Astorga v. State, No. 32,744 (N.M. 
Feb. 4, 2011) (attaching Def.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra). The New Mexico Supreme Court 
granted a stay of proceedings and requested a response from the State. After full briefing on the 
constitutional issues, the court denied the defendant’s petition and lifted the stay of proceedings. 
See Order at 1, Astorga v. Candelaria, No. 32,744 (N.M. Feb. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Feb. 2011 
Order]. 
Because the court’s order did not expressly reserve judgment on the constitutional arguments 
raised in the December 2010 Petition, it is unclear whether the court found them to be without merit 
or merely inappropriate to address in a writ proceeding. Compare Feb. 2011 Order, supra (no 
reasoning), with Order at 3, Astorga v. State, No. 33,152 (N.M. Sept. 1, 2011) (finding it 
“inappropriate” to decide whether rules of statutory construction required retroactive application of 
prospective-only repeal, and “expressly” refusing to do so in writ proceeding). What is clear is that 
the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to give retroactive effect to New Mexico’s prospective-
only repeal in a pending case. Other state supreme courts have done so more explicitly. See, e.g., 
State v. Alcorn, 638 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ind. 1994) (holding that prospective-only statute allowing 
jury to recommend life imprisonment without possibility of parole rather than death was 
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment and not retroactive in the pending case); In re Schneck, 
96 P. at 44–45 (holding that prospective-only death penalty repeal was not retroactive in pending 
case in which defendant was charged with capital crime three months before repeal). 
 4. Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (Apr. 1, 2013), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year. 
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Michael Paul Astorga shot Candido Ray Martinez in the head, killing him.5 
Astorga believed that Martinez had stolen his 1959 El Camino, which had 
gone missing while Astorga was serving a sentence for various weapons, 
vandalism, and drug charges.6 Police issued an arrest warrant for Astorga 
but were unable to find him.7 Then, on March 22, 2006, New Mexico 
County Deputy Sheriff James McGrane Jr. pulled Astorga over as part of a 
routine traffic stop.8 Seconds later, McGrane lay dead—shot in the head by 
Astorga.9 Mr. Astorga was eventually located in Mexico where he was 
arrested.10 On April 14, 2006, the State of New Mexico charged Astorga 
with murdering McGrane and filed notice of its intention to seek the death 
penalty, asserting the murder of a police officer as an aggravating factor.11  
On March 13, 2009, well before Astorga’s murder trials, New Mexico’s 
legislature passed House Bill 285, which repealed the death penalty for 
“crimes committed on or after July 1, 2009.”12 The legislature’s rationales 
for repeal ranged from the high costs of administering the death penalty 
and the prevention of false hope for the families of murder victims, to the 
results of a 2008 poll that demonstrated that 64% of New Mexico’s citizens 
favored life without parole over the death penalty.13 The legislature’s 
reasons for the bill’s prospective-only feature, on the other hand, were far 
different. In a “Motion to Dismiss the Death Penalty,” filed with the trial 
court on the eve of sentencing, Astorga’s attorney brought the unseemliness 
of prospective-only repeal into stark relief: 
Legislative debate, according to some involved, on the repeal 
                                                                                                                     
 5. Maggie Shepard, Family Feud Had Fugitive on the Run, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB. (Mar. 21, 
2006, 1:14 PM), http://www.abqtrib.com/news/2006/mar/21/family-feud-had-fugitive-on-the-run; 
Olivier Uyttebrouck, Michael Paul Astorga Could Be Spared from Death Penalty in Case of Slain 
Deputy, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Aug. 7, 2007), http://www.abqjournal.com/news/metro/584352metro08-
07-07.htm. Candido Ray Martinez was also known as Candy Ray Martinez. Shepard, supra. 
 6. Shepard, supra note 5. 
 7. Uyettebrouck, supra note 5. 
 8. Scott Sandlin & Olivier Uyttebrouck, Astorga Convicted of Killing Sheriff’s Deputy, 
ALBUQUERQUE J. (June 5, 2010), http://www.abqjournal.com/news/metro/05235649metro06-05-
10.htm. 
 9. Michael Navrot, Astorga’s Passenger Held, Let Go, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Mar. 26, 2006), 
http://www.abqjournal.com/news/metro/445213metro03-26-06.htm. 
 10. Sandlin & Uyttebrouck, supra note 8. 
 11. NM’s January 2011 Response, supra note 3, at 1. 
 12. An Act Relating to Capital Felony Sentencing; Abolishing the Death Penalty; Providing 
for Life Imprisonment Without Possibility of Release or Parole, ch. 11, 2009 N.M. Laws 133, 
available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/09%20Regular/final/HB0285.pdf; 2009 Regular 
Session; HB 285; Abolish Death Penalty, N.M. LEGISLATURE, http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/
legislation.aspx?Chamber=H&LegType=B&LegNo=285&year=09 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) 
(noting the date the Senate passed the bill). 
 13. Press Release, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., New Mexico’s Legislature Votes to Abolish 
Death Penalty—Part of National Trend Away from Capital Punishment (Mar. 13, 2009), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/NMpressrel.pdf. 
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of the death penalty included a compromise, “no repeal for 
Michael Astorga.” This appears to be the compromise the 
governor and certain legislators requested/demanded in order 
to support and/or sign the repeal bill. It appears that 
politicians want him to die at the hands of the government 
executioner to satisfy the demands of certain law enforcement 
and the right-wing pro-death crowd. The last vestige of the 
abhorrent death penalty, for politicians and revenge-seekers, 
is Michael Astorga’s dead body.14 
Governor Bill Richardson, who signed the repeal bill into law on 
Wednesday, March 18, 2009, made public statements regarding the bill that 
do not contradict this characterization.15 The day after signing the repeal 
bill, Richardson told the press he believed Astorga—who had not yet been 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Def.’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 3.  
 15. Governor Bill Richardson Signs Repeal of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/governor-bill-richardson-signs-repeal-death-penalty (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2013) (quoting in full Governor Richardson’s signing statement). The statements of 
Representative Gail Chasey, sponsor of New Mexico’s prospective-only death penalty repeal bill, 
on the other hand, do contradict Astorga’s characterization. Interview with Gail Chasey, State 
Representative, N.M. House of Representatives (July 11, 2013) (notes on file with author) 
[hereinafter Chasey Interview]. According to Representative Chasey, New Mexico’s death penalty 
abolition bill had been prospective-only since she first introduced it 1999—well before Astorga’s 
crimes. Id. Although the bill’s prospective-only feature certainly made it easier for lawmakers to 
support it, Representative Chasey notes, the decision to make the bill prospective-only had nothing 
to do with lawmakers wanting Astorga to get the death penalty. Id. Instead, the decision was based 
on, among other things, New Mexico’s constitutional savings clause, which prohibits a new law 
from extinguishing penalties, rights, and liabilities under a prior law. N.M. CONST. art. IV, §§ 33–
34; see also id. art. II, § 19 (“No . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted by 
the legislature”). New Mexico lawmakers interpreted New Mexico’s savings clause to prevent 
passage of a retroactive death penalty repeal bill. Chasey Interview, supra; cf. Comment, Today’s 
Law and Yesterday’s Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Legislation, 121 U. 
PA. L. REV. 120, 129 (1972) (“The legislature in [New Mexico] is powerless to lessen penalties for 
past transgressions; to do so would require constitutional revision.”). While the New Mexico 
legislature’s interpretation of the savings clause is a reasonable one, it is debatable as a matter of 
law. For example, the savings clause did not stop the legislature from previously abolishing the 
death penalty retroactively, “revo[king] death penalties already imposed and substitut[ing] a 
sentence of life imprisonment.” State v. Pace, 456 P.2d 197, 205 (N.M. 1969) (per curiam) 
(supplemental opinion) (“It is clear from [the 1969 repeal law] that the legislature intended the act 
to apply retroactively.”). It also did not stop the legislature from enacting legislation in 1997 that 
explicitly allows the legislature to pass laws that retroactively reduce penalties. See N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 12-2A-16(c) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 2013 Legis. Sess.) (“If a criminal 
penalty for a violation of a statute or rule is reduced by an amendment, the penalty, if not already 
imposed, must be imposed under the statute or rule as amended.”); id. § 12-2A-8 (“A statute or rule 
operates prospectively only unless the statute or rule expressly provides otherwise . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). Therefore, if New Mexico’s legislature had wanted to abolish the death penalty 
retroactively for those sentenced to death—at least those whose sentences were not yet final—it 
likely could have done so by including an express provision saying as much. For further discussion 
of savings clauses, see infra Subsection III.A.1. 
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convicted of murder, much less sentenced to death—“should go to the 
death penalty. But I think for the future, life in prison without parole is a 
huge punishment.”16  
Ironically, despite the hue and cry over Astorga, he ultimately was not 
sentenced to death.17 Two other men were on New Mexico’s death row 
when the repeal bill was signed, and they remain there.18 Although the 
governor of New Mexico has the authority to commute death sentences, 
their sentences stand.19 
As in New Mexico, Connecticut’s path to prospective-only repeal took 
place in the shadow of two highly publicized death penalty trials that arose 
out of a brutal home invasion and triple murder in the town of Cheshire, 
Connecticut.20 In the early morning hours of July 23, 2007, Joshua 
Komisarjevsky and Steven Hayes entered the home of the Petit family.21 
The men beat and bound Dr. William Petit, then forced his wife, Jennifer 
Hawke-Petit, to go to the bank and withdraw $15,000.22 Komisarjevsky 
tied the two Petit daughters, eleven-year-old Michaela and seventeen-year-
old Hayley, to their beds and sexually assaulted Michaela; Hayes raped 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Crystal Gutierrez, Gov Subpoenaed in Death-Penalty Case, KRQE (Nov. 23, 2010, 7:13 
PM), http://www.krqe.com/news/crime/gov-subpoenaed-in-death-penalty-case (emphasis added). 
New Mexico’s gubernatorial candidates also weighed in, both agreeing that New Mexico’s 
prospective-only repeal did not apply to Astorga. New Mexico: Death Penalty Becomes Issue in 
Gubernatorial Race, DEATH PENALTY NEWS (June 9, 2010), http://deathpenaltynews.blogspot.com/
2010/06/new-mexico-death-penalty-becomes-issue.html.  
 17. Convicted NM Deputy Killer Avoids Death Penalty, ALAMOGORDO DAILY NEWS (May 18, 
2012, 12:24 PM) [hereinafter Deputy Killer], http://www.alamogordonews.com/ci_20655404/nm-
jurors-death-penalty-case-ask-about-safety. On June 4, 2010, Astorga was convicted of first-degree 
murder of McGrane, among other charges. Sandlin & Uyttebrouck, supra note 8. On May 18, 2012, 
he was sentenced to life in prison plus thirteen years when a jury failed to unanimously agree on 
imposition of the death penalty. Deputy Killer, supra. On January 18, 2012, Astorga was convicted 
of second-degree murder of Candido Martinez, among other charges. Astorga Convicted in Second 
Murder Trial, KOAT (Jan. 18, 2012, 4:48 AM), http://www.koat.com/Astorga-Convicted-In-
Second-Murder-Trial/-/9154444/9708110/-/12hpmd9/-/index.html. On August 3, 2012, he was 
sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison for that crime. Hailey Heinz, Astorga Gets 28 More Years, 
ALBUQUERQUE J. (Aug. 3 2012, 10:45 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/122206/abqnews 
seeker/astorga-gets-28-more-years.html. 
 18. New Mexico, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-
mexico-1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 19.  LINDA E. CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 250 n.8 (2d ed. 
2008); New Mexico, supra note 18. 
 20. William Glaberson, Reliving Horror in a Test for the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/nyregion/19cheshire.html (“‘All of the things that are 
about to play out in the Cheshire case will have a tremendous effect on the death-penalty debate in 
this state,’ said State Representative Michael P. Lawlor . . . .”). 
 21. Manny Fernandez & Alison Leigh Cowan, When Horror Came to a Connecticut Family, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/07/nyregion/07slay.html?
pagewanted=all (corrected Aug. 10, 2007) (reporting the facts of the invasion and subsequent 
murders). 
 22. Id. 
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Jennifer and then strangled her to death.23 The two men then doused the 
house in gasoline and ignited it.24 Both Petit girls died from smoke 
inhalation.25 Dr. Petit, having regained consciousness, survived by escaping 
through a basement door shortly before the gasoline was lit.26 Police 
apprehended Komisarjevsky and Hayes as they attempted to flee.27 
In 2009, two years after the Cheshire murders, the Connecticut General 
Assembly passed a prospective-only bill repealing the death penalty.28 The 
addition of the prospective-only feature of the bill, and specifically its 
application to Hayes and Komisarjevsky, was the subject of intense debate 
in the house and senate.29 When Governor Jodi Rell vetoed the bill on June 
5, she was acting in part on the testimony of Dr. Petit, who had argued in 
support of the death penalty.30 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. An Act Concerning the Penalty for a Capital Felony, H.R. 6578, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Jan. 
Sess. (Conn. 2009), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/act/Pa/pdf/2009PA-00107-R00HB-
06578-PA.PDF (vetoed June 5, 2009). H.R. 6578 passed the House by a vote of 90-56 and the 
Senate by a vote of 19-17. Death Penalty in Connecticut, CONN. NETWORK TO ABOLISH DEATH 
PENALTY, http://www.cnadp.org/resources/death-penalty-in-connecticut/ (updated Nov. 15, 2010). 
Two years before the Cheshire murders, in 2005, the Connecticut General Assembly attempted to 
pass a bill that would have repealed the death penalty both prospectively and retroactively. An Act 
Concerning Murder with Special Circumstances, H.R. 6012, 2005 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 
2005), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/TOB/h/pdf/2005HB-06012-R02-HB.pdf; see also 
Death Penalty in Connecticut, supra. The backdrop to that legislation, and no small reason for its 
demise, was the then-pending, widely publicized execution of serial killer Michael Ross (which 
eventually occurred on May 13, 2005). See LAWRENCE B. GOODHEART, THE SOLEMN SENTENCE OF 
DEATH: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONNECTICUT 243 (2011). Because “[a] move to strike the death 
penalty would not only effectively commute the death sentences of six inmates, but also of Ross, to 
life in prison,” Democrats worried about being the target of “attack campaign[s] . . . with the 
message: Did your legislator vote to spare Michael Ross?” Id.; see also H. Sess. Transcript for Apr. 
11, 2012, Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2012), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/trn/H/2012HTR00411-R00-
TRN.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) [hereinafter 2012 H. Sess. Transcript] (statement of Rep. 
Larry Cafero, H. Minority Leader) (stating that 2005 debate “was all about Michael Ross, . . . the 
poster boy for the death penalty . . . who was reviled as one of the most heinous villains of our time 
in our State’s history”). That was the last time Connecticut’s General Assembly attempted to pass a 
retroactive repeal. 
 29. See, e.g., S. Sess. Transcript for May 21, 2009, Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2009) 
http://search.cga.state.ct.us/dtsearch_lpa.asp?cmd=getdoc&DocId=33324&Index=I%3A%5Czindex
%5C2009 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (statement of Sen. McDonald in opposition to an amendment 
excluding from repeal murder in the course of a home invasion) (“I think it would be a mistake to 
leave the impression that somehow anything in the underlying bill would affect the prosecution of 
the two defendants in the Petit case.”); see also Amendment to H.R. 6578: An Act Concerning the 
Penalty for a Capital Felony, 2009 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2009), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/AMD/H/2009HB-06578-R00SA-AMD.htm (excluding murder in the 
course of a home invasion). 
 30. See Press Release, State of Conn. Exec. Chambers, Governor Rell Vetoes HB 6578, An 
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When the state assembly next attempted to repeal the death penalty in 
2011, it did so in the wake of Stephen Hayes’s capital murder trial and 
sentencing, and on the eve of Joshua Komisarjevsky’s trial.31 The Cheshire 
murders weighed so heavily on the minds of some legislators that the 
murders single-handedly derailed an effort to pass even a prospective-only 
bill.32 After a personal visit from Dr. Petit, two state senators changed their 
position “out of sympathy” for him, and the 2011 prospective-only repeal 
failed.33 One of those senators, Edith Prague, told the press that “[t]hey 
should bypass the trial and take that second animal and hang him by his 
penis from a tree out in the middle of Main Street.”34 
In 2012, a prospective-only repeal bill was considered for the third 
time. The Cheshire murders were at the center of debate in the House and 
                                                                                                                     
Act Concerning the Penalty for a Capital Felony (June 5, 2009), http://www.ct.gov/governorrell/
cwp/view.asp?A=3675&Q=441204 (reciting Dr. Petit’s quotation of Lord Justice Denning, Master 
of the Rolls of the Court of Appeals in the United Kingdom). The United Kingdom abolished its 
death penalty for murder in 1965 and did so both prospectively and retroactively. See Murder 
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965, c. 71 (Eng.), available at http://www.legisla
tion.gov.uk/ukpga/1965/71. 
 31. Hayes was convicted of capital murder on October 5, 2010 and sentenced to death on 
November 8, 2010. William Glaberson, Death Penalty for a Killer of 3 in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 8, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/nyregion/09cheshire.html. Komisarjevsky was 
convicted of capital murder on October 13, 2011 and sentenced to death on December 9, 2011. 
William Glaberson, Death Penalty for 2nd Man in Connecticut Triple-Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/nyregion/joshua-komisarjevsky-gets-death-for-
cheshire-killings.html. 
 32. See An Act Revising the Penalty for Capital Felonies, S. 1035, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Jan. 
Sess. (Conn. 2011), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/TOB/S/2011SB-01035-R01-SB.htm. 
 33. See State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d 566, 696 (Conn. 2012) (Harper, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Because Josh Komisarjevsky had not yet been convicted of the 2007 crimes, Dr. 
Petit argued that passage of a prospective-only repeal “could complicate [his] capital trial.” Mark 
Pazniokas, At Petit’s Request, Two Senators Stop Repeal of Death Penalty, CT MIRROR (May 11, 
2011), http://www.ctmirror.org/story/12559/petits-request-prague-stop-repeal-death-penalty-year. 
As Senator Edith Prague later told legislators:  
I did have a meeting with Dr. Petit and his sister and their attorney. And the 
attorney said if you vote for repeal now, it’s going to be next to impossible for us 
to get the death penalty for these two monsters who were involved in the slaughter 
of the Petit family. And out of respect for Dr. Petit, I said . . . I could not vote for 
repeal. I couldn’t because certainly Dr. Petit had suffered enough and I wasn’t 
about to cause anymore [sic] problems. 
S. Sess. Transcript for Apr. 4, 2012, Gen. Assemb. (Conn. 2012), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/trn/S/
2012STR00404-R00-TRN.htm [hereinafter 2012 S. Sess. Transcript] (statement of Sen. Edith 
Prague); see also Pazniokas, supra (“For Dr. Petit, for me to do one more thing to cause him some 
kind of angst, I can’t do it. . . . I’m [refusing to vote for repeal] because that’s what they came in 
for . . . . ” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sen. Edith Prague)). 
 34. Santiago, 49 A.3d at 696 (Harper, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 
Bob Connors, Prague: “Hang the Animal By His . . . .,” NBC CONN. (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/Prague-Hang-the-Animal-by-His-121670559.html. 
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the Senate.35 With assurances that the bill was prospective-only,36 the 
Assembly passed a repeal of the death penalty for “crimes committed on or 
after” the date of passage, and Governor Dannel Malloy signed the bill into 
law on April 25, 2012.37 Connecticut’s eleven death row inmates38 remain 
on death row; only the Board of Pardons and Paroles has the authority to 
commute their sentences, which it has not done.39 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Compare 2012 H. Sess. Transcript, supra note 28 (statement of Rep. Cafero) (“It is no 
secret that what is weighing over all of us is the Petit murders. We heard through the summer and 
spring, the fall of 2010 and 2011 of these horrible, heinous, deplorable crimes. People in the jury 
box vomited for the pictures they saw and the descriptions they heard. . . . [Those voting for 
prospective repeal] want to see justice by way of the death penalty happen for those in the Petit 
case . . . . [I]t’s because of [Komisarjevsky and Hayes] that we have the bill that we have before 
us.”), id. (statement of Rep. Hewett) (acknowledging “members who are voting for a prospective 
bill so they can make sure that Hayes and Komisarjevsky get the death penalty”), and id. (statement 
of Rep. Adinolfi) (“There are many people in this room that have changed in their mind their vote 
to abolish the death penalty [prospectively] rather than vote against abolishing the death penalty 
based on these 11 who are on death row being executed, especially, Komisarjevsky and 
Hayes . . . .”), with 2012 S. Sess. Transcript, supra note 33 (statement of Sen. Boucher) (“[T]he 
crimes that affected the Petit family . . . [are] behind the whole rationale for making this 
prospective.”), and id. (statement of Sen. Kissel) (“Mr. Hayes and Mr. Komisarjevsky . . . had 
multiple capital convictions. And that is why it’s almost impossible to get a bill through this 
Legislature right now that would repeal the death penalty across the board.”). 
 36. See, e.g., 2012 S. Sess. Transcript, supra note 33 (statement of Sen. Coleman, responding 
to question from Sen. Prague) (“[T]here will be no retroactive application of this change for anyone 
who’s currently on death row.”). 
 37. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (citing repeal statute); Daniela Altimari, Without 
Fanfare, Malloy Signs Bill Abolishing Death Penalty, HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 25, 2012), 
http://articles.courant.com/2012-04-25/news/hc-death-penalty-signing-0426-20120425_1_death-
penalty-gail-canzano-capital-punishment. 
 38. Shortly after Connecticut’s repeal became law, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
overturned the death sentence of Eduardo Santiago, one of Connecticut’s eleven death row 
prisoners, on grounds that the trial court had improperly failed to disclose privileged records 
regarding abuse and neglect of Mr. Santiago’s siblings. State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d at 566, 653–54 
(Conn. 2012). The Connecticut Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a new 
penalty phase hearing, id., but Mr. Santiago argued that Connecticut’s prospective-only repeal 
prohibited the state from seeking the death penalty against him. Supplemental Brief of Defendant, 
State v. Santiago, S.C. 17413, at 1–3 (Conn. Nov. 13, 2012). Mr. Santiago’s case is once again 
pending before the Connecticut Supreme Court. Because Mr. Santiago remains subject to the death 
penalty at the time of this writing (albeit not sentenced to death), this Article includes him within 
Connecticut’s death row population as a statistical matter. Connecticut Supreme Court Considers 
Executions After Death Penalty Repeal, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/connecticut-supreme-court-considers-executions-after-death-penal
ty-repeal (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
 39. CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 250 n.9; Connecticut, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/connecticut-1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). Even if Governor 
Malloy had the authority to commute the sentences of those on Connecticut’s death row, it is 
unlikely that he would do so. In a gubernatorial debate in October 2010, Malloy stated that “he 
would abolish the death penalty only in future cases—not in those currently underway,” and singled 
out the two defendants in the Cheshire murders, stating that “[i]f these two gentlemen are sentenced 
to death, that sentence will be carried out. Period.” Christopher Keating, Tom Foley, Dan Malloy 
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Like New Mexico and Connecticut, Maryland’s decision to repeal the 
death penalty prospective-only was motivated in part by political concerns. 
Between 2001 and 2008, Maryland’s legislature introduced death penalty 
repeal bills nearly every year. 40 All were explicitly retroactive, and none 
ever made it to a floor vote. 41 
In 2008, the legislature passed a law creating the Maryland Commission 
on Capital Punishment, a 23-person body tasked with studying the 
administration of the death penalty, holding public hearings, and issuing a 
report with recommendations to the legislature by the end of the year.42 At 
the Commission’s hearings, several family members of murder victims 
testified in support of the death penalty. One of those family members was 
Phyllis Bricker, whose elderly parents were “bound, gagged, and 
repeatedly stabbed to death in their Baltimore home” in 1983 by a neighbor 
who wanted money for drugs.43 Ms. Bricker testified that she had waited 
for “equal justice” for over twenty-five years, “attending every trial, appeal, 
and hearing,” including five trips to the U.S. Supreme Court.44 In her 
testimony in support of the death penalty, Sharon Ward Blickenstaff 
likewise described in intimate detail the fatal stabbing of her blind, elderly 
father in his home in 2002.45 “[T]he murder[er]’s victims are put into a 
situation where their cries of pain and pleas for mercy fall on uncaring 
ears,” Ms. Blickenstaff wrote.46 “Who stands for the true victims? Who 
gives them a voice? Who cares for the families of survivors?”47 And 
Harold Bernadzikowski, whose sister was murdered in 2000, testified 
about the “debilitating stress” and depression that survivors experience, 
and encouraged members of the Commission to “put victim’s [sic] rights 
                                                                                                                     
Clash On Death Penalty, Jobs, Records In Gubernatorial Debate, HARTFORD COURANT (Oct. 6, 
2010), http://articles.courant.com/2010-10-06/news/hc-gubernatorial-debate-1006-20101005_
1_death-penalty-foley-malloy-democrat-dannel-malloy (emphasis added). 
 40. DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS. OF MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE: HB 316, 
2009 Sess., at 9, available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2009rs/fnotes/bil_0006/hb0316.pdf 
(discussing legislative history of Maryland death penalty repeal bills from 2001 to 2008). It appears 
2002 was the only year in which a death penalty repeal bill was not introduced. See id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Commission members “included police officers, correctional officers, family members of 
murder victims, prosecutors and defense attorneys, an innocent Maryland man sentenced to death 
who was later exonerated, and other members of Maryland’s community.”  Maryland Commission 
Recommends Abolition of Death Penalty in Final Report, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER. 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/maryland-commission-recommends-abolition-death-penalty-final-
report. 
 43. Transcript for Aug. 5, 2008, Md. Comm’n. on Capital Punishment, at 7 (Md. 2008), 
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/transcript-aug-5.doc. 
 44. Id. at 8, 11. 
 45. Testimony of Sharon Ward Blickenstaff, Md. Comm’n on Capital Punishment, at 3-4 
(Md. Aug. 27 2008), http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/blickenstaff-
testimony.pdf.  
 46. Id. at 4. 
 47. Id. at 7. 
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first.”48 
On December 12, 2008, the Commission issued a report calling for 
repeal of the death penalty.49 One month later, in January 2009, the 
Maryland legislature introduced Maryland’s first prospective-only death 
penalty repeal bill.50 That bill deleted the retroactive language found in 
prior bills, which stated that “an inmate who has been sentenced to death 
before the effective date of this Act and who has not been executed may 
not be executed and shall be considered as having received a sentence of 
life.”51  
With the strong support of Governor Martin O’Malley, the bill passed in 
2013 and took effect on October 1, 2013.52 Officials involved in the effort 
to abolish Maryland’s death penalty attribute the success of the bill, in part, 
to its prospective-only feature.53 Maryland’s five death row inmates remain 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Testimony of Harold Bernadzikowski, Md. Comm’n on Capital Punishment, at 1, 5 (Md. 
Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/bernadzikowski-
testimony.pdf. Support for the death penalty was not shared among all family members of murder 
victims.  “Bonnita Spikes, whose husband was murdered, Lisa Delity, whose brother was murdered, 
Ginger Beale, whose son was murdered, Art Laffin, whose brother was murdered, Kim Armstrong, 
whose son was murdered and Erricka Bridgeford, whose brother was murdered, favor repeal of the 
death penalty.” Final Report to the Gen. Assemb., Md. Comm’n on Capital Punishment, at 55 (Md. 
Dec. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Final Report], http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capital-
punishment/documents/death-penalty-commission-final-report.pdf. 
 49. Final Report, supra note 48. 
 50.  See An Act Concerning Criminal Law – Death Penalty – Repeal, HB 316, 2009 Reg. 
Sess. (Md. 2009) (deleting retroactivity provision); An Act Concerning Criminal Law – Death 
Penalty – Evidence, S.B. 279, ch. 186, 2009 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009). 
 51.  Compare An Act Concerning Criminal Law – Death Penalty – Repeal, HB 1328,2008 
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008) (“BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, [t]hat an inmate who has been sentenced to 
death before the effective date of this Act and who has not been executed may not be executed and 
shall be considered as having received a sentence of life . . . .”), with An Act Concerning Criminal 
Law – Death Penalty – Repeal, H.B. 316, 2009 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009) (deleting retroactivity 
provision), and An Act Concerning Criminal Law – Death Penalty – Repeal, S.B. 279, 2009 Reg. 
Sess. (Md. 2009) (same). 
 52.  S.B. 276. Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013); see also What Made Maryland Different?, NAT’L 
COALITION TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY, http://www.ncadp.org/blog/entry/what-made-
maryland-different. 
 53.  Telephone Interview (Aug. 9, 2013) (source confidential at request of interviewee; notes 
on file with author). Like New Mexico, Maryland’s legislature also appears to have been motivated 
by a legal determination that reducing the sentences of those currently on death row would create a 
“constitutional separation of powers problem.” Email from Jane Henderson, Exec. Dir., Md. 
Citizens Against State Executions (July 16, 2013) (on file with author). Lawmakers apparently 
believed that they did “not have the power to sentence any individual to anything,” so, in 2009, they 
removed the bill’s explicitly retroactive language. Id. Although the Maryland legislature’s 
interpretation of the law is reasonable, it is debatable as a matter of law. For example, Maryland’s 
general savings statute explicitly allows the legislature to pass laws that retroactively reduce 
penalties. See MD. CODE ANN., art. 1, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (preserving 
penalties under repealed statutes “unless the repealing . . . act shall expressly so provide”). 
Furthermore, Maryland’s constitutional prohibition on “retrospective Laws, punishing acts 
committed before the existence of such Laws,” and  “retrospective oath[s] or restriction[s],” by its 
terms, prohibits retroactive legislation that burdens, not benefits. MD. CONST. of 1867, Declaration 
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on death row; Governor O’Malley has stated that he “would consider 
commuting the five inmates’ sentences to life in prison on a case-by-case 
basis once a request is made.”54 
New Mexico’s, Connecticut’s, and Maryland’s experience with 
prospective-only repeal gives rise to three important questions. The first is 
a pragmatic question: Is prospective-only repeal helpful to the cause of 
abolition? The second is a moral question: Is prospective-only repeal 
morally right? And the third question is a legal one: Is prospective-only 
repeal permissible under the law? This Article answers all three questions 
in the affirmative. 
Part I of this Article addresses the pragmatic question. It concludes that 
prospective-only repeal, with its promise of gradual abolition, is useful to 
the cause of abolition. States have long used prospective-only repeal to 
abolish the death penalty. In the past five years, all that has changed is that 
three states have not commuted the sentences of those on death row 
following prospective-only repeal. Connecticut, New Mexico, and 
Maryland have left their death rows intact after abolishing the death 
penalty for everyone else.55 While abolition’s principles may be at odds 
with prospective-only repeal, abolition’s progress may not be. The states 
next in line for abolition have inmates on death row, which makes 
prospective-only repeal an enticing option for some lawmakers. If states’ 
high courts or lower federal courts strike down prospective-only repeals, 
abolition may lose a trusty and useful tool. 
While this Article cannot do justice to the weighty moral questions 
raised by prospective-only repeal, Part II offers some introductory thoughts 
on how prospective-only repeal, when viewed through the lens of sacrifice, 
may actually be moral. While it may be immoral to punish a person with 
death, it is not necessarily immoral to sacrifice them for the higher good of 
eliminating the death penalty forever. Many of Connecticut’s, New 
Mexico’s, and Maryland’s lawmakers voted for prospective-only repeal 
because they knew that a retroactive bill would not be passed. Rather than 
maintain the death penalty for all, these lawmakers voted for a bill that 
would maintain it for only some, thus transforming an immoral punishment 
into an arguably moral sacrifice. In dying, these convicted men destroy the 
death penalty. 
Part III, the heart of this Article, analyzes the legality of prospective-
only repeal, both as a matter of statutory construction and as a 
constitutional question under the Eighth Amendment. Because this issue is 
                                                                                                                     
of Rights, art. 17. Therefore, if Maryland’s legislature had wanted to abolish the death penalty 
retroactively for those sentenced to death, it likely could have done so by including an express 
provision saying as much. For further discussion of savings clauses, see infra Subsection III.A.1. 
 54.  Brian White, Maryland Governor Slow to Commute Death Sentences, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Sept. 13, 2013, 11:54 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/md-governor-slow-commute-death-
sentences. 
 55. See Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 4. 
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currently before the Connecticut Supreme Court and will undoubtedly 
come before other state supreme and federal courts, this Article discusses 
the issue in depth. A companion article, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II): The 
Fourteenth Amendment Case for Gradual Abolition of the Death Penalty, 
addresses the legality of prospective-only repeal under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.56 
This Article first argues that, as a matter of statutory construction, 
clearly prospective-only repeals of death penalty legislation are not given 
retroactive effect. When such repeals are silent or ambiguous as to whether 
they are prospective-only, most courts still construe them as being 
prospective-only by resorting to general savings statutes, which prohibit 
retroactive application of laws in the absence of contrary legislative intent. 
Next, this Article argues that prospective-only repeal is constitutional 
under the Eighth Amendment. Because the death penalty remains 
constitutional per se, the Eighth Amendment permits states to abolish the 
death penalty without clearing their death rows. Prospective-only repeal is 
also constitutional under the Eighth Amendment as applied. Under Atkins 
v. Virginia57 and its progeny, there is no national consensus against 
prospective-only repeal. The vast majority of legislatures have abolished 
prospective-only. Although some executives have commuted the sentences 
of those remaining on death row post-repeal, others have not. There simply 
is no national consensus against prospective-only repeal. Furthermore, 
those remaining on death row post-repeal share no unifying characteristic 
that diminishes their culpability or susceptibility to deterrence. Lastly, 
under Furman, the death sentences at issue are not “pregnant with 
discrimination”; they were imposed under a constitutional scheme and 
remain constitutional post-repeal.  
Prospective-only repeal is also consistent with policy considerations 
underlying the Eighth Amendment. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court 
has expressed reluctance to expand the death penalty. On the other hand, 
the Court’s dissenters have argued that the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
inquiry into evolving standards of decency is not a “ratchet” that forbids 
states from evolving in other directions—“giving effect to altered beliefs 
and responding to changed social conditions.”58 Prospective-only repeal 
does not upset either concern: it does not loosen the screw one iota, rather 
it allows states to turn the screw at their own pace. The effect of a ruling 
that prospective-only repeals are unconstitutional would be to require that 
states not only use a ratchet—in the sense that the screw must turn toward 
abolition, not away, but also ratchet with a zeal that outpaces the 
                                                                                                                     
 56. See Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II), supra note 1. 
 57.  536 U.S. 304, 349 (2002). 
 58. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 466 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Harmelin 
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990 (1991) (Scalia, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same). 
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ratcheter—in the sense that the screw must turn toward prospective and 
retroactive abolition. If prospective-only repeal is ruled prospective in 
name only, some states may decide not to abolish the death penalty at all, 
thereby fossilizing their standard of decency rather than allowing it to 
evolve. 
I.  THE UTILITY OF PROSPECTIVE-ONLY REPEAL 
A.  Prospective-Only Repeal’s Long History 
Prospective-only death penalty repeal is helpful to the cause of 
abolition. To understand why this is so, one need only look at the sixteen 
states that have abolished their death penalties by statute.59 With just three 
exceptions, every one of those states did so prospective-only, albeit not as 
explicitly as New Mexico, Connecticut, or Maryland.60 Prospective-only 
repeal is therefore not novel; it has been an effective tool of the abolition 
movement for over a hundred years.61 What is novel, however—at least in 
modern death penalty jurisprudence—is the refusal of governors and 
administrative boards to commute sentences in anticipation of, or 
immediately following, prospective-only repeal.62 
In the past five years, for example, four states have repealed their death 
penalties and all have done so through prospective-only legislation. In 
2011, the governor of Illinois commuted the sentences of those on death 
row immediately after repeal so the death penalty was effectively abolished 
completely.63 By contrast, in Maryland, where the death penalty was 
                                                                                                                     
 59. Eighteen states plus the District of Columbia have abolished the death penalty. States 
With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). Of 
those, Massachusetts, New York, and the District of Columbia have abolished their death penalties 
by court decision and legislative inaction. See Massachusetts, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/massachusetts-0 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014); New York, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-york-1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014); 
District of Columbia, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/district-
columbia (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 60. See supra notes 2–3 (discussing New Mexico, Connecticut, and Maryland); infra 
Subsection III.B.2.a.i (discussing three explicitly retroactive state statutes and three explicitly 
prospective-only state statutes, and arguing that the other ten state statutes are prospective-only); cf. 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342 n.1, 342–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing prospective-only statutes 
prohibiting execution of people with intellectual disabilities). 
 61. See In re Schneck, 96 P. 43, 44–45 (Kan. 1908) (holding that prospective-only death 
penalty repeal was not retroactive); accord State v. Lewis, 201 S.W. 80, 85–86 (Mo. 1918); 
Historians Brief, supra note 1, at 4 n.11 (noting that in Minnesota, which repealed its death penalty 
in 1911, Board of Pardons commuted death sentences of remaining death-row inmates, which 
would only have been necessary if the repeal was prospective-only). 
 62. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 63. An Act Concerning Criminal Law, Pub. Act 96-1543, 2010 Ill. Laws 7778 (2011), 
available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/96/PDF/096-1543.pdf; Illinois, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/illinois-1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
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abolished with a prospective-only act in 2013, five men remain on death 
row because the governor is unwilling to commute their sentences.64 
Likewise, the governor of New Mexico has been unwilling to commute the 
sentences of two inmates on death row after that state’s legislature 
abolished the death penalty by a prospective-only act in 2009.65 In 
Connecticut, where the death penalty was abolished with a prospective-
only act in 2012, eleven men remain on death row because the 
administrative board with the authority to commute their sentences has not 
done so.66 Kansas and Delaware are poised to become the nineteenth and 
twentieth states to abolish the death penalty. They will likely do so with 
prospective-only legislation; prospective-only death penalty repeal bills are 
pending in both states’ legislatures.67 If the Kansas legislature passes a 
prospective-only repeal, it will be up to the governor to decide whether to 
commute the sentences of Kansas’ ten death row prisoners or add those 
prisoners to the roll of inmates who remain on death row post-repeal.68 If 
the Delaware legislature passes a prospective-only repeal, an 
administrative board will decide whether to recommend commutation to 
the governor of the sentences of that state’s eighteen death row inmates; 
the governor is bound by that recommendation.69 
It is clear from these examples that prospective-only death penalty 
                                                                                                                     
 64. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Compare Press Release, The Office of Governor 
Martin O’Malley, Statement from Governor Martin O’Malley on Passage of Death Penalty Repeal 
in Maryland (Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://www.governor.maryland.gov/blog/?p=8492 
(noting that the governor will make case-by-case determinations for the five inmates on death row), 
with Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 4 (noting that there remain five inmates on death 
row). 
 65. See text accompanying notes 18–19. 
 66. See supra notes 2, 37–39 and accompanying text. 
 67. E.g., S. 239, 2013 Leg., 2013 Sess. (Kan. 2013), http://kslegislature.org/li/b2013_14/
measures/documents/sb126_00_0000.pdf (“(a) No person shall be sentenced to death for a crime 
committed on or after July 1, 2013. (b) Any person who is sentenced to death for a crime committed 
prior to July 1, 2013, may be put to death pursuant to the provisions of article 40 of chapter 22 of 
the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto.”); An Act to Amend Title 11 of the 
Delaware Code Relating to the Death Penalty, S. 19, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013), 
http://www.legis.delaware.gov/LIS/LIS147.NSF/vwLegislation/SB+19?Opendocument. Senate 
Amendment No. 1 modified the bill as originally proposed, removing the retroactive provision, 
making the bill prospective-only. S. Amendment 1 to S. 19, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2013), 
http://www.legis.delaware.gov/LIS/lis147.nsf/vwLegislation/SA+1+to+SB+19?opendocument; 
Senate Amendment No: 1 to Senate Bill No. 19, DELAWARE.GOV, http://www.legis.delaware.gov/
LIS/lis147.nsf/vwLegislation/SA+1+to+SB+19?opendocument (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (noting 
passage of the amendment). 
 68. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 250 n.8 (stating that, in Kansas, “the governor has 
sole authority to grant clemency”); Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 4 (noting ten death row 
inmates in Kansas). 
 69. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 251 n.11 (stating that, in Delaware, “the governor 
may grant clemency only after a recommendation by an administrative board”); Death Row Inmates 
by State, supra note 4 (noting eighteen death row inmates in Delaware). 
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repeal has momentum in states whose legislatures would rather leave the 
difficult decision of what to do about current death row inmates to the 
governor or pardon board. It also has momentum in states where the 
governor will not sign a repeal bill into law unless it is prospective-only. 
Given its enduring success, especially in recent years, prospective-only 
repeal is likely to be an attractive option for future states considering 
abolition, including: Colorado (with four inmates on death row); Kentucky 
(thirty-four on death row); Montana (two on death row); Nebraska (eleven 
on death row); New Hampshire (one on death row); Pennsylvania (a 
staggering 198 on death row); and South Dakota (three on death row).70 In 
Nebraska and Pennsylvania, the governor does not have the unilateral 
authority to commute death sentences after prospective-only repeal.71 In 
the remaining states from the list above—where the governor retains the 
authority to commute death sentences72—political pressure or other 
considerations may prevent the governor from doing so, as happened in 
New Mexico and Maryland. The past seven years have brought six states to 
the abolitionist camp.73 Odds are good that the next seven years will bring 
more, and that some will choose to keep their death rows intact.  
B.  Prospective-Only Repeal’s Uncertain Future 
In 2014, in State v. Santiago, the Connecticut Supreme Court will 
decide the issue of whether a state can completely abolish its death penalty 
going forward while maintaining its death row intact.74 If the court 
                                                                                                                     
 70. Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 4. Significantly, California’s 2012 ballot 
proposition abolishing the death penalty was both prospective and retroactive. SAFE California 
Act, § 10, 2012 Cal. Leg. Serv. Proposition 34, at 95, 100, available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/
2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-v2.pdf#nameddest=prop34 (“In order to best achieve the 
purpose of this act as stated in Section 3 and to achieve fairness, equality and uniformity in 
sentencing, this act shall be applied retroactively.”). Proposition 34 narrowly missed passing by a 
vote of 48.0% to 52.0%. Directory of California State Propositions, SMART VOTER (Dec. 17, 2012, 
13:48), http://www.smartvoter.org/2012/11/06/ca/state/prop. Had it passed, Proposition 34 would 
have reduced the sentences of California’s then-725 death row prisoners to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole. Prop 34. Death Penalty. Initiative Statute., CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE: 
OFFICIAL VOTER INFO. GUIDE, http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/34/analysis.htm (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2014). 
 71. Clemency Process by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency#process (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 72. Id. In some states, the governor may receive a nonbinding recommendation from a board 
or advisory group. Id. 
 73. These states are New York (2007), New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), Illinois 
(2011), Connecticut (2012), and Maryland (2013). States With and Without the Death Penalty, 
supra note 59. 
 74. See Brief Amicus Curiae for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Conn. at i., 
State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d 566 (Conn. Feb. 11, 2013) (No. SC17413), available at 
http://www.cjlf.org/briefs/SantiagoE.pdf (question presented); see also supra note 3 (discussing 
the New Mexico Supreme Court’s experience with prospective-only death penalty repeal in State v. 
Astorga). 
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challenge is successful, it will be a coup for the defendant in that case and 
possibly for Connecticut’s ten other death row inmates, whose sentences 
might therefore be reduced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole. It would also create strong persuasive precedent for the seven men 
who remain on death row in Maryland and New Mexico to use in similar 
appeals. 
While abolitionists would no doubt warmly receive these ripple effects, 
there could be other less desirable effects. Reverberations from the court’s 
ruling would be felt, not only on death row but also in the legislature, 
particularly among abolition’s foes. If these opponents challenged 
abolitionists on the legal merits of prospective-only repeal, as they did in 
Connecticut,75 abolitionists may have little to say beyond, “Connecticut’s 
court got it wrong.” Legislatures might therefore be less willing to pass 
prospective-only repeals, and governors might be less likely to sign them, 
if these repeals become “prospective” in name only.76 A federal court 
decision striking down prospective-only repeal would have a similar 
impact, in effect requiring that states repeal retroactively or not at all.77 In 
short, while the invalidation of prospective-only death penalty repeal 
would be good for at least some of the eighteen inmates currently on death 
row post-repeal, it may be bad for the abolition movement.78 It may 
                                                                                                                     
 75. See 2012 H. Sess. Transcript, supra note 28 (statement of Rep. Labriola) (“To the notion 
that somehow this bill will be prospective in nature, I do believe that that is a complete and utter 
falsehood. . . . [B]y operation of law the people who are now sentenced to death on our death row in 
Connecticut, their death penalties will be commuted to life in prison without parole, without 
question. It’s—it’s a certainty.”); id. (statement of Rep. Hewett) (“[F]or the members who are 
voting for a prospective bill so they can make sure that Hayes and Komisarjevsky get the death 
penalty, it’s not going to happen.”); 2012 S. Sess. Transcript, supra note 33 (statement of Sen. 
Kissel) (“[I]f matters of life and death come before a Supreme Court and a prospective repeal of the 
death penalty is the law of the land in our state, I really can’t imagine for a second that they would 
allow the execution of the 11 folks on death row while acknowledging that under any legal analysis, 
this law is the best and most recent indication of evolving standards in our society of human 
decency.”). 
 76.  Cf. Millard H. Ruud, The Savings Clause:  Some Problems in Construction and Drafting, 
33 TEX. L. REV. 285, 286, 310 (1955) (stating that statutory language that leaves in place existing 
penalties “make[s] the transition from one set of laws to another less painful and disrupting” and 
“may be used to create a favorable climate for a bill by assuring legislators that the change proposed 
will take effect with the minimum disruption of existing expectations and liabilities”). 
 77. Cf. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (stating 
that, in the context of state parole legislation, “[o]ur system of federalism encourages . . . state 
experimentation. If parole determinations are encumbered by procedures that states regard as 
burdensome and unwarranted, they may abandon or curtail parole.”). 
 78. Courts’ rejection of prospective-only repeal might be bad for the abolition movement for 
another reason. If a court were to declare prospective-only language unconstitutional, the court may 
decide that such language is not severable from the remainder of the repeal statute. In that case, “the 
only remedy available to th[e] Court is to strike down the entire statute, which would have the effect 
of reinstating the [death penalty].” NM’s January 2011 Response, supra note 3, at 32; see also 
Supplemental Brief of the State of Conn.—Appellee at 41, State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d 566 (Conn. 
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undermine a strategy that has worked well in recent years—that of gradual 
abolition. 
Some abolitionists might say good riddance to the strategy of gradual 
abolition, pointing to its cost in human lives. It is not enough that no more 
should die; none should die. But this purist position assumes that those on 
death row will be executed. The reality is, in many cases, those on death 
row will not be executed. They will challenge their sentences, and continue 
challenging them, until either they die of old age, or the Supreme Court 
declares the death penalty unconstitutional per se. In sum, gradual abolition 
may be a win-win: lawmakers retain their death rows and (many of) those 
on death row retain their lives. 
Others might argue that prospective-only repeal will ultimately 
backfire. When it comes time for the U.S. Supreme Court to revisit the 
question of whether there is a national consensus against the death penalty, 
the argument goes, it will discount those states that have abolished the 
death penalty prospective-only. In other words, states like New Mexico, 
Connecticut, and Maryland will not be counted as having abolished the 
death penalty. The response to this concern is straightforward: the Court’s 
precedent suggests otherwise.79 Although the Court’s dissenters care 
whether the death penalty repeal is prospective-only or complete, the 
majority does not.  
In Atkins, for example, the Court determined that a consensus of states 
objected to the execution of people with intellectual disabilities, 
notwithstanding the fact that eleven of the states that abolished the death 
penalty for people with intellectual disabilities did so prospective-only.80 
Although Justice Scalia believed that prospective-only repeal was far 
different than complete repeal because it prohibited some but not all 
executions, the majority did not share his concerns.81 As Atkins makes 
clear, consensus has to do with whether a state abolishes, not how. States 
                                                                                                                     
Jan. 11, 2013) (No. SC17413) [hereinafter CT’s January 2013 Response] (“[I]f this Court strikes 
[the death penalty repeal statute] in its entirety, [the prior statute] would be revived, thereby 
restoring capital punishment as it existed before the passage of the [repeal statute].”). 
 79. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–15 (2002). 
 80. See id. at 315–16 (discussing the “large number of States prohibiting the execution of 
mentally retarded persons”). 
 81. Compare id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Eleven of those [states] that the Court counts 
enacted statutes prohibiting execution of mentally retarded defendants convicted after, or convicted 
of crimes committed after, the effective date of the legislation; those already on death row, or 
consigned there before the statute’s effective date, or even (in those States using the date of the 
crime as the criterion of retroactivity) tried in the future for murders committed many years ago, 
could be put to death. That is not a statement of absolute moral repugnance, but one of current 
preference between two tolerable approaches.” (footnote omitted)), with id. at 315 (majority 
opinion) (compiling state statutes prohibiting death penalty for “mentally retarded”), and Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,  564–65 (2005) (“When Atkins was decided, 30 States prohibited the death 
penalty for the mentally retarded. This number comprised 12 that had abandoned the death penalty 
altogether, and 18 that maintained it but excluded the mentally retarded from its reach.”). 
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that have repealed prospective-only are not at odds with those that have 
repealed prospectively and retroactively; they are two sides of the same 
coin, sharing an underlying opposition to the death penalty. States with 
prospective-only repeal statutes are evolving, one might say. For a variety 
of moral and pragmatic reasons, however, they are just evolving more 
slowly. So far as the Court is concerned, though, prospective-only repeal is 
still repeal; it is part of the evolution away from the death penalty.82 
II.  THE MORALITY OF PROSPECTIVE-ONLY REPEAL 
Even assuming that prospective-only repeal is helpful to abolition’s 
cause, one might reasonably ask how it is moral. How is it right for New 
Mexico’s, Connecticut’s, and Maryland’s legislatures to leave eighteen men 
convicted of murder on day one on death row, while eliminating the death 
penalty for those who commit murder on day two?83 While it is not the 
purpose of this Article to plumb the depths of this difficult issue, some 
introductory thoughts are instructive. 
The moral debate over the death penalty is straightforward. Death 
penalty abolitionists believe that the death penalty is an immoral form of 
punishment, while those in favor of retaining the death penalty take the 
opposite position.84 When debate focuses on prospective-only repeal of the 
death penalty, however, the debate gets trickier. Dr. Martin Luther King 
Jr.’s words, which he wrote from a jail cell in Birmingham, are illustrative 
of this debate: “[T]he means we use must be as pure as the ends we 
seek . . . . [I]t is wrong to use immoral means to attain moral ends.”85 
Abolitionists grudgingly accept maintaining the death penalty for those on 
death row as a necessary evil, a side effect of achieving the greater good—
abolition going forward.86 Prospective-only repeal is undesirable, these 
                                                                                                                     
 82. See id. at 315 (majority opinion). As Justice Scalia wrote of the Court’s death penalty 
jurisprudence, “It is just a game, after all.” Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He may be right. But it 
is a game with the highest stakes, one abolitionists must play—and win. Prospective-only repeal 
helps. 
 83. See, e.g., 2012 H. Sess. Transcript, supra note 28 (statement of Rep. Cafero) (“How could 
we say it is no longer the policy of the State of Connecticut to take a life, yet, we are allowing a life 
to be taken? So it’s in conflict.”). 
 84.  See generally CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 8–13 (discussing debate over deterrence 
and retribution in the context of the death penalty). 
 85. Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), available at 
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html. 
 86. 2012 H. Sess. Transcript, supra note 28 (statement of Rep. Holder-Winfield) (“[T]here is 
nothing wrong with being opposed to the State executing people and saying if I can’t get the State 
to stop executing people that are already on death row, at least, that I can stop the State from 
executing people that maybe [sic] on death row in the future. There’s nothing wrong with that. It 
makes perfect sense. It’s logical. What is illogical is to say to a person who is opposed to the death 
penalty, you have the chance to stop the State from moving forward, but because you can’t stop the 
State from dealing with those who it has already put through its system, you do nothing.”); see also 
Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (last updated Sept. 7, 
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abolitionists say, but not immoral. For retentionists, this position is 
disingenuous. Reserving the death penalty for those currently on death row, 
retentionists say, is not a mere side effect; it is an immoral means of 
achieving (what abolitionists believe to be) a moral end.87 According to 
retentionists, if the death penalty is immoral, then retaining it through 
prospective-only repeal is also immoral. 
As Dr. King’s words suggest, the moral debate over prospective-only 
repeal sets undesirable side effects against immoral means. But peace can 
be made between these two sides. Prospective-only repeal is a means, and 
it is also a moral one.  
The death penalty is, as its name suggests, a form of punishment. It is a 
means by which the State condemns the acts of the offender—retribution—
and discourages others from committing similar acts in the future—
deterrence. Through punishment, the State restores balance to the 
community by making up for what the offender has taken away.88 In the 
context of prospective-only repeal, however, the death penalty is not only a 
means of punishment; it is also a means of ending a punishment. It is not 
just a means of restoring what the community has lost. Rather, it also 
becomes a means of making the community better than it was before. In 
Connecticut, for example, many legislators wanted to repeal the death 
penalty completely, but they knew that this was not politically feasible. 
                                                                                                                     
2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect (“The doctrine (or principle) of double effect 
is often invoked to explain the permissibility of an action that causes a serious harm, such as the 
death of a human being, as a side effect of promoting some good end. It is claimed that sometimes it 
is permissible to cause such a harm as a side effect (or ‘double effect’) of bringing about a good 
result even though it would not be permissible to cause such a harm as a means to bringing about 
the same good end. This reasoning is summarized with the claim that sometimes it is permissible to 
bring about as a merely foreseen side effect a harmful event that it would be impermissible to bring 
about intentionally.”); cf. Evangelium Vitae from Pope John Paul II para. 73 (Mar. 25, 1995), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html (“[W]hen it is not possible to overturn or completely 
abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, whose absolute personal opposition to procured 
abortion was well known, could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a 
law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality. 
This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate and 
proper attempt to limit its evil aspects.” (emphasis added)).  
 87. E.g., 2012 S. Sess. Transcript, supra note 33 (statement of Sen. Suzio) (“If you’re going 
to say that taking human life in the form of a legal execution is wrong going forward, then it’s 
wrong going backwards. . . . If you can support the execution of the Petit family killers for what 
they did five years ago, why couldn’t you support it if it should occur two years from now or three 
years from now or 20 years from now? It strikes me as an ungravely inconsistent moral position to 
take. . . . No matter what good you want to do in life, you can’t achieve that good using morally 
illicit means. I bring that up because I suspect that one reason why there’s this big gaping . . . moral 
hole in this law is because of the political consequences of making it an absolute both prospectively, 
as well as retrospectively.”). 
 88. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (stating that retribution is, among other 
things, “an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim”). 
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Because many of their colleagues believed that the death penalty was an 
appropriate punishment, at least with respect to the eleven men currently 
on death row, a retroactive repeal bill simply did not have sufficient 
support.89 Rather than allow death penalty repeal to fail, many legislators 
who supported retroactive repeal settled for prospective-only repeal 
instead. These legislators did not support prospective-only repeal for the 
purpose of retribution or deterrence; rather, they did so for the purpose of 
eliminating the death penalty in Connecticut. This is a significant 
distinction. 
When legislators change the purpose for which the death penalty exists 
(in this case from punishing offenders to abolishing the death penalty), they 
may also change the morality of the means.90 Imposing death on some so 
that no others will ever be put to death is not punishment—it is sacrifice. It 
does not restore community by redressing an offender’s wrong; it improves 
community by eliminating an unjust punishment for future offenders. In 
this view, the eleven men on Connecticut’s death row are not being 
punished; they are being sacrificed. 
Of course, sacrifice, like punishment, is not always moral. As I 
previously observed: 
[w]hen we talk about sacrifice, we often think of those 
who willingly offer themselves up for a higher good like God 
or country. This is the stuff of heroes and martyrs and, for 
many, it is to be celebrated. 
Being sacrificed, on the other hand, has a very different 
connotation. It’s not about those who choose their fate, but 
those whose fate is chosen for them. They are lambs, plucked 
from the field and thrown onto the altar for some higher good. 
This bothers us—and it should. Who among us has the right 
to decide the fate of innocent others for some purported good? 
                                                                                                                     
 89. See also CT’s January 2013 Response, supra note 78, at 19 & n.14 (“[N]ot everyone [in 
the Connecticut legislature] who voted for prospective repeal is morally opposed to capital 
punishment.” (citing legislative history)). Compare 2012 H. Sess. Transcript, supra note 28 
(statement of Rep. Holder-Winfield) (“[I]n 2009 when I attempted to completely abolish the death 
penalty, I came to the realization that the only way to move forward was with the bill that was 
prospective.”), with 2012 S. Sess. Transcript, supra note 33 (statement of Sen. Kissel) (“You 
guys . . . support the death penalty prospectively only, because the votes aren’t there to do it across 
the board . . . .”).  
 90. But cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU Foundation of Conn. in Support of the 
Supplemental Brief of the Defendant with Attached Appendix at 8, State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d 566 
(Conn. Dec. 3, 2012) (No. SC17413) [hereinafter ACLU-CT Brief], available at 
http://ctbriefsonline.com/Briefs/SC17413ac3.pdf (“By repealing the death penalty prospectively, the 
General Assembly has, in effect, sacrificed Santiago to end the death penalty for everyone. As 
Justice Marshall stated in Furman, the Constitution does not permit legislatures to make ‘sacrificial 
lambs’ of its citizenry. Fundamental fairness prohibits it.” (emphasis added)). 
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This is the stuff of genocide and is to be avoided at all costs.91 
While it is exceedingly difficult to imagine circumstances in which 
sacrificing others is morally defensible, prospective-only repeal may 
present such a circumstance. “The [eleven] men on [Connecticut’s] death 
row are no martyrs, nor are they innocents plucked from the field.”92 And 
because they are already sentenced to death, the legislature’s failure to 
intervene leaves them no worse off than before. “In these [eleven] men, 
Connecticut’s legislature saw an opportunity to do something” for the 
higher good.93  
The legislature has, in effect, taken these 11 men from the 
death chamber and walked them to the altar. It has 
transformed their punishment into an act of sacrifice. From 
wolves, lambs. Yes, these 11 men remain on death row, but 
now they die for something; they die so that others will not be 
put to death. 
This is the uneasy morality of gradual abolition. Dying, 
these men destroy our death penalty.94 
Punishing a person for committing murder on day one but not on day two 
may well be morally incoherent. But gradual abolition is not only about 
punishment; it is also about sacrifice. While it may be immoral to punish 
eleven men with death post-repeal, it may not necessarily be immoral to 
sacrifice them for the sake of ending the death penalty.95 Prospective-only 
repeal may transform an immoral punishment into a moral sacrifice.96 
                                                                                                                     
 91. Kevin Barry, Are Death Row Inmates Sacrificial Lambs?, HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 9, 
2012), http://articles.courant.com/2012-11-09/news/hc-op-barry-are-death-row-inmates-sacrifical-
lambs-20121109_1_death-row-death-penalty-abolition; see also C.D. BROAD, BROAD’S CRITICAL 
ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 278 (1971) (“[C]ommon-sense holds that it may be right and 
praiseworthy for a person voluntarily to make sacrifices which it would be wrong for anyone else to 
impose on him.”). 
 92. Barry, supra note 91. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. BROAD, supra note 91, at 275, 277 (discussing “the sacrifices which a person may 
legitimately impose on others,” and stating that “it does not follow that, when one has taken 
account of the features which distinguish a person from a brute or an inanimate thing, and has 
endeavored to give weight to them, it is never right to treat him in certain respects as if he were one 
or the other. It is not clear, e.g., that it is never right to compel a person to do what he believes to be 
wrong . . . For, although he is a person, he is not the only one . . . .”). As distasteful as this line of 
moral reasoning may be, it may serve the cause of abolition in the end by revealing what Professor 
Austin Sarat has called the “sadism that is at the heart of the state’s tenacious attachment to capital 
punishment” and by “invit[ing] the ‘bad taste’” of the public. AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE 
KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION 208 (2001). 
 96. One might reasonably argue that Connecticut’s prospective-only repeal did not sacrifice 
eleven men to end the death penalty—it sacrificed nine men out of a desire for retribution against 
Joshua Komisarjevsky and Steven Hayes. Likewise, the argument goes, New Mexico’s prospective-
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III.  THE LEGALITY OF PROSPECTIVE-ONLY REPEAL 
Having briefly touched on the utility and morality of prospective-only 
death penalty repeal, Part III turns in depth to the legality of prospective-
only death penalty repeal. Section A analyzes prospective-only death 
penalty repeal in the context of statutory construction, and Section B turns 
to the Eighth Amendment question raised by prospective-only repeal.97 
A.  Clearly Prospective-Only Death Penalty Repeals Are Not Given 
Retroactive Effect 
1.  Retroactivity Basics 
Rules of statutory construction require that courts give effect to the 
                                                                                                                     
only repeal did not sacrifice two men to end the death penalty—it sacrificed them out of a desire for 
retribution against Michael Astorga. But for Komisarjevsky, Hayes, and Astorga, one might argue, 
Connecticut and New Mexico might have repealed their death penalties retroactively. These 
arguments have merit. To the extent that some legislators were motivated by these retributive 
purposes, their sacrifice was not a moral one. 
 97. Before analyzing the legality of prospective-only repeal, an important distinction should 
be made between the retroactivity of statutes (statutory retroactivity), which is squarely at issue in 
the context of prospective-only repeal, and the retroactivity of judicial decisions interpreting the 
constitutionality of those statutes (judicial retroactivity), which is not. The retroactivity of a new 
capital sentencing statute is controlled by rules of statutory construction and by courts’ 
interpretation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. It is therefore different from the 
retroactivity of a new constitutional ruling by a court, which is controlled by judicial precedent, 
namely, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). In 1989, in Teague, the Supreme Court held that 
“new constitutional rules of criminal procedure” declared by the court, while applicable to cases 
pending on direct review, “will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the 
new rules are announced,” unless one of two exceptions applies. Id. at 310. According to the Court, 
a new rule should be applied retroactively “if it places ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual 
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe’” or “if it requires the 
observance of ‘those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Id. at 307 
(alteration in original) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692–93 (1971)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Just four months later, in Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court confirmed that 
Teague’s non-retroactivity analysis applies to capital sentencing proceedings, but held that court 
decisions prohibiting the execution of certain classes of prisoners (such as those with intellectual 
disabilities) would nevertheless be retroactive because they fell within the first Teague exception. 
See 492 U.S. 302, 329–30 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002). 
In sum, Teague has to do with judicial retroactivity, which means that if a court were to find a 
prospective-only death penalty repeal statute unconstitutional, “evenhanded justice” would require 
“that it be applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 300. The fact 
that such a ruling would be retroactive under Teague, however, has nothing to do with whether a 
statute will be given retroactive effect. That is an issue of statutory retroactivity which, as set forth 
in this Part, implicates rules of statutory construction and courts’ interpretation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Teague is simply not relevant to this determination. For a helpful 
discussion of Teague’s non-retroactivity analysis, see generally Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on 
Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the 
Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161 (2005). 
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plain language of a statute, provided that it does not lead to absurd 
results.98 Therefore, as a matter of statutory construction, courts are duty-
bound to prohibit retroactive application of laws that are unambiguously 
prospective-only, and to give retroactive effect to laws that are 
unambiguously retroactive.99 Accordingly, many statutes contain a so-
called savings clause that explicitly provides that the statute applies only to 
conduct committed, or to convictions or sentences that occur, on or after a 
date certain.100 Other statutes explicitly state the opposite—that the statute 
applies “irrespective of whether the crime was committed, the conviction 
had, or the sentence imposed, before or after” a date certain.101 
Importantly, courts’ obligation to give retroactive effect to 
unambiguously retroactive laws is subject to an important caveat: 
retroactive legislation typically does not apply to final judgments.102 
According to the Supreme Court, “Congress can always revise the 
judgments of Article III courts in one sense: When a new law makes clear 
that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply that law in reviewing 
judgments still on appeal that were rendered before the law was enacted, 
and must alter the outcome accordingly.”103 Once “all appeals have been 
forgone or completed,” however, “[i]t is the obligation of the last court in 
the hierarchy that rules on the case to give effect to Congress's latest 
                                                                                                                     
 98. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1989) (“[W]here . . . the 
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its 
terms. . . . except in the rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters. In such cases, the intention of the drafters, 
rather than the strict language, controls.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 487 (1917); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 
564, 571 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 99. See id.; e.g., Meade v. Comm’r of Corr., 920 A.2d 301, 304 (Conn. 2007) (“When 
considering the retroactivity of a penal statute, ‘[i]t is axiomatic that, [w]hether to apply a statute 
retroactively or prospectively depends upon the intent of the legislature.’” (alterations in original) 
(quoting State v. Skakel, 888 A.2d 985, 1020 (Conn. 2006))). The retroactivity of a penal statute is, 
of course, subject to the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. See infra note 219. 
 100. See, e.g., supra notes 2–3 (discussing Connecticut and New Mexico death penalty repeal 
statutes); supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing a Kansas death penalty repeal bill). 
 101. Act of Mar. 12, 1965, ch. 40, 1965 W. Va. Acts 202, 207; see infra note 270 and 
accompanying text (discussing West Virginia and North Dakota death penalty repeal statutes); cf. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.06(E) (West, Westlaw through 2013 File 47 of the 130th Gen. 
Assemb.) (“This section [making capital offenders eligible for a death sentence on 
resentencing] . . . shall apply equally to all such offenders sentenced to death prior to, on, or after 
March 23, 2005, including offenders who, on March 23, 2005, are challenging their sentence of 
death and offenders whose sentence of death has been set aside, nullified, or vacated by any court of 
this state or any federal court but who, as of March 23, 2005, have not yet been resentenced.”); 
State v. White, 972 N.E.2d 534, 543 (2012) (concluding that “[b]y enacting [§ 2929.06(E)], the 
General Assembly has clearly expressed its intent that [the statute making capital offenders eligible 
for a death sentence on resentencing] apply retroactively”). 
 102.  See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 103.  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 226 (1995). 
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enactment . . . . Having achieved finality, . . . a judicial decision becomes 
the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or 
controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that 
the law applicable to that very case was something other than what the 
courts said it was.”104 Doing so, the Court held, violates “[t]he 
Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial powers.”105 
In the criminal context, this means that ameliorative legislation—that is, 
legislation that is less onerous than prior law—is typically not held to apply 
retroactively to final sentences.106 Debate over the retroactivity of criminal 
                                                                                                                     
 104.  Id. at 226–27. 
 105.  Id. at 240 (“We know of no previous instance in which Congress has enacted retroactive 
legislation requiring an Article III court to set aside a final judgment, and for good reason. The 
Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial powers denies it the authority to do so.”). 
 106.  See Harold J. Krent, Retroactivity and Crack Sentencing Reform, 47 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 53, 74 (2013) (discussing federal and state courts’ reluctance to apply legislation 
retroactively to final sentences, noting separation of powers concerns under both Article III 
(usurping judicial authority) and Article II (usurping executive’s pardon authority)); id. at 74 & 
n.148 (discussing federal and state legislature’s reluctance to pass legislation altering final 
sentences); S. David Mitchell, In with the New, Out with the Old: Explaining the Scope of 
Retroactive Amelioration, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 28–29 (2009) (stating that courts’ and legislatures’ 
“current practice of retroactive amelioration is inadequate because an entire class of defendants, 
namely post-final judgment defendants, is barred from benefiting from the ameliorative sentencing 
changes”); Comment, supra note 15, at 145 (“[A]meliorative legislation has never been held to 
apply to finalized convictions. It is well-settled that a legislative change will not arrest or interfere 
with execution of sentence.”), cited in Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 660 (1974); id. (noting 
finality and separation-of-powers concerns); see also Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 
2330 (2012) (holding that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced sentences of crack offenders 
whose sentences became final after—but not before—enactment of FSA); Loving v. United States, 
517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (“Congress may not revise judicial determinations by retroactive 
legislation reopening judgments.” (citing Plaut, 514 U.S. at 225–26)); United States v. Blewett, 
Nos. 12-5226, 12-5582, 2013 WL 6231727, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013) (“Consistent with a 142–
year–old congressional presumption against applying reductions in criminal penalties to those 
already sentenced, consistent with the views of all nine Justices and all of the litigants in Dorsey v. 
United States, consistent with the decisions of every other court of appeals in the country, and 
consistent with dozens of our own decisions, we hold that the [Fair Sentencing] Act does not 
retroactively undo final sentences.” (citations omitted)). 
Despite the weight of authority against ameliorative legislation’s application to final 
judgments, significant questions remain regarding whether such legislation violates separation-of-
powers principles. Although an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, some 
introductory thoughts are instructive. First, the Plaut majority’s central premise—that Congress has 
no authority to reopen final judgments—was highly contested. Three justices, one concurring and 
two dissenting, argued that Congress does have that authority. Compare Plaut, 514 U.S. at 240 
(stating that “Constitution's separation of legislative and judicial powers denies it the authority” to 
“enact[] retroactive legislation requiring an Article III court to set aside a final judgment”), with id. 
241–42 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[A]t least sometimes Congress lacks the power under Article I to 
reopen an otherwise closed court judgment.”), and id. at 247 (Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) 
(“Throughout our history, Congress has passed laws that allow courts to reopen final judgments.”).  
Indeed, in Dorsey, the Supreme Court implied this authority in dictum, stating that 
“disparities . . . will exist whenever Congress enacts a new law changing sentences (unless 
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statutes instead tends to focus on cases involving those who committed 
criminal acts before the effective date of the ameliorative legislation but 
were not convicted or sentenced, or did not exhaust their direct appeals, 
until after the effective date of the legislation.107 
This issue of finality aside, some further complexity arises when the 
statute is silent or otherwise ambiguous as to whether it is retroactive or 
prospective-only. Where an ambiguous statute is more onerous than 
existing law, “impos[ing] new burdens on persons after the fact,” there is a 
                                                                                                                     
Congress intends re-opening sentencing proceedings concluded prior to a new law's effective 
date).” 132 S. Ct. at 2335. Likewise, in Blewett, the Sixth Circuit joined “[e]very other federal court 
of appeals” in holding that the Fair Sentencing Act “does not apply to individuals sentenced before 
its effective date,” but strongly implied that Congress could have made the Act retroactive to 
offenders already sentenced if it had wanted to. Compare Blewett, 2013 WL at *1 (holding that the 
Fair Sentencing Act “does not retroactively undo final sentences”), with id. at *2 (stating that “[t]he 
Fair Sentencing Act nowhere provides that it covers offenders sentenced before it became effective. 
Nor do the Act's clear implications show a desire to apply the new law to offenders already 
sentenced”), and id. at *13 (“Congress should think seriously about making the new minimums 
retroactive. . . . Any request for a sentence reduction must be addressed to a higher tribunal (the 
Supreme Court) or to a different forum altogether (the Congress and the President).”). Blewett’s 
dissenting opinions also assume Congress’s authority to apply the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively 
to final sentences. See, e.g., id. at *41 (White, J., dissenting)  (“[T]he scheme set up by Congress 
contemplates not only that finality is not sacrosanct, but that consideration whether a change should 
be available for application to offenders already under sentence should be a part of the very process 
of making changes, and the determination left to the Commission's sound discretion.”); see also 
Krent, supra, at 73–77 (distinguishing Plaut and arguing that separation-of-powers principles do 
not prevent Congress from applying ameliorative legislation to final sentences). 
Second, Plaut’s holding was narrow. Plaut involved “retroactive legislation requiring an 
Article III court to set aside a final judgment”; if the retroactive legislation had required the court to 
review the judgment but had given the court discretion to set it aside, Plaut might have gone the 
other way. Id. at 240 (emphasis added); see id. at 231–32 (stating that a retroactive legislative 
change “subject to the control of the courts themselves would obviously raise no issue of separation 
of powers”). The Smarter Sentencing Act now pending in Congress is a case in point. That 
legislation would allow certain inmates sentenced before the effective date of the Fair Sentencing 
Act to petition for sentence reductions consistent with the Fair Sentencing Act, and would give 
courts the discretion to impose a reduced sentence. See Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, S. 1410, 
113th Cong. § 3(b), available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1410/text (“A court 
that imposed a sentence for a covered offense, may, on motion of the defendant, the Director of the 
Bureau of Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or the court, impose a reduced sentence as if 
sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense 
was committed.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see also Durbin and Lee Introduce Smarter 
Sentencing Act, U.S. SENATE (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.durbin.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=be68ad86-a0a4-4486-853f-f8ef7b99e736. 
Finally, and of particular importance to this Article, separation-of-powers principles have not 
stopped several state legislatures from passing legislation that retroactively repealed the death 
penalty in all cases—final and not final. See infra note 270 (discussing North Dakota, West 
Virginia, and New Jersey repeals); cf. Krent, supra, at 74–77 (arguing that Congress has passed 
noncapital legislation that retroactively altered final judgments). 
 107.  See infra Subsection III.A.2 (discussing retroactivity in non-final cases). 
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“presumption against statutory retroactivity.”108 The statute will be given 
only prospective effect because imposing new burdens after the fact is 
“unfair[].”109 Indeed, in the criminal context, “[i]f the new legislation 
increase[s] the punishment for the same crime, or ma[kes] previously 
lawful activity unlawful, the ex post facto clause preclude[s] prosecution 
under the new statute of offenses committed before the statute’s effective 
date.”110 
Where the ambiguous statute is more lenient than existing law, 
removing a burden “by repealing a penal provision (whether criminal or 
civil),” the common law deemed such a repeal to be retroactive as to 
judgments that were not yet final.111 In 1871, Congress abolished this 
presumption through passage of a general savings statute, which provides 
that “a new criminal statute that ‘repeal[s]’ an older criminal statute shall 
not change the penalties ‘incurred’ under that older statute ‘unless the 
repealing Act shall so expressly provide.’. . . Penalties are ‘incurred’ under 
the older statute when an offender becomes subject to them, i.e., commits 
the underlying conduct that makes the offender liable.”112 In other words, 
under the federal general savings statute, ameliorative federal legislation is 
not considered to be retroactive absent explicit language to the contrary or 
some other “indicia of congressional intent.”113 In the absence of such 
                                                                                                                     
 108.  Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994). 
 109. Id.   
 110. Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Dobbert v. Florida, 
432 U.S. 282, 294 (1977) (“It is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous 
than the prior law.”). For further discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause, see infra note 219. 
 111. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270–71. This is known as the doctrine of abatement. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated in Bradley v. United States, “At common law, the repeal of a criminal statute 
abated all prosecutions which had not reached final disposition”—i.e., the imposition of a 
sentence—“in the highest court authorized to review them.” 410 U.S. 605, 607 (1973). To avoid 
such results, legislatures frequently indicated an intention not to abate pending prosecutions by 
including in the repealing statute a specific clause stating that prosecutions of offenses under the 
repealed statute were not to be abated.”  Id. at 609–10; see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 
230, 232 (1964) (reciting the “universal common-law rule that when the legislature repeals a 
criminal statute or otherwise removes the State's condemnation from conduct that was formerly 
deemed criminal, this action requires the dismissal of a pending criminal proceeding charging such 
conduct. The rule applies to any such proceeding which, at the time of the supervening legislation, 
has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it. . . . In the present 
case the judgment is not yet final, for it is on direct review in this Court.”); Holiday, 683 A.2d at 66 
(“At common law, [repeals of criminal statutes] applied retroactively, abating every prosecution 
which had not yet resulted in final conviction (including appeal to the highest reviewing court)—
unless a special provision had been enacted to save prosecutions under the repealed statute.”). 
 112. See Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting 
1 U.S.C. § 109). 
 113.  Id. at 2332. “[B]ecause statutes enacted by one Congress cannot bind a later Congress, 
which remains free to repeal the earlier statute, to exempt the current statute from the earlier statute, 
to modify the earlier statute, or to apply the earlier statute but as modified,” the Supreme Court has 
long held that the general savings statute “creates what is in effect a less demanding interpretive 
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language or intent, ameliorative federal legislation does not apply to those 
who commit their crimes prior to the effective date of the statute—even if 
they are not convicted or sentenced, or if the sentence does not become 
final, until after the effective date of the statute.114 Most states have passed 
similar general savings statutes.115  
Although federal courts have overwhelmingly applied the federal 
general savings statute to prohibit retroactive application of ameliorative 
legislation, a minority of state supreme courts have disregarded their own 
savings statutes and given such ameliorative legislation retroactive 
effect.116 Other state supreme courts have given retroactive effect to 
ameliorative legislation pursuant to ameliorative amendments to their 
savings statutes, which permit individuals to benefit from subsequent 
ameliorative changes to the law.117 Importantly, as noted above, even when 
state supreme courts have given retroactive effect to ameliorative 
legislation—whether by disregarding their state savings statutes or by 
                                                                                                                     
requirement.” Id. at 2331. The result is a general savings statute with moderate bite: it “set[s] forth 
an important background principle of interpretation,” but Congress remains free to disregard it 
“either expressly or by implication as it chooses.” Id. at 2331–32; see id. at 2340 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (stating that where repeal is not explicit, “the implication from the subsequently enacted 
statute must be clear enough to overcome our strong presumption against implied repeals”). 
 114.  United States v. Blewett, Nos. 12-5226, 12-5582, 2013 WL 6231727, at *8 (6th Cir. Dec. 
3, 2013) (stating that, “by default under the [federal] savings statute,” ameliorative statutory change 
“would not have applied to people who offended before the statute’s effective date, even those 
sentenced after the effective date”) (emphasis added); see also Holiday, 683 A.2d at 72–74 
(rejecting argument that federal general savings statute “is limited to preserving sentences already 
imposed”). But cf. Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2335 (stating that, in non-capital cases involving 
application of federal sentencing guidelines, “the ordinary practice is to apply new penalties to 
defendants not yet sentenced, while withholding that change from defendants already sentenced”). 
 115. Mitchell, supra note 106, at 8 n.48, 20, 47–51 (compiling state savings statutes); id. at 
47–51 (listing four state constitutions that contain savings provisions). The Holiday court 
explained, 
As a way of preventing abatements of criminal prosecutions and other 
liabilities when legislatures failed to provide special savings clauses in the 
repealing legislation, state legislatures began in the last century to adopt general 
savings statutes applicable thereafter to all repeals, amendments, and reenactments 
of criminal and civil liabilities. For criminal prosecutions, therefore, these statutes 
shifted the legislative presumption from one of abatement unless otherwise 
specified to one of non-abatement in the absence of contrary legislative direction. 
683 A.2d at 66 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 116.  Mitchell, supra note 106, at 29. State courts have justified their disregard of general 
savings statutes for a number of reasons, including that the general savings statute is itself 
ambiguous; that following the general savings statute would be inconsistent with legislative intent; 
and that general savings statutes prohibit the retroactive application of more onerous laws but not 
ameliorative ones. Id. at 29–32. 
 117.  Id. (compiling state savings statutes, ten of which contain exceptions allowing retroactive 
application of ameliorative legislation in cases that are not final); see also Comment, supra note 15, 
at 129 & nn.66–69 (1972) (compiling ameliorative amendments). 
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following ameliorative amendments to those statutes—they have stopped 
short of disturbing final sentences.118 These courts appear willing to give 
retroactive effect to ameliorative legislation only in cases that have not 
resulted in a final judgment.119 
The upshot is that, generally speaking, “legislation, especially of the 
criminal sort, is not to be applied retroactively.”120 Federal courts and a 
majority of state courts hold that, absent some express intent of the 
legislature to the contrary, “ameliorative criminal sentencing laws 
repealing harsher ones in force at the time of the commission of an 
offense” are not given retroactive effect.121 This is consistent with the 
                                                                                                                     
 118.  Compare Comment, supra note 15, at 133 (discussing court’s disregard of savings statute 
where “amendatory statute lessening punishment becomes effective prior to the date of appellate 
finalization”), with Mitchell, supra note 106, at 20 (noting that ameliorative amendment exceptions 
to general saving statutes are “restricted . . . to pre-final judgment defendants, resulting in a limited 
number of defendants being eligible to receive the benefits of an ameliorative sentencing change”). 
 119.  See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 120. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (emphasis added). One well-
recognized exception is for procedural legislation, which generally is applied retroactively 
notwithstanding a general savings statute. Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 660–61 (1974) 
(stating that the federal general savings statute “does not ordinarily preserve discarded remedies or 
procedures”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-481, 88 
Stat. 1455, 1455; see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 275 (1994) (noting “the 
diminished reliance interests in matters of procedure” and stating that “[c]hanges in procedural rules 
may often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns about 
retroactivity”); 1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 23:38, at 566–67 (7th ed. 2009) (“[R]ights which are not substantive and private 
in nature . . . are beyond the scope of general saving statutes, and are eliminated by repeal of their 
derivative source.”). Although the line between substantive and procedural legislation is not always 
clear, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that legislation affecting “all forms of punishment for 
crime” is not procedural; it affects substantive rights and is therefore subject to the federal general 
savings statute. Marrero, 417 U.S. at 661. Compare id. (citing Jones v. United States, 327 F.2d 867 
(D.C. Cir. 1963)) (holding that ineligibility for parole was “punishment” and was therefore 
preserved by 1 U.S.C. § 109)), and Jones, 327 F.2d at 871 (concluding that the death sentence was 
preserved by 1 U.S.C. § 109), with United States v. Obermeier, 186 F.2d 243, 254–55 (2d Cir. 
1950) (holding that “a statute of limitations is considered no part of a ‘right’ or ‘liability,’ but as 
affecting the ‘remedy’ only,” and was therefore not preserved by 1 U.S.C. § 109). 
 121. Marrero, 417 U.S. at 661; see, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315–16 (2001) 
(“[C]ongressional enactments . . . will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their 
language requires this result.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. 
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), superseded by statute on 
other grounds, REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii), 119 Stat. 302, 310; 
id. at 316–17 (“A statute may not be applied retroactively . . . absent a clear indication from 
Congress that it intended such a result. . . . The standard for finding such unambiguous direction is 
a demanding one. [C]ases where this Court has found truly retroactive effect adequately authorized 
by statute have involved statutory language that was so clear that it could sustain only one 
interpretation.” (alteration in original) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 328 n.4 (1997)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280 (“When a case implicates a federal 
statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has 
expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need 
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principle articulated in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, a case in which the 
Supreme Court addressed the retroactivity of statutory provisions creating 
a right to recover compensatory and punitive damages for certain violations 
of Title VII, providing for a jury trial if such damages were claimed. In 
Landgraf, the Court stated:  
It will frequently be true . . . that retroactive application of 
a new statute would vindicate its purpose more fully. That 
consideration, however, is not sufficient to rebut the 
presumption against retroactivity. Statutes are seldom crafted 
to pursue a single goal, and compromises necessary to their 
enactment may require adopting means other than those that 
would most effectively pursue the main goal. A legislator who 
supported a prospective statute might reasonably oppose 
retroactive application of the same statute. Indeed, there is 
reason to believe that the omission of [a prior bill’s] express 
retroactivity provisions was a factor in the passage of the [bill 
that became law]. Section 102 [of the law] is plainly not the 
sort of provision that must be understood to operate 
retroactively because a contrary reading would render it 
ineffective.122 
Importantly, this determination does not change when the prospective-only 
repeal applies to the death penalty, as multiple federal and state courts have 
made clear.123 In nearly all cases, death row inmates remain eligible for 
death notwithstanding the subsequent repeal of the death penalty or the 
procedures used to implement it.124  
                                                                                                                     
to resort to judicial default rules.”); id. at 273, 278–79 (harmonizing the “presumption against 
statutory retroactivity” and “explicitly retroactive statutes”); State v. Reis, 165 P.3d 980, 996 (Haw. 
2007) (“[T]he inclusion of a specific savings clause within an amendment—the polar opposite of an 
express retroactivity provision—must operate as clear evidence of the legislature’s intention that the 
act in question should apply prospectively only. Indeed, where a specific savings clause has been 
included in amendatory legislation, the general trend among the states nationally is, in fact, not to 
apply the amendments retroactively, even when they are ameliorative.”); Holiday v. United States, 
683 A.2d 61, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[A]bsent an express provision specifying the class or classes to 
which the new sentencing scheme applies, we cannot conclude that, ‘obviously’ and inevitably, the 
legislature must have intended a retroactive, rather than a prospective, approach.”); id. at 80 (“[I]f 
the Council had intended for the repeal of mandatory-minimum sentences to apply retroactively—to 
pending prosecutions, either pre-sentence or pre-final judgment—express language to that effect 
could have been included.”). See generally Mitchell, supra note 106, at 29–37 (discussing judicial 
retroactive amelioration). 
 122. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 285–86 (footnote omitted). 
 123. See, e.g., Jones, 327 F.2d at 869–71 (applying both the federal general savings statute, 1 
U.S.C. § 109, and repeal statute’s savings clause in refusing to give retroactive effect to an 
ameliorative statute eliminating mandatory death penalty). 
 124. See, e.g., id. 
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2.  Retroactivity and the Death Penalty 
This subsection addresses the issue of retroactivity and the death 
penalty. It first reviews several cases in federal and state jurisprudence 
where the courts refused to give retroactive effect to prospective-only 
repeal. It then turns to consideration of circumstances under which the 
courts took the opposite approach.  
a.  Cases Refusing to Give Retroactive Effect to Prospective-Only 
Repeal 
In Jones v. United States, the D.C. Circuit held that the defendant, who 
was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death under a 
mandatory death penalty, could not benefit from a subsequent law 
repealing the mandatory death penalty and allowing a jury (or, in the case 
of pending cases, a judge) to decide between execution or life 
imprisonment.125 The court noted that the repeal was “obviously 
prospective in operation” because it “contained no language applying its 
ameliorating provisions to previously committed offenses” and instead 
included a specific savings clause preserving the defendant’s sentence 
under the prior statute.126 “Quite apart from the [statute’s savings clause],” 
the court added, the federal general savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, 
conclusively established “that the death sentence not only was mandatory, 
final and unreviewable, but that sentence had not been vacated by the 
[repeal].”127  
Jones’s reasoning finds explicit support in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in the non-capital case of Warden v. Marrero.128 In that case, the 
Court refused to give retroactive effect to a prospective-only federal 
statute, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
1970, which removed ineligibility for parole for certain drug crimes.129 
According to the Court, the Act’s savings clause required this result by 
explicitly prohibiting application of the Act to “[p]rosecutions for any 
violation of law occurring prior to the effective date of [the Act].”130 The 
Court also premised its decision on the federal general savings statute, 1 
                                                                                                                     
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 871. At the time, the repeal statute’s savings clause read, “Cases tried prior to the 
effective date of this Act and which are before the court for the purpose of sentence or resentence 
shall be governed by the provisions of law in effect prior to the effective date of this Act.” Act of 
Mar. 22, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-423, 76 Stat. 46 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 22-2104 
(West, Westlaw through 2013)). 
 127. Jones, 327 F.2d at 870–71. 
 128. 417 U.S. 653, 660–61 (1974), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of Oct. 26, 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-481, 88 Stat. 1455, 1455. 
 129. Id. at 657–59; accord Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 609–10 (1973). 
 130. Marrero, 417 U.S. at 655–56 & n.4 (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1103(a), 
84 Stat. 1236, 1294) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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U.S.C. § 109, citing Jones for the proposition that § 109 “bar[s] application 
of ameliorative criminal sentencing laws repealing harsher ones in force at 
the time of the commission of an offense.”131 
Significantly, the prisoner in Marrero argued that, by removing 
ineligibility for parole, 
Congress completely changed its approach to regulation of 
narcotics offenses in the 1970 Act, jettisoning the retributive 
approach of the [prior] law in favor of emphasis in the 1970 
Act upon rehabilitation of the narcotics offender. . . . [I]n light 
of this basic change, little purpose is served by denying 
respondent eligibility for parole, indeed that such denial 
frustrates the current congressional goal of rehabilitating 
narcotics offenders.132 
While acknowledging the “undeniable” force of this argument, the Court 
rejected it, stating that it was “addressed to the wrong governmental 
branch.133 Punishment for federal crimes is a matter for Congress, subject 
to judicial veto only when the legislative judgment oversteps constitutional 
bounds.”134 The statute’s own savings clause, together with the federal 
savings statute, “saved from repeal the bar of parole eligibility under [the 
prior statute], and, however severe the consequences for respondent, 
Congress trespassed no constitutional limits.”135 
Support for prospective-only repeal of death penalty legislation can 
arguably be found in one of the Supreme Court’s most infamous death 
penalty cases, Rosenberg v. United States.136 On April 5, 1951, Julius and 
                                                                                                                     
 131. Id. at 661 (citing Jones, 327 F.2d 867; United States v. Kirby, 176 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 
1949); Lovely v. United States, 175 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1949)). 
 132. Id. at 664. 
 133.  Id.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. Many lower federal courts and state supreme courts have similarly rejected retroactive 
application of clearly prospective-only sentencing statutes in the noncapital context. See, e.g., 
United States v. Ross, 464 F.2d 376, 378–79 (2d Cir. 1972) (refusing to give retroactive effect to a 
portion of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, which liberalized 
sentences for drug crimes); id. at 380 (distinguishing two Supreme Court cases in which laws were 
applied retroactively on grounds that those cases involved decriminalization of conduct, namely, 
consumption of alcohol and equal access to public accommodations); State v. Reis, 165 P.3d 980, 
981–82, 991 n.19 (Haw. 2007) (refusing to give retroactive effect to a prospective-only statute 
allowing probation for first-time nonviolent drug offenders because the “plain language [of the 
savings clause] bar[red] retroactive application”). 
 136. 346 U.S. 273 (1953). Rosenberg was decided in a very short per curiam order on June 19, 
1953. Id. at 288 (per curiam). Two concurring opinions were delivered that same day, with the same 
six Justices joining the two concurrences. See id. at 289 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 293 (Clark, 
J., concurring). A few weeks later, Chief Justice Fred Vinson filed the opinion of the Court, which 
was joined by the same Justices who had joined the earlier concurrences. Id. at 277 (majority 
opinion). Accordingly, the same six-Justice majority backed three separate opinions. For simplicity, 
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Ethel Rosenberg were sentenced to death for conspiracy to commit 
espionage during a time of war, in violation of the Espionage Act of 
1917.137 On June 17, 1953, just two days before their execution,138 Justice 
William Douglas granted a stay of execution to address whether the 
Rosenbergs’ death sentences, which were imposed without 
recommendation of a jury and without a finding that the offense was 
committed with the intent to injure the United States, violated the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1946, which authorized capital punishment only upon jury 
recommendation and a finding of such intent.139 “[T]he sole ground of this 
stay,” the Court stated, “is that the Atomic Energy Act may have 
retrospective application to conspiracies in which the only overt acts were 
committed before that statute was enacted.”140 The Court rejected this 
claim.141 
According to the Court, assuming that the Atomic Energy Act in fact 
repealed the Espionage Act,142 “the Government could not have invoked 
the Atomic Energy Act against [the] defendants.”143 Because “[t]he crux of 
the charge alleged overt acts committed in 1944 and 1945, years before 
[the Atomic Energy] Act went into effect,” that Act was inapplicable.144 
                                                                                                                     
this Article considers all three opinions to speak for the Court. 
 137. Id. at 277. 
 138. See infra text accompanying note 147. 
 139. Rosenberg, 346 U.S. at 283 (describing Justice Douglas’s actions); id. at 294 (Clark, J., 
concurring) (stating that the Atomic Energy Act of 1946’s elements “are not prerequisite to a 
sentence of death” under the Espionage Act of 1917); id. at 317 (App’x to Op. of Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (noting neither element was satisfied). 
 140. Id. at 290 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 141.  Id. at 289. 
 142. The Court held that the Atomic Energy Act merely supplemented, rather than repealed, 
the Espionage Act and therefore did not apply to the Rosenbergs, who were convicted under the 
Espionage Act. Id. at 289 (per curiam) (“The Atomic Energy Act did not repeal or limit the 
provisions of the Espionage Act.”); see id. at 290 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[T]he Atomic Energy 
Act does not, by text or intention, supersede the earlier Espionage Act. It does not purport to repeal 
the earlier Act, nor afford any grounds for spelling out a repeal by implication. Each Act is 
complete in itself and each has its own reason for existence and field of operation.”); see also id. at 
295 (Clark, J., concurring) (“[I]nstead of repealing the penalty provisions of the Espionage Act, [the 
Atomic Energy Act] in fact preserves them in undiminished force. Thus there is no warrant for 
superimposing the penalty provisions of the later Act upon the earlier law.”). Significantly, the 
Court did not stop there, and held that even if the Atomic Energy Act did repeal the Espionage Act, 
it did not apply retroactively to the Rosenberg’s offenses. Id. at 295–96. 
 143. Id. at 295–96 (Clark, J., concurring). 
 144. Id. at 295; see also id. at 290 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The crime here involved was 
commenced June 6, 1944. This was more than two years before the Atomic Energy Act was passed. 
All overt acts relating to atomic energy on which the Government relies took place as early as 
January 1945.”); id. at 311 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[O]bviously no criminal statute can have 
retroactive application.”). Although the majority reasoned that retroactive application of the Atomic 
Energy Act would impose harsher penalties than the Espionage Act in violation of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause, see id. at 290 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 295–96 (Clark, J., concurring), its 
determination that the former Act “authorize[d] capital punishment only upon recommendation of a 
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Significantly, Justices Frankfurter and Douglas, writing separately in 
dissent, did not dispute that the Atomic Energy Act applied only 
prospectively;145 instead, they argued that part of the Rosenbergs’ crime 
took place after the Act’s effective date.146 On June 19, 1953, the Court 
issued a per curiam opinion vacating the stay, and the Rosenbergs were 
executed later that evening.147 
While acknowledging the troubling stakes, the majority concluded that 
the law was clear; the petition raised a pure “question of statutory 
construction” and the majority had “no doubts” as to its answer.148 
“Vacating this stay,” Justice Jackson stated in a separate opinion, “is not to 
be construed as indorsing the wisdom or appropriateness to this case of a 
death sentence. That sentence, however, is permitted by law and, as was 
previously pointed out, is therefore not within this Court’s power of 
revision.”149 Justice Clark was less contrite: “Though the penalty is great 
and our responsibility heavy, our duty is clear.”150 
                                                                                                                     
jury and a finding that the offense was committed with intent to injure the United States” belies this 
reasoning and suggests that the Atomic Energy Act was ameliorative. Id. at 294 (emphasis added); 
see id. at 305–06 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The decisive thing in this case is that under the 
Espionage Act the power to impose a sentence of death was left exclusively to the discretion of the 
court, while under the Atomic Energy Act a sentence of death can be imposed only upon 
recommendation of the jury.”). 
 145. Id. at 311 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The Solicitor General says . . . that the Government 
would have been laughed out of court if . . . this case had been laid under the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946. I agree. For a part of the crime alleged and proved antedated that Act. And obviously no 
criminal statute can have retroactive application.”); see id. at 304–05 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(implying that the Atomic Energy Act was prospective-only). 
 146. See id. at 311 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]hat conspiracy, as defined in the indictment 
itself, endured almost four years after the Atomic Energy Act became effective.”); see also id. at 
305 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the terminal date of the Rosenberg Conspiracy [did 
not] precede[] the effective date of the Atomic Energy Act”). 
 147. The Rosenbergs were executed on June 19, 1953, several hours after the Supreme Court 
vacated the stay. Brad Snyder, Taking Great Cases: Lessons from the Rosenberg Case, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 885, 932 (2010). 
 148. Rosenberg, 346 U.S. at 287–88; see id. at 288 (stating that “[m]ore complete statements 
of the reasons for our decision are set forth in the opinions of Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice 
Clark”). 
 149. Id. at 292–93 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 150. Id. at 296 (Clark, J., concurring); cf. Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 612 (1973) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court in Rosenberg “resolved an ambiguity in a statutory 
scheme against life, not in its favor”). Lower federal court decisions interpreting the federal death 
penalty lend further support to the permissibility of prospective-only repeal as a matter of statutory 
construction. In 2008, for example, the Fourth Circuit refused to give retroactive effect to the 
Federal Death Penalty Act, which repealed various provisions of an earlier federal death penalty 
statute under which the defendant was sentenced. “[U]nder the [Federal] Savings Statute,” the court 
concluded, “a liability that arises under a later-repealed statute is preserved despite repeal and may 
be enforced by a post-repeal action.” United States v. Stitt, 552 F.3d 345, 353 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Korshin v. Comm’r, 91 F.3d 670, 673 (4th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit 
reversed “the district court’s decision to sentence [the defendant] to life imprisonment plus 780 
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Numerous other state supreme courts have refused to give retroactive 
effect to a variety of prospective-only repeals of death penalty statutes as a 
matter of statutory construction. Some of these cases involved prospective-
only repeal of the death penalty for certain offenders and certain crimes. 
The Indiana Supreme Court, for example, refused to give retroactive effect 
to a prospective-only repeal of the death penalty for people with 
intellectual disabilities.151 The Supreme Court of Georgia refused to give 
retroactive effect to a prospective-only repeal of the death penalty for 
people who were less than seventeen years of age at the time of their 
offense.152 And the Supreme Court of North Carolina refused to give 
retroactive effect to a statute that removed the death penalty for second-
degree rape.153 “[I]n a capital case, just as in any other case,” North 
Carolina’s high court stated, “we are not at liberty to disregard established 
principles of law in arriving at the intent of the Legislature in enacting a 
statute, nor, having determined that intent, may we properly refuse to give 
it effect.”154 
Many more cases, such as Jones v. United States, involve prospective-
                                                                                                                     
months” and ordered the court to conduct a new capital sentencing hearing. Id. at 356. 
 151. Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506, 512 (Ind. 1999) (“[A]bsent a constitutional mandate for 
the rule exempting mentally retarded individuals, this Court is neither expected nor required to 
engage in retroactivity analysis. Rather, the extent of our writ is to enforce the law as it was at the 
time [he] committed his crimes.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 
760, 786 (Ind.1997))). The Tennessee Supreme Court similarly refused to give retroactive effect, as 
a matter of statutory construction, to a prospective-only repeal of the death penalty for people with 
intellectual disabilities. See Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 798 (Tenn. 2001). According to the 
court:  
[T]he absence of express language providing for retroactive application supports 
the conclusion that the legislature did not expressly intend [a 
retroactive] application. As the State contends, other Public Acts demonstrate that 
when retroactive application is intended, the General Assembly includes specific, 
clear language expressing its intent. Such clear language is absent from [the repeal 
statute]. In short, notwithstanding the presence of some ambiguous language in the 
statute and in the legislative history, there is no evidence of a clear legislative 
intent to apply the statute retroactively as required by the general rule. 
Id. But see infra notes 318–21 and accompanying text (discussing Van Tran’s holding that the death 
sentence nevertheless violated the state and federal constitutions). 
 152. Cobb v. State, 152 S.E.2d 403, 406 (Ga. 1966) (“The trial judge here properly ruled that 
[a statute providing that any minor less than seventeen years of age at the time of an alleged offense 
could not be given the death penalty] could not be given retroactive effect so as to apply to the 
appellant.”), rev’d per curiam, Cobb v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 12 (1967). 
 153. State v. Williams, 212 S.E.2d 113, 119–20 (N.C. 1975) (“We construe the provision in 
the 1974 Act, ‘This act shall become . . . applicable to all offenses hereafter committed’ as a saving 
clause, showing the intent of the Legislature to leave the preexisting statute in effect as to the 
elements of and punishment for the crime of rape committed prior to 8 April 1974. Otherwise, that 
provision of the Act would be a mere meaningless redundancy.” (alteration in original)). 
 154. Id. at 119. 
36
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss1/6
2014] FROM WOLVES, LAMBS (PART I) 349 
 
only repeal of various death penalty procedures. For example, the supreme 
courts of Connecticut,155 Florida,156 Indiana,157 Maryland,158 Tennessee,159 
and Utah160 all refused to give retroactive effect to prospective-only 
statutes that required the jury to consider life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole as a sentencing option. The Indiana Supreme Court 
refused to give retroactive effect to a prospective-only statute requiring 
courts to instruct the jury on the potential for consecutive or concurrent 
sentencing.161 The Supreme Court of Nebraska refused to give retroactive 
                                                                                                                     
 155. Dortch v. State, 110 A.2d 471, 476 (Conn. 1954) (“The murder for which the plaintiff 
stands convicted was committed on September 3, 1949. Judgment was rendered upon the verdict on 
February 23, 1950. . . . [The repeal statute] did not become effective until October 1, 1951. . . . The 
legislature expressed no intent that [the repeal statute] should operate retrospectively, and it has no 
retrospective effect.”); id. at 472 (“[The repeal statute] gives to the jury before whom any 
prosecution for a murder is tried the power to recommend imprisonment for life . . . .”). 
 156. Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6, 10 (Fla. 1999) (“In 1994, the Legislature enacted [a statute 
which] ma[de] life without the possibility of parole the alternative punishment to a death sentence 
for the crime of first-degree murder. . . . [T]he amended sentencing statute applies to all crimes 
committed after May 25, 1994. We find no unequivocal language that the Legislature intended this 
amendment to apply retroactively[.]”); accord Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 547 (Fla. 2009). 
 157. State v. Alcorn, 638 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ind. 1994) (“[A]ppellee’s trial is governed by 
the death penalty statute that was in effect at the time of the offense. The jury has no authority to 
apply the amended statute in this case since the saving clause makes the statute inapplicable to 
murders that were committed before June 30, 1993.”); id. at 1244 (“As amended, [the death penalty 
statute] allows a trial court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole as an 
alternative sentence to death.”); accord State v. Azania, 875 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ind. 2007). 
 158. Collins v. State, 568 A.2d 1, 15 (Md. 1990) (“We rule the life without parole sentencing 
option is only available for offenses occurring after the effective date of the provision, July 1, 1987. 
The instant offense occurred prior to the effective date.” (citation omitted)); accord Booth v. State, 
608 A.2d 162, 174 (Md. 1992). 
 159. State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 213–14 (Tenn. 2000) (“[T]he plain language of the statute 
[permitting the jury to consider life without parole] applies only to cases in which the offense was 
committed after July 1, 1993 . . . .”); accord State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 735 (Tenn. 1998). 
 160. State v. Andrews, 843 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1992) (holding that the trial court “did not 
err in concluding that the new sentencing option [of life without parole] has no retroactive 
application to defendant, whose date of sentence occurred on November 27, 1974”); accord 
Andrews v. Carver, 798 F. Supp. 659, 662 (D. Utah 1992) (refusing, on habeas review, to give 
retroactive effect to a prospective-only statute adding option of life without possibility of parole, but 
suggesting that the result might be different if the prospective-only statute were passed before 
defendant’s conviction became final); id. (“There is no obligation that a state accord retroactive 
effect to new substantive statutes to allow a convicted person the benefit of a new statute where the 
conviction is final. The state’s interest in maintaining the finality of convictions and sentences 
justifies a prospective legislative limitation.”). 
 161. See Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 160 n.7 (Ind. 1999) (“Under our current death 
penalty sentencing statute, courts should instruct the jury on the potential for consecutive or 
concurrent sentencing, and the court’s failure to provide the jury with a verdict form which included 
the possibility of sentencing a defendant to life imprisonment without parole would have been  
error. Because [the defendant] committed his crime on August 12, 1986, however, the law which 
was in force on that date applies to him. It is a well established rule of our criminal jurisprudence 
that the law which applies is that law in effect at the time the crime is committed.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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effect to a prospective-only statute that required the court to determine the 
propriety of a death sentence in light of previous cases involving the same 
or similar circumstances.162 The Supreme Court of California refused to 
give retroactive effect to a prospective-only statute that limited the 
evidence relevant to the prosecution’s case for aggravation.163 And both the 
Supreme Court of California and the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to 
give retroactive effect to prospective-only statutes that required courts to 
instruct juries with respect to the balancing of aggravating and mitigating 
factors.164 According to the Supreme Court of California, “[t]he 
presumption that a criminal defendant is entitled to an ameliorative change 
in the law is just that—a presumption—which plainly does not apply 
where, as here, the new law provides otherwise.”165 
Further examples include courts’ refusal to give retroactive effect to 
prospective-only statutes changing the method of execution;166 amending 
the aggravating factors required to sentence a person to death;167 giving the 
district attorney discretion to seek the death penalty against defendants 
tried and convicted of first-degree murder;168 authorizing bifurcated trials 
in capital cases and permitting defendants to offer certain evidence in 
mitigation of punishment;169 and replacing an existing death penalty statute 
with a new death penalty statute.170 
                                                                                                                     
 162. State v. Rust, 303 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Neb. 1981) (stating that the repeal statute “was not 
enacted until after the sentence in this case had been imposed and became final. Having become a 
final judgment prior to the effective date of [the repeal statute], it is not affected by the adoption of 
[the statute].” (quoting State v. Holtan, 287 N.W.2d 671, 673 (Neb. 1980) (per curiam))). 
 163. People v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 1109, 1127 (Cal. 1989) (“Because defendant committed 
the offenses when the [prior] law was in effect, that statute’s provisions governed the penalty 
retrial. . . . A capital trial must be held under the death penalty law in effect at the time the capital 
offenses were committed; application of any other law is error.”). But see id. (suggesting that the 
result may be different if the subsequent law affected the “criminality of defendant’s conduct or the 
severity of punishment” (emphasis added)). 
 164. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 267 (Tenn. 1994) (“[W]here an offense is committed 
before the effective date of the [statute requiring the jury to find that aggravating circumstances 
outweigh mitigating circumstances “beyond a reasonable doubt” before imposing a death sentence], 
but the trial and sentencing occur after that effective date, a trial court does not err by instructing the 
jury under the statute as it existed at the time the offense was committed.”); People v. Stankewitz, 
793 P.2d 23, 47 (Cal. 1990) (stating that a statute requiring a jury to find that aggravating 
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances before imposing a death sentence “was intended 
to be purely prospective in effect” (citation omitted)). 
 165. Stankewitz, 793 P.2d at 47. 
 166. Simborski v. Wheeler, 183 A. 688, 689–90 (Conn. 1936). 
 167. State v. Blanton, 975 S.W.2d 269, 280 (Tenn. 1998). 
 168. State v. Ward, 555 S.E.2d 251, 260 (N.C. 2001). 
 169. Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352, 359 (Tex. 1968). 
 170. Watkins v. State, 409 So. 2d 901, 902–03 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (“It is clear that the 
legislature intended to apply [the] pre-existing [death penalty statute] to conduct occurring prior to 
12:01 a.m. on July 1, 1981, and to apply [the new death penalty statute] to all conduct occurring on 
and after that time and date.”); accord Ex parte Cochran, 500 So. 2d 1179, 1181 n.1 (Ala. 1985). 
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Courts’ overwhelming refusal to give retroactive effect to prospective-
only repeals of death penalty statutes is not a recent phenomenon; this has 
been their consistent approach for over 100 years. In 1889, in the case of 
People v. Nolan,171 the Court of Appeals of New York refused to give 
retroactive effect to a prospective-only statute that replaced hanging with 
electrocution.172 Rejecting the defendant’s argument that neither the old nor 
the new statute applied to him, the court stated: 
By reason of [the savings clause of the act,] the sections of the 
Code as they existed prior to the passage of the act remain, for 
all purposes therein stated, in full force and effect, exactly the 
same as if no act of amendment, alteration, or repeal had ever 
been passed; and on that account, and for that reason, the law 
in force in this state, so far as the defendant is concerned, 
remains as it was before [the date on which the act took 
effect], and all its provisions relating to the infliction of the 
death penalty by hanging are saved and continued. No amount 
of reasoning or argument can make this plainer than it is made 
by the statute itself, and further amplification would only tend 
to confuse what is now clear and unambiguous.173 
In 1908, in In re Schneck,174 the Kansas Supreme Court held that a statute 
(like Connecticut’s) that completely repealed the death penalty prospective-
only did not apply retroactively to a defendant who committed his offense 
three months before repeal but who would not be tried until after repeal.175 
According to the court, 
[h]ad the Legislature in the enactment of the amendment 
[repealing the death penalty] provided to what cases the 
amendment should be applicable with reference to the time of 
its passage, the special provision would control. In the 
absence, however, of any such provision, the general [savings 
statute] applies. . . .  
. . . [S]ince the crime is charged to have been committed 
before the repeal of the statute prescribing the penalty of 
death, . . . the repeal and amendment does not affect the 
penalty of the crime charged . . . .176 
In 1918, in State v. Lewis,177 the Supreme Court of Missouri held that, 
                                                                                                                     
 171. 21 N.E. 1060 (N.Y. 1889). 
 172. Id. at 1062. 
 173. Id. 
 174. 96 P. 43 (Kan. 1908). 
 175. Id. at 44–45. 
 176. Id.  
 177. 201 S.W. 80 (Mo. 1918). 
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pursuant to the state’s general savings statute, a 1917 statute completely 
repealing the death penalty prospective-only (like Connecticut’s) did not 
apply retroactively to a defendant who was sentenced to death three 
months before passage of the repeal.178 “Undoubtedly the Legislature in 
1917 had the power to abolish capital punishment as to all offenses, 
whether committed before or after the enactment of the new law,” the court 
stated, “but it did not do so.”179 And in 1927, in Ex parte Faltin,180 the 
Supreme Court of Arizona refused to apply a 1916 prospective-only repeal 
of the death penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree to a 
defendant sentenced to death in 1913.181 “The old law is abrogated, 
repealed and modified for future offenses,” the court concluded, “but 
preserved by the [general] saving clause . . . in so far as the penalties to be 
inflicted for offenses committed under it . . . .”182  
As these cases demonstrate, courts that treat clearly prospective-only 
death penalty repeals as such are not forging a new path. Instead, they are 
standing on a long and well-worn road. 
b.  Cases Giving Retroactive Effect to Prospective-Only Repeal 
Pursuant to Rules of Statutory Construction 
While the overwhelming weight of authority rejects retroactive 
application of death penalty repeals, some courts have applied such repeals 
retroactively on the basis of statutory construction. They have done so in 
two circumstances: (1) when the death penalty repeal was clearly 
retroactive, thereby making resort to the general savings statute 
unnecessary, or (2) when the death penalty repeal was silent or ambiguous 
as to retroactivity and legislative history or fundamental fairness concerns 
favored retroactive application over application of the general savings 
statute.183 In both circumstances, courts have stopped short of disturbing 
final judgments; as discussed above, these courts have interpreted death 
                                                                                                                     
 178. Id. at 85–86; accord State v. Hill, 201 S.W. 58, 61 (Mo. 1918) (holding that the statute 
abolishing death penalty, which became operative on June 18, 1917, did not apply where “trial and 
conviction was had in May, 1917”). 
 179. Lewis, 201 S.W. at 85. Because Missouri’s general savings statute contained an exception 
for ameliorative legislation enacted prior to “the penalty or punishment for any offense,” the Lewis 
court suggested that the result might be different if the judgment and sentence had not been entered 
before enactment of the repeal. Id. (quoting the ameliorative statute) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see id. at 85–86 (“[A]s the sentence and judgment in this case were prior to the going into 
effect of the new statute, they were correct and in no way erroneous at the time of their entry, and 
the new law . . . does not affect them in any way.”). 
 180. 254 P. 477 (Ariz. 1927). 
 181. Id. at 479–80. 
 182. Id. at 479. 
 183.  A review of death penalty case law did not reveal a third circumstance in which courts 
might otherwise apply repeals retroactively: application of an ameliorative amendment exception.  
See supra text accompanying note 117 (discussing ameliorative amendment exception). 
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penalty repeals to apply retroactively only to capital offenders who have 
not exhausted their direct appeals.184 
When the death penalty repeal is clearly retroactive as to crimes 
committed before its effective date, thereby making the general savings 
statute inapplicable, lower courts consistently give the statute retroactive 
effect as a matter of statutory construction. For example, in Watts v. 
State,185 the Supreme Court of Mississippi gave retroactive effect to a 
statute requiring the jury to consider life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole as a sentencing option in “any case in which pre-trial, 
trial or resentencing proceedings take place after July 1, 1994.”186 The fact 
that the defendant’s crime occurred several months before the effective 
date of the statute was “immaterial”; what mattered was that the defendant 
was tried in 1996, “more than two years after the effective date of the 
statute.”187  
Similarly, in State v. Payne,188 the Idaho Supreme Court gave 
retroactive effect to a statute that required new procedures for,  
any capital sentencing proceeding occurring after the effective 
date of this act, including those cases where the murder for 
which sentence is to be imposed occurred before the effective 
date of this act and including those cases where a first-degree 
murder conviction or death sentence occurring before the 
effective date of this act has been set aside and the case is 
                                                                                                                     
 184.  See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing finality and statutory 
retroactivity). Capital offenders who have not exhausted their direct appeals consist of those who 
have not had their conviction and sentence reviewed by the state court of last resort (and by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, assuming one of the parties petitions for a writ of certiorari and the Court grants the 
petition). BARRY LATZER & JAMES N.G. CAUTHEN, JUSTICE DELAYED? TIME CONSUMPTION IN 
CAPITAL APPEALS: A MULTISTATE STUDY 10–11 (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/217555.pdf. Although the time it takes for a case to complete direct appeal differs 
significantly from state to state, commentators report a median of 966 days from the date of 
sentencing, or about 2.5 years, plus another 188–250 days for U.S. Supreme Court review of a 
petition for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 3. 
Following direct appeal, capital offenders can file a motion in the state trial court for state 
post-conviction review of claims not raised on direct appeal. Id. at 11. They can also file a petition 
for the writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Id. at 11–12. Both routes allow for the appeal 
of adverse decisions and can take, roughly speaking, an additional ten years to resolve. Id. at 3, 9 
(stating that it takes approximately three years from the date of sentencing to complete the direct 
appeal process, and that it takes approximately twelve years from the date of sentencing to carry out 
an execution). If a conviction or sentence is overturned in either post-conviction or habeas 
proceedings, and the person is resentenced to death, the direct appeal process restarts. See id. at 9 
n.1. 
 185. 733 So. 2d 214 (Miss. 1999). 
 186. Id. at 237 (quoting Act of Apr. 7, 1994, ch. 566, § 5, 1994 Miss. Laws. 847, 851) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 187. Id.  
 188. 199 P.3d 123 (Idaho 2008). 
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before the court for retrial or resentencing[] . . . .189  
And in State v. Pace,190 the New Mexico Supreme Court gave retroactive 
effect to a statute abolishing (with some exceptions for special 
circumstances) the death penalty for murder and “provid[ing] for 
revocation of death penalties already imposed and substitution of a 
sentence of life imprisonment.”191 Because it was “clear from [the repeal 
statute] that the legislature intended the act to apply retroactively,” the 
court “perceive[d] no reason under the constitution why it could not make 
the law applicable in situations where, as here, the case was pending on 
appeal.”192 
Rather than apply their general savings statute, some courts give 
retroactive effect to ameliorative death penalty statutes that are ambiguous 
or merely silent as to retroactivity. Legislative intent and fundamental 
fairness figure prominently in these cases. For example, in 2004, in State v. 
Fortin,193 the Supreme Court of New Jersey gave retroactive effect to a 
2000 law that allowed a jury to consider life without parole as a sentencing 
option in certain capital cases.194 “If the statute was not intended to apply 
to capital murders that occurred before the enactment,” the court 
acknowledged, “then the inquiry ends.”195 But the court found no such 
intent. “[T]he language of the statute does not provide an answer [to the 
question of whether the statute is retroactive] because the legislative 
direction that the ‘act shall take effect immediately’ is insolubly 
ambiguous.”196 Finding scant legislative history addressing the ambiguity, 
the court concluded that “policy objectives of the legislation”—such as 
eliminating recidivism and proportionality among defendants awaiting 
sentencing—“clearly support the most far-reaching application of the 
statute.”197 
                                                                                                                     
 189. Id. at 154 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Act of Feb. 13, 2003, ch. 19, § 6, 2003 Idaho Sess. 
Laws 71, 75). 
 190. 456 P.2d 197 (N.M. 1969). 
 191. Id. at 205 (per curiam) (supplemental opinion); see also Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The End 
of the Beginning: The Politics of Death and the American Death Penalty Regime in the Twenty-
First Century, 90 OR. L. REV. 797, 821 (2012) (“Punishment by death for any crime is abolished 
except for the crime of killing a police officer or prison or jail guard while in the performance of his 
duties and except if the jury recommends the death penalty when the defendant commits a second 
capital felony after the time for due deliberation following the commission of a capital felony.” 
(quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2.1 (1963) (repealed 1973)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 192. Pace, 456 P.2d at 205. The court declined to consider whether the repeal also applied 
retroactively to final death sentences. Id. 
 193. 843 A.2d 974 (N.J. 2004). 
 194. Id. at 1010, 1012. 
 195. Id. at 1012. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 1012–13. After the reversal of his capital murder conviction and death sentence in 
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In 1988, in State v. Bey,198 the Supreme Court of New Jersey gave 
retroactive effect to a statute repealing the death penalty for crimes 
committed by minors.199 In that case, New Jersey’s 1982 death penalty 
statute was silent as to whether it applied to juveniles.200 When the 
legislature amended the statute four years later to clarify that juveniles 
were not included, it did not specify whether the amendment was 
retroactive.201 The court relied on legislative history and other public 
statements of legislators regarding the amendment’s intended retroactivity 
to conclude that it was “clear . . . that the Legislature never had intended to 
subject juvenile offenders to capital punishment [under the 1982 law], and 
did intend that its ameliorative amendment [in 1986] would apply 
retroactively to defendant’s case.”202 “[T]he presumption against 
retroactive application,” the court added, “is no more than a rule of 
statutory interpretation, and can be overcome by an indication of contrary 
legislative intent, either expressed in the language of the statute itself, or 
implied in its purpose.”203 In addition to legislative intent, the court stated 
that “notions of fundamental fairness . . . likewise demand[ed] retroactive 
application of the juvenile-offender exemption in this case.”204 
                                                                                                                     
2004, the defendant in Fortin was again convicted of capital murder. State v. Fortin, 969 A.2d 
1133, 1134 (N.J. 2009). In 2007, prior to sentencing, the New Jersey legislature abolished the death 
penalty and replaced it with life imprisonment without parole. Id. Because the state did “not dispute 
that the Legislature clearly intended to retroactively apply the amended sentencing statute to 
defendants who committed crimes prior to 2007,” id. at 1138, and instead moved to have the 
defendant sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, id. at 1136, the court never had to decide 
whether New Jersey’s 2007 death penalty repeal was retroactive. See id. at 1138. Nor is it likely that 
the court will do so since all of New Jersey’s remaining death row inmates had their sentences 
commuted to life without parole. New Jersey, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-jersey-1 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014); see also infra note 
270 (discussing New Jersey’s repeal statute). 
 198. 548 A.2d 846 (N.J. 1988). 
 199. Id. at 873, 877. 
 200. Id. at 872 (noting silence); id. at 873 (noting date of statute); id. at 872 n.29 (“Any person 
convicted under subsection a. (1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct or 
who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment, 
of anything of pecuniary value shall be sentenced as provided hereafter . . . .”) (alteration in 
original) (emphasis added); see id. at 874 (“[W]e cannot lightly presume that the ‘any person’ 
language was intended to sweep within its purview juveniles tried as adults.”). 
 201. Id. at 873 (“A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of murder shall not 
be sentenced [to death].” (quoting Act of Jan. 17, 1986, ch. 478, § 1(g), 1985 N.J. Laws 1935, 
1940)). 
 202. Id. at 873 & n.32 (noting that, at the time the statements were made, defendant “was the 
only juvenile offender in New Jersey who had been convicted and sentenced to death”). 
 203. Id. at 876 (citation omitted) (quoting Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496, 499 (1974)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 204. Id. at 877 (noting that “the Attorney General . . . concedes that ‘sound public policy and 
fundamental fairness dictate that defendant not be singled out to be the only juvenile ever executed 
or even eligible for execution under our current death penalty law.’” (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also State v. Biegenwald, 524 A.2d 130, 157–58 (N.J. 1987) (giving 
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In Cheatham v. State,205 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals gave 
retroactive effect to a statute that required juries to consider the sentencing 
option of life imprisonment without parole.206 The statute “bec[a]me 
effective November 1, 1987,”207 but did not explicitly state that it was 
retroactive. The court cited “the extreme nature of the penalty involved in 
capital murder cases . . . [and] the need for extremely careful scrutiny of 
the imposition of the death sentence,” and held that the statute applied in 
that narrow band of cases in which the statute took effect while the 
offender awaited trial.208 According to the court: 
[S]entences of death must be absolutely, unquestionably fair.  
Given the gravity of the death penalty, we find that 
principals of fundamental fairness compel us to reverse this 
case for a new second stage trial. . . . Quite simply, we cannot 
justify a decision which would act as a total bar to 
consideration of a punishment alternative to death merely 
because the crime giving rise to the trial occurred a short time 
before the effective date of . . . [the ameliorative] legislation. 
. . . In the interests of fundamental fairness, we find that 
justice demands the action taken by this Court under these 
distinctively compelling facts.209 
Similarly, in People v. Oliver,210 the Court of Appeals of New York gave 
retroactive effect to a statute that, among other things, prohibited any child 
                                                                                                                     
retroactive effect to an ambiguous statutory amendment requiring the state to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors, based on legislative history 
and fundamental fairness, reasoning that “we would regard it as impermissibly harsh to apply to one 
defendant, on this critical question of life and death, a standard significantly less favorable than that 
to be applied to another defendant, merely because of the relatively short time differential between 
the commission of their crimes. Much more is at stake than doing justice to [the defendant]. What is 
at stake is the fundamental fairness of a system that generates life and death decisions”). 
 205. 900 P.2d 414 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). 
 206. Id. at 429. 
 207. Act of May 18, 1987, ch. 96, § 7, 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws 95, 96. 
 208. Cheatham, 900 P.2d at 429. 
 209. Id.; accord Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 739–41 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993). The 
majority’s reliance upon fundamental fairness in Cheatham and three factually analogous cases 
prompted vigorous dissents by Judge Lumpkin. See Cheatham, 900 P.2d at 430 (Lumpkin, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Humphrey v. State, 864 P.2d 343, 345 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1993) (Lumpkin, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part ); Hain v. State, 852 P.2d 744, 753–56 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (Lumpkin, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 755 
(“‘Principles of fundamental fairness’ is an easy solution to the problem this Court has created by 
ignoring its own caselaw in determining ‘death is different.’ And as with many easy solutions, it is 
neat, plausible—and wrong.”); Salazar v. State, 852 P.2d 729, 741–43 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) 
(Lumpkin, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 743 (“Death is different; but law is law. 
This Court in its ruling today stresses the former and ignores the latter. Nearly nine decades of 
Oklahoma jurisprudence should have taught us better.”). 
 210. 134 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1956). 
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under fifteen from being charged with or prosecuted for a crime punishable 
by death or life imprisonment.211 According to the court:  
A legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime 
represents a legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the 
different treatment is sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of 
the criminal law. Nothing is to be gained by imposing the 
more severe penalty after such a pronouncement; the excess in 
punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose other than to 
satisfy a desire for vengeance.212 
Therefore, the court concluded, “nothing but the very clearest legislative 
direction should lead us to conclude that [the legislature] intended the prior 
law to apply in any subsequent trial.”213 Because the statute contained “no 
express instructions” as to its retroactivity, the court held that it applied 
retroactively to those who, as in Cheatham, were “not tried and sentenced 
by the time it became law.”214 
Lastly, in People v. Kellick,215 the Illinois Supreme Court gave 
retroactive effect to a statute that removed the aggravating factor under 
which the defendant was charged with death.216 Although the statute was 
ambiguous as to whether it was retroactive (its effective date preceded the 
date it was signed into law), the court found “the legislative 
history . . . replete with evidence that the General Assembly intended the 
[amendment] to operate retrospectively.”217 
                                                                                                                     
 211. Id. at 199, 202–04. 
 212. Id. at 202. 
 213. Id. at 204. 
 214. Id. at 202. Significantly, the court limited its holding to pending cases, noting “the settled 
rule that, once final judgment has been pronounced, a change in the law does not arrest or interfere 
with execution of the sentence.” Id. at 203 (quoting Welch v. Hudspeth, 132 F.2d 434, 436 (10th 
Cir. 1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. (“[T]he construction that we are here according 
to the amendment cannot be applied in favor of an offender tried and sentenced to imprisonment 
before its enactment.”); id. (“Whenever the Legislature alters existing law, a certain measure of 
inequality is bound to ensue.”); see also Mitchell, supra note 106, at 8 n.48, 47–51 (discussing state 
savings statutes that contain exceptions allowing retroactive application of ameliorative legislation 
in cases that are not final). 
 215. 464 N.E.2d 1037 (Ill. 1984). 
 216. Id. at 1042–45. The repealing statute made a defendant eligible for a death sentence when 
the defendant killed a child under twelve years of age—as opposed to sixteen years of age under the 
former statute—in a particularly brutal or heinous fashion. Id. at 1043–44. The victim in Kellick 
was fifteen years old. Id. at 1042. 
 217. Id. at 1043–45; see id. at 1045 (“Retroactive legislation is not favored, and as a general 
rule statutes are construed to operate prospectively unless the legislative intent that they be given 
retroactive operation clearly appears from the express language of the acts, or by necessary or 
unavoidable implication.” (quoting U.S. Steel Credit Union v. Knight, 204 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1965)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Interestingly, the court did not discuss Illinois’ ameliorative 
amendment exception to its general savings clause, which states that “if any penalty, forfeiture or 
punishment be mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision may, by the consent of the 
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3.  Summary of Statutory Construction Analysis 
As a matter of statutory construction, clearly prospective-only repeals of 
death penalty legislation are not given retroactive effect. Likewise, clearly 
retroactive repeals of death penalty legislation are given retroactive effect. 
When repeals are silent or ambiguous as to whether they are prospective-
only, most courts construe them as being prospective-only by resorting to 
general savings statutes, which prohibit retroactive application of laws 
absent contrary legislative intent. Some courts have applied ambiguous 
repeals retroactively when legislative history or fundamental fairness 
concerns favored retroactive application.  
In the case of prospective-only death penalty repeal, then, the critical 
legal question is not whether the legislature intended the law to apply 
retroactively. It will most likely be clear from the repeal statute’s savings 
clause—or from a state’s general savings statute as it applies to the 
repeal—that the legislature did not intend the repeal to be retroactive, and 
courts will respect such intent. Rather, the question is whether the 
prospective-only law renders the sentences of people already on death row 
unconstitutional. Although it is a familiar rule of statutory construction that 
courts should not decide constitutional questions when a case does not 
require it,218 there is no escaping those questions here. Prospective-only 
death penalty repeal raises significant questions of constitutional law. 
B.  Prospective-Only Death Penalty Repeal Does Not Violate the 
Eighth Amendment 
The two most likely constitutional challenges to prospective-only repeal 
are that it violates the Eighth Amendment (as applied to states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment), and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses.219 This Article addresses the stronger 
                                                                                                                     
party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect.” 5 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 70/4 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 98-626 of 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
Early cases likewise support the retroactive application of death penalty repeals that are 
ambiguous as to retroactivity. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 31 S.C.L. (2 Rich.) 418, 422–23 (1846) 
(retroactively applying an ambiguous statute that abolished the death penalty for forgery because 
the statute provided that, in lieu of death, “the person convicted”—not the person who shall be 
convicted in the future—“shall be sentenced to be whipped thirty nine lashes”); Rex v. Davis, 
(1785) 168 Eng. Rep. 238 (K.B.); 1 Leach 271 (retroactively applying an ambiguous statute that 
abolished the death penalty for killing deer), discussed in Comment, supra note 15, at 123. 
 218. E.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented 
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed 
of. . . . Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional 
question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only 
the latter.”). 
 219. Two other likely constitutional arguments are that prospective-only repeal violates the 
Bill of Attainder Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 
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of the two challenges: the Eighth Amendment. A companion article, From 
Wolves, Lambs (Part II): The Fourteenth Amendment Case for Gradual 
Abolition of the Death Penalty, addresses the equal protection and due 
process arguments under the Fourteenth Amendment.220 
There are three general types of Eighth Amendment challenges to the 
death penalty: (1) the death penalty is invariably, or per se, 
unconstitutional;221 (2) the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to a 
particular defendant based on the character of the defendant’s crime or a 
characteristic of the defendant;222 and (3) the death penalty is 
unconstitutional as applied to a particular defendant based on the 
procedures used to sentence the person to death.223 The issue of 
prospective-only repeal is unique in that it raises questions under all three 
types. While forceful, none of the Eighth Amendment arguments against 
prospective-only repeal are winning ones. Indeed, only two cases have 
struck down prospective-only death penalty repeal under the Eighth 
Amendment or its state corollaries.224 
                                                                                                                     
1. For the sake of brevity, this Article will not give detailed treatment to these arguments, which are 
unpersuasive. Nevertheless, some brief points are instructive. Bills of attainder are “legislative 
acts . . . that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such 
a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial.” United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 
303, 315 (1946), quoted with approval in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 448–49 (1965); 
see Brown, 381 U.S. at 442 (“[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause was intended . . . as an implementation 
of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against . . . trial by legislature.”). Prospective-only 
death penalty repeal is not a bill of attainder because it does not apply to a particular group of 
people; it applies to crimes committed before its effective date (assuming the effective date turns on 
the date of the crime, as in Connecticut and New Mexico). Although people currently on death row 
remain eligible for death, so do those who committed a capital crime prior to repeal but have not yet 
been charged (e.g., “cold cases”), convicted, or sentenced. Prospective-only repeal therefore applies 
to more than just those currently on death row. More importantly, prospective-only repeal does not 
inflict punishment without a judicial trial; it preserves punishment after a judicial trial. For these 
reasons, prospective-only death penalty repeal does not violate the Bill of Attainder Clause. 
Prospective-only repeal also does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it does not “make[] 
more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment”; it merely preserves intact 
the punishment in existence at the time the crime was committed. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 
435 (1987) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 36 (1981), abrogated on other grounds by 
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (2010), and Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 
(1995) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Collins, 497 U.S. 37); 
see id. at 430 (“[W]e have recognized that central to the ex post facto prohibition is a concern for 
the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond 
what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.” (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 220. See Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II), supra note 1. 
 221. CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 25–26. 
 222. Id. at 26–32. 
 223. Id. at 22–24. 
 224. See infra Subsection III.B.2.c (discussing the Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989) 
and Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) cases). 
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1.  Unconstitutional Per Se 
In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia225 and its four companion cases,226 the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the death penalty was per se 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment (as 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).227 The Court 
answered this question in the negative and upheld three of the five statutes, 
all of which attempted to alleviate the arbitrariness in sentencing that had 
led the court to effectively invalidate the death penalty nationwide just four 
years earlier in the case of Furman v. Georgia.228 Relying in part on the 
fact that a staggering thirty-five states had reenacted death penalty statutes 
in the four years since Furman,229 and on the acceptability of the death 
penalty’s penological goals—retribution, deterrence, and 
incapacitation230—the Court held both that “the punishment of death does 
not invariably violate the Constitution” and that it “is not a form of 
punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of 
the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of 
the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it.”231 
The Eighth Amendment argument against prospective-only repeal is, in 
effect, an argument that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional. 
Accordingly, it should fail under Gregg. Those who remain on death row 
do not share a common characteristic or crime putting them in a class that 
the Supreme Court considers ineligible for the death penalty: they are not 
insane,232 they are not minors,233 they do not have an intellectual 
disability,234 and they have all committed crimes involving the taking of a 
life.235 They are, quite literally, “everyone else.” Their only similarity is 
that, because of prospective-only repeal, they face the death penalty and all 
                                                                                                                     
 225. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 226. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson 
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 227. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162 (plurality opinion). 
 228. Compare id. at 207 (holding that the death penalty was not unconstitutional per se and 
upholding the Georgia death penalty statute as applied in that case), Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242 
(upholding the Florida death penalty statute as applied in that case), and Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 
(upholding the Texas death penalty statute as applied in that case), with Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the death penalty was unconstitutional as 
applied). In two companion cases to Gregg, the Court struck down two statutes that made the 
imposition of the death penalty mandatory for first-degree murder. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 
(striking down the North Carolina death penalty statute); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336 (striking down 
the Louisiana death penalty statute). 
 229. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179–80. 
 230. Id. at 183 & n.28. 
 231. Id. at 169, 187. 
 232. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). 
 233. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 234. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 235. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008). 
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others do not. But the effective date of a statute, without more, is not a 
meaningful basis for establishing a constitutionally protected class immune 
from the death penalty. Indeed, it would be the height of irony if, in 
attempting to maintain the status quo for those on death row, legislators 
created a catch-all class protected from the death penalty by repealing it 
prospectively. 
An argument against applying the death penalty to the unprotected 
remainder is therefore an argument that the death penalty cannot be 
imposed at all, against anyone. While the Supreme Court has “insist[ed] 
upon confining the instances in which [capital] punishment can be 
imposed” in recent years,236 it has never retreated from Gregg’s reasoning 
that the death penalty is constitutional, provided that “the circumstances of 
the offense,” “the character of the offender,” and “the procedure followed 
in reaching the decision to impose [the death penalty]” pass muster.237 
None of these caveats are at issue here. It is one thing to say that the death 
penalty cannot be imposed against any person on death row with an 
intellectual disability, for example, but quite another to say it cannot be 
imposed against any person on death row—full stop. This would 
effectively strike down death sentences post-repeal, in contradiction of 
Gregg. 
2.  Unconstitutional as Applied: Atkins and Its Progeny 
Since Gregg’s rejection of the argument that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional per se, most constitutional challenges to the death penalty 
have contested the excessiveness of the death penalty as applied to 
particular classes of defendants and crimes.238 In 2002, for example, in 
Atkins v. Virginia,239 the Supreme Court held that it was cruel and unusual 
to execute a person with an intellectual disability (referred to by the Court 
as “mental retardation”).240 In its opinion, the Court’s majority articulated a 
two-prong test to determine whether a punishment is excessive as applied 
to particular classes of defendants and crimes.241 
In conducting this two-prong inquiry into the excessiveness of the death 
penalty, the Court is guided not by the standards that prevailed “when the 
Bill of Rights was adopted,” or some other time in the past, but rather by 
“those that currently prevail”; that is, the Court is guided by “the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”242 In 
determining whether the death penalty, as applied, is inconsistent with 
                                                                                                                     
 236. Id. at 420. 
 237. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 238. CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 26. 
 239. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 240. Id. at 321. 
 241. Id. at 312–13. 
 242. Id. at 311–12. 
49
Barry: From Wolves, Lambs (Part I): The Eighth Amendment Case for Gradua
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
362 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
evolving standards of decency, the Court first looks to “objective evidence 
of contemporary values.”243 This evidence includes jury verdicts as well as 
“the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures,” which is “the 
clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.”244 
But “objective evidence, though of great importance, d[oes] not ‘wholly 
determine’ the controversy,”245 even if it evinces a “national consensus.”246 
In the end, the Constitution requires that the Court bring its “own 
judgment . . . to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death 
penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”247 The court must determine 
“whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the 
citizenry and its legislators.”248 
This second prong of the test is subjective.249 In exercising its own 
judgment, the Court considers whether the death penalty “measurably 
contributes”250 to one or both of “two distinct social purposes served by the 
death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective 
offenders.”251 Retribution is “the interest in seeing that the offender gets his 
‘just deserts’”252 for the “hurt he caused”;253 it is an expression of the 
“community’s moral outrage,” “an attempt to right the balance for the 
wrong to the victim.”254 “[C]ulpability or blameworthiness”255—the 
offender’s “personal responsibility and moral guilt”256—figure prominently 
into the Court’s analysis.257 If an offender is less blameworthy, as in the 
                                                                                                                     
 243. Id. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated on other 
grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 244. Id. (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The jury also is a significant and reliable 
objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved.”); see also id. at 175 
(“[I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and 
consequently the moral values of the people.” (alteration in original) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 245. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)). 
 246. See id. at 312–13; see also, e.g., id. at 314 (using the phrase “national consensus”) 
 247. Id. at 312 (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 248. Id. at 313. 
 249. See id. at 312. 
 250. Id. at 319 (“Unless the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded person 
‘measurably contributes’ to one or both of these goals, it is nothing more than the purposeless and 
needless imposition of pain and suffering, and hence an unconstitutional punishment.” (quoting 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 251. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 252. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
 253. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 442 (2008). 
 254. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See id. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 257. Id. at 571 (majority opinion); id. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 319 (“[T]he severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of 
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case of a minor or a person with intellectual disabilities, that person is not 
“the most deserving of execution” and, therefore, retribution is sufficiently 
served by a less severe punishment.258  
Deterrence, on the other hand, is “the interest in preventing capital 
crimes by prospective offenders.”259 As the Court notes, “[t]he theory of 
deterrence in capital sentencing is predicated upon the notion that the 
increased severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors from 
carrying out murderous conduct.”260 “Although some . . . studies suggest 
that the death penalty may not function as a significantly greater deterrent 
than lesser penalties, there is no convincing empirical evidence either 
supporting or refuting this view,” and the Court accepts that “there are 
murderers . . . for whom . . . . the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant 
deterrent.”261 The Court requires at a minimum, though, that future 
offenders have the capacity to “process the information of the possibility of 
execution as a penalty and . . . control their conduct based upon that 
information.”262  
“Unless the imposition of the death penalty on a [prisoner] measurably 
contributes to one or both of these goals, it is nothing more than the 
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering, and hence an 
unconstitutional punishment.”263 
In Atkins, the Court credited “the large number of States prohibiting the 
execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States 
passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions)” as 
evincing a “national consensus” against executing people with intellectual 
disabilities.264 While thirty states prohibited the execution of people with 
intellectual disabilities, the Court noted that “[i]t is not so much the 
number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the 
                                                                                                                     
the offender.”). 
 258. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; see also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 (“[C]apital punishment must 
be limited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose 
extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.” (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 
568)). 
 259. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
 260. Id. at 320. 
 261. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185–86 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted), 
quoted in Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 440–41; accord Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
 262. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320. 
 263. Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in Atkins, suggested a third social purpose 
earlier recognized by the Court: “incapacitation of dangerous criminals and the consequent 
prevention of crimes that they may otherwise commit in the future.” Id. at 350 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 n.28); see id. (noting that the majority “conveniently 
ignores [this] third ‘social purpose’ of the death penalty”). 
 264. Id. at 315–16 (“The practice, therefore, has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that 
a national consensus has developed against it.”). 
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direction of change.”265 This national consensus, together with the Court’s 
own judgment that retribution and deterrence were not served by executing 
a person with reduced cognitive capacity and therefore reduced culpability, 
led the Court to hold the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to 
people with intellectual disabilities.266 
Employing Atkins’ two-part analysis, the Court subsequently struck 
down the death penalty in two other cases: the first involving children who 
were under 18 at the time of the offense,267 and the second involving 
crimes that do not take the life of the victim.268 One might argue that 
prospective-only repeal is unconstitutional as applied to those currently on 
death row because it is inconsistent with evolving standards of decency. 
This argument is unavailing in light of the Supreme Court’s two-pronged 
test under Atkins and its progeny. 
a.  There Is No National Consensus Against Prospective-Only 
Repeal 
This subsection analyzes state legislation for indications of national 
consensus regarding prospective-only repeal. Exploring several avenues for 
comparing states’ application of repeal legislation, it finds, at best, an even 
split, and concludes that there is no consensus against prospective-only 
repeal of the death penalty. 
i.  “45:3” 
Thirty-two states retain the death penalty.269 Because the legislatures in 
these states support the death penalty, it seems far-fetched to think that they 
would object to prospective-only repeal because it leaves in place the 
sentences of those on death row. Retentionist states like the death penalty, 
and it is therefore safe to assume that they would find a decision to 
maintain the state’s death row intact post-repeal to be a rather reasonable 
compromise—not beyond the pale. In fact, if any of these thirty-two states 
were to object to prospective-only repeal, it would most likely be for the 
opposite reason—that the death penalty should not be repealed for anyone, 
let alone those currently on death row. 
                                                                                                                     
 265. Id. at 315; Entzeroth, supra note 191, at 815 (noting that “eighteen death penalty states 
and twelve non-death-penalty states prohibited the death penalty against mentally retarded 
offenders”). 
 266. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20 (“If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to 
justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally 
retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution. . . . [I]t is the same cognitive and 
behavioral impairments that make these defendants less morally culpable . . . that also make it less 
likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a 
result, control their conduct based upon that information.”). 
 267. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
 268. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008). 
 269. States with and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 59. 
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The eighteen states (plus the District of Columbia) that have abolished 
the death penalty provide little support for a national consensus against 
prospective-only repeal. Only three of these states, West Virginia, North 
Dakota, and New Jersey, unambiguously abolished the death penalty 
retroactively,270 while three other states, New Mexico, Connecticut, and 
                                                                                                                     
 270. See Act of Dec. 17, 2007, ch. 204, § 2, 2007 N.J. Laws 1427, 1429–30, available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/PL07/204_.PDF (“An inmate sentenced to death prior to the 
date of the enactment of this act, upon motion to the sentencing court and waiver of any further 
appeals related to sentencing, shall be resentenced to a term of life imprisonment during which the 
defendant shall not be eligible for parole. Such sentence shall be served in a maximum security 
prison. Any such motion to the sentencing court shall be made within 60 days of the enactment of 
this act. If the motion is not made within 60 days the inmate shall remain under the sentence of 
death previously imposed by the sentencing court.”); Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 63, § 1, 1915 N.D. 
Laws 76, 76 (“Every person who has been or may be hereafter convicted of murder in the first 
degree shall be punished by confinement at hard labor in the State Penitentiary for life.” (emphasis 
added)); Act of Mar. 12, 1965, ch. 40, 1965 W. Va. Acts 203, 207 (“[N]o person . . . shall be 
executed, irrespective of whether the crime was committed, the conviction had, or the sentence 
imposed, before or after the enactment of this section.”). Although the intent of the legislatures in 
each of these states was clearly to abolish all death sentences—both final and not yet final—it is not 
clear that repeals of final sentences, if challenged, would withstand scrutiny under separation-of-
powers principles. Although important, this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
One might reasonably argue that New Jersey’s repeal was not truly retroactive because it did 
not simply convert all death sentences to life without parole (LWOP), but rather required inmates 
on death row to file a court motion and waive further appeals before being resentenced to LWOP. 
Cf. Historians Brief, supra note 1, at 6 (listing only two states, North Dakota and West Virginia, as 
having explicitly retroactive legislation). This argument has merit. Nevertheless, because New 
Jersey’s repeal explicitly provided for resentencing death row inmates to LWOP upon fulfilment of 
certain non-onerous conditions, and because the decision to resentence was to be automatic—not 
discretionary—the stronger argument is that New Jersey’s repeal was retroactive, albeit less 
straightforward than North Dakota’s or West Virginia’s repeals. Indeed, in a case that indirectly 
raised this question, New Jersey’s State’s Attorney did “not dispute that the Legislature clearly 
intended to retroactively apply the amended sentencing statute to defendants who committed crimes 
prior to [the 2007 repeal].” State v. Fortin, 969 A.2d 1133, 1138 (N.J. 2009). The fact that New 
Jersey’s governor preemptively commuted the sentences of those on death row immediately prior to 
repeal—effectively mooting the repeal’s retroactive language—does not alter this conclusion. See 
New Jersey, supra note 197. Lawyers for inmates on New Jersey’s death row objected to the repeal 
statute’s requirement that inmates waive any further appeals on grounds that it was unconstitutional 
as applied to those who were still contesting guilt and thus punishment. Out of concern that a court 
would invalidate this provision, thereby leaving those on death row where they sat, Governor 
Corzine commuted the sentences of those on death row. Email to author (Apr. 15, 2013) (source 
confidential at request of interviewee; notes on file with author); see also New Jersey, supra note 
197. Further, although New Jersey’s death penalty repeal was not explicitly retroactive as to inmates 
awaiting sentencing, this was strongly implied, as conceded by the State in Fortin, 969 A.2d at 
1138. 
“In 1915, North Dakota [retroactively] abolished the death penalty [for all but] two crimes: 
treason and murder committed by an inmate already serving a life sentence.” North Dakota, DEATH 
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/north-dakota-0 (last visited Feb. 28, 
2014). When North Dakota completely abolished its death penalty in 1973, it did so prospective-
only. See Act of Mar. 15, 1973, ch. 116, §§ 1, 41, 1973 N.D. Laws 215, 216, 300 (replacing the old 
criminal code with a new criminal code without the death penalty and providing that the new code 
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Maryland, went the other way—unambiguously abolishing the death 
penalty prospective-only.271 
Of the remaining twelve abolitionist states, Massachusetts and New 
York (and the District of Columbia) did not abolish the death penalty 
legislatively. Instead, they did so through judicial action (i.e., striking down 
the death penalty on constitutional grounds) coupled with legislative 
inaction (i.e., failing to resurrect the death penalty).272 Because legislatures 
and, to a lesser extent, juries (not courts) are the best indicator of evolving 
standards, these two states and the District of Columbia neither support nor 
undermine a national consensus against prospective-only repeal. As a 
result, they should be excluded from the tally. 
The remaining ten abolitionist states passed statutes that were silent, or 
ambiguous at best, as to retroactivity.273 These states should be considered 
to be supportive of prospective-only repeal for the following reasons: First, 
as discussed above, in states with general savings statutes, there is a 
presumption against retroactive application of statutes unless the repeal 
statute explicitly states otherwise, as was the case in West Virginia, North 
Dakota, and New Jersey.274 Because all ten states appear to have had 
general savings statutes at the time of repeal, any ambiguity would have 
been construed against retroactivity.275 Second, in four states with people 
                                                                                                                     
“shall not apply to offenses committed prior to its effective date. Prosecutions for such offenses 
shall be governed by prior law, which is continued in effect for that purpose”); Rodney S. Webb, A 
Prosecutor Looks at the Criminal Code, 50 N.D. L. REV. 631, 631, 633 (1974) (similar). 
 271. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 272. See Massachusetts, supra note 59; New York, supra note 59; District of Columbia, supra 
note 59.  
 273. Those ten states are Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See Historians Brief, supra note 1, at 3–5 (compiling abolition 
statutes); id. at 6 (suggesting that statutes in those ten states were silent or ambiguous); see also 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826 n.25 (1988) (compiling abolition statutes). 
 274. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Mitchell, supra note 106, at 47–51 (compiling savings statutes, but excluding 
Minnesota, among others); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.35 (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Special 
Sess.) (Minnesota savings statute); accord Ruud, supra note 76, at 296 & n.54; Comment, supra 
note 15, at 127–28 & nn.51–52. In his 1955 article discussing state savings statutes, Professor 
Millard H. Ruud noted that the “general statistical data presented here are based upon an 
examination of the available statutes and not upon a study of all the statutory and case law on the 
subject in each state,” and is therefore “sufficiently,” but perhaps not “completely” accurate. Ruud, 
supra, at 76 n.54. The same caveat applies here. For example, it is not clear when Maine, Michigan, 
Minnesota, and Vermont enacted their savings statutes, so it is difficult to know whether their 
statutes were in effect at the time of repeal. Likewise, although Iowa and Vermont have adopted 
ameliorative amendment exceptions to their general savings statutes, thereby giving retroactive 
effect to ameliorative legislative changes, it is not clear whether these amendments were in effect at 
the time of repeal. (Illinois’ ameliorative amendment exception was clearly in effect at the time of 
its repeal in 2011.) Even assuming that these ameliorative amendments were in effect at the time of 
repeal, they would have applied only to pre-final judgment defendants, not to those already on 
death row, thereby “resulting in a limited number of defendants being eligible to receive the 
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on death row at the time of repeal, governors (or, in one state, the Board of 
Pardons) commuted those death sentences immediately after, or in 
anticipation of, repeal—proof positive that the repeals were not 
retroactive.276 If they had been retroactive, there would have been no death 
sentences to commute. And finally, even if these states’ repeals were 
interpreted to apply retroactively, such an interpretation would most likely 
have extended only to capital offenders whose sentences had not yet 
become final.277 Absent language like North Dakota’s, West Virginia’s, or 
New Jersey’s, these statutes do not evince an intent to abolish the death 
penalty for all capital offenders.  
This means that a total of forty-five states (thirty-two retentionist plus 
thirteen abolitionist—three of which were clearly prospective-only) 
support prospective-only repeal; three do not. In Roper and Atkins, the 
Court held that thirty states’ rejection of the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders and people with intellectual disabilities, respectively, constituted 
a consensus against the death penalty.278 Here the complete opposite is 
true: well over thirty states support prospective-only repeal. This is not 
evidence of a consensus against prospective-only repeal and, in fact, 
strongly suggests consensus for it. 
ii.  “13:3”  
The Court’s majority, when surveying the actions of legislatures to 
discern evolving standards of decency, includes all states in their tally, 
those that have abolished the death penalty as well as those that have 
not.279 That same reasoning applies here; evolving standards of decency 
regarding prospective-only repeal should be gauged by looking at both 
retentionist and abolitionist states. As noted above, this reasoning yields a 
strong majority of states—forty-five—in favor of prospective-only repeal, 
and only three against it. 
                                                                                                                     
benefits of an ameliorative sentencing change.” Mitchell, supra note 106, at 20; see supra notes 
117–18 and accompanying text (noting that courts have not interpreted  ameliorative amendments 
to apply retroactively to final sentences). Because the repeals in Iowa, Vermont, and Illinois were, 
at best, only partially retroactive—as opposed to those in North Dakota, West Virginia, and New 
Jersey, which were complete—these three states should be counted as supporting prospective-only 
repeal. 
 276. See Historians Brief, supra note 1, at 3 nn.5–7, 4 nn.11–12 (discussing prospective-only 
repeals and commutations in Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota with the commutations in Iowa 
and Minnesota occurring before repeal). 
 277.  See supra note 184 and accompanying text (noting that state courts have interpreted death 
penalty repeals to apply retroactively only to capital offenders who have not exhausted their direct 
appeals). 
 278. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (counting thirty states and noting that 
Atkins involved thirty states as well); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008) 
(noting that forty-five states’ rejection of the death penalty for child rape constituted significant 
evidence of the national consensus against the practice). 
 279. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
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But perhaps including retentionist states in the tally is improper in this 
context. The fact that thirty-two states retain the death penalty, one might 
argue, tells us that the death penalty is popular—not that prospective-only 
repeal is popular. As Justice Scalia has reasoned in a slightly different 
death penalty context, the fact that thirty-two states favor executions says 
something about consensus for the death penalty, but nothing—“absolutely 
nothing”—about consensus that those on death row should remain on 
death row after prospective-only repeal of the death penalty.280 
When the thirty-two retentionist states are left out of the tally, thirteen 
abolitionist states have statutorily abolished the death penalty prospective-
only (three of them explicitly), while three others have abolished the death 
penalty retroactively. Stated another way, approximately 19% of the 
abolitionist states that have statutorily abolished their death penalties (three 
out of sixteen) opposed prospective-only repeal. That percentage falls well 
short of the 47% of retentionist states that opposed the execution of minors 
and people with intellectual disabilities at the time of Roper and Atkins, 
and which the Court used to support finding the death penalty 
unconstitutional in both cases.281 Furthermore, as the Court’s majority has 
repeatedly stated, “It is not so much the number of . . . States that is 
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”282 The four 
most recent states to repeal the death penalty legislatively, New Mexico 
(2009), Illinois (2011), Connecticut (2012), and Maryland (2013), all did 
so through prospective-only statutes.283 The direction of change thus points 
unmistakably toward prospective-only repeal, evincing a trend in favor of 
the practice or, as Justice Alito might say, perhaps “the beginning of a new 
evolutionary line.”284 
                                                                                                                     
 280. See id. at 610–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Consulting States that bar the death penalty 
concerning the necessity of making an exception to the penalty for offenders under 18 is rather like 
including old-order Amishmen in a consumer-preference poll on the electric car. Of course they 
don’t like it, but that sheds no light whatever on the point at issue.”). 
 281. See id. at 564 (majority opinion) (noting that eighteen of thirty-eight retentionist states 
prohibited execution of juveniles and individuals with intellectual disabilities); see also id. at 562 
(citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370–71 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Roper, 
543 U.S. 551, for the proposition that twelve out of thirty-seven retentionist states’ prohibition of 
execution of people who were seventeen at the time of the offense—or approximately 32% of all 
retentionist states—was not sufficient to constitute a national consensus against such executions); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314 (2002) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989), 
abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, for the proposition that two out of thirty-six 
retentionist states’ prohibition of execution of individuals with intellectual disabilities—or 
approximately 6% of all retentionist states—was not sufficient to constitute a national consensus 
against such executions). 
 282. E.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315. 
 283. See supra text accompanying notes 63–66. 
 284. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 455 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting). However, in 
Kennedy, the Court held that “six new death penalty statutes, three enacted in the last two years” did 
not “reflect a consistent direction of change in support of the death penalty for child rape.” Id. at 
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iii.  “3:3” 
When the six states to have explicitly addressed prospective-only repeal 
are looked at in isolation—North Dakota (1915), West Virginia (1965), 
New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), Connecticut (2012), and 
Maryland (2013)—the percentage of abolitionist states opposing 
prospective-only repeal increases to 50%; three for prospective-only repeal 
(New Mexico, Connecticut, and Maryland), and three against (North 
Dakota, West Virginia, and New Jersey).285 Here, too, the direction of 
change is significant. In the past five years, no state has repealed the death 
penalty retroactively and prospectively; rather, three states have explicitly 
repealed the death penalty prospective-only. At best, these numbers 
demonstrate no consensus—for or against—prospective-only repeal. 
iv.  “0:50” 
The fact that four states (New Mexico, Illinois, Connecticut, and 
Maryland) in the past five years—and thirteen states in U.S. jurisprudential 
history—have abolished the death penalty prospective-only, one might 
argue, obscures the fact that not one offender has apparently ever been 
executed after prospective-only repeal.286 In Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, 
Minnesota, and New Jersey, for example, the governor or board of pardons 
commuted the sentences of those on death row in anticipation of or 
immediately following prospective-only repeal.287 In many other 
abolitionist states, commutation was not necessary because there appears to 
have been no one on death row at the time of repeal.288 Because apparently 
no state has ever executed a person on death row post-repeal, one might 
reasonably argue that New Mexico, Connecticut, and Maryland, all of 
which have preserved their death rows intact post-repeal, are an anomaly 
among abolitionist states—not a new evolutionary line entitled to respect. 
                                                                                                                     
431–32. This was because the recent trend in favor of the death penalty for child rape was 
counterbalanced by the total number of states—a whopping forty-four plus the federal 
government—that had recognized the impropriety of the practice. See id. at 423, 426, 431–33. In 
the prospective-only context, there is no inconsistency between past and present; the recent trend in 
favor of prospective-only repeals matches the historical trend of prospective-only repeals among 
states. 
 285. See supra notes 2–3, 60 and accompanying text.  
 286. Historians Brief, supra note 1, at 1, 10. 
 287. Id. at 3 nn.5–7, 4 nn.11–12. Contra id. at 5 (mentioning Iowa). 
 288. See supra note 1 (arguing that the dearth of case law addressing challenges to 
prospective-only repeals suggests that there was no one on death row in some abolitionist states). 
See generally Historian’s Brief, supra note 1, at 3–5 (noting that five executives commuted death 
sentences immediately before or after repeal, and that there is no record of executions being carried 
out after repeal). Further research into abolitionist states’ death row populations is needed in order 
to distinguish states in which commutation was not needed because there simply was no one on 
death row at the time of repeal, from states that had inmates on death row at the time of repeal but 
refused to sign death warrants. 
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While this argument has considerable merit, it fails for two reasons. 
First, consensus about prospective-only repeal is not principally amassed 
from the whim of boards of pardon and outgoing governors. As the Court 
has repeatedly stated, it is the country’s legislatures (and, to a lesser extent, 
juries) that are the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of 
contemporary values,” not its executive officials.289 Although “review of 
national consensus is not confined to tallying the number of States with 
applicable death penalty legislation,” and therefore includes “[s]tatistics 
about the number of executions,” it is legislation that matters most.290 In 
Kennedy, for example, the infrequent execution of people convicted of 
child rape “confirm[ed]” the consensus of forty-five jurisdictions with 
statutes prohibiting the practice.291 In Roper and Atkins, the infrequent 
execution of juveniles and people with intellectual disabilities, 
respectively, supported the consensus of thirty jurisdictions with statutes 
prohibiting the practice.292 Thus, while execution statistics may support a 
strong demonstration of national consensus as expressed by the acts of the 
legislature, or “counterbalance an otherwise weak demonstration of 
[national] consensus”293 as expressed by the acts of the legislature, they do 
not substitute for the acts of the legislation. Four states in the past five 
years, and a majority of all abolitionist states through death penalty history, 
have abolished the death penalty prospective-only.294 To exalt the 
infrequency of post-repeal executions over the frequency of legislation 
repealing the death penalty prospective-only would make execution 
statistics the tail that wags the dog of national consensus. 
Second, giving undue import to execution statistics is particularly 
inappropriate in the context of prospective-only repeal. Because 
establishing the effective date of a statute uniquely implicates the 
                                                                                                                     
 289. E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2012) (“We have pinpointed that the ‘clearest 
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the 
country’s legislatures.’” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated on other 
grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304)); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (stating that 
“objective indicia of consensus [are] expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that 
have addressed the question” (emphasis added)); accord Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 422 (“The existence 
of objective indicia of consensus . . . was a relevant concern in Roper, [and] Atkins . . . and we 
follow the approach of those cases here.”). 
 290. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 426, 433; cf. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 323 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(stating that “the actions of sentencing juries[ are] entitled to less weight than legislative 
judgments”). 
 291. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 433–34 (confirmation); id. at 426 (forty-five jurisdictions). 
 292. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–65; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315–16. 
 293. Cf. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 431 (noting that the consistent change in direction of legislative 
support for the death penalty of child rapists “might counterbalance an otherwise weak 
demonstration of consensus” (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315)); Roper, 543 U.S. at 565–66 (same). 
 294. See supra Subsection III.B.2.a.i–ii (noting the four recent prospective-only repeals and 
arguing that thirteen states had prospective-only statutory repeals out of sixteen states with statutory 
repeals). 
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lawmaking function, legislatures are not simply the best source for gauging 
the propriety of prospective-only repeal. They are, in fact, the only source. 
Setting effective dates of legislation (as opposed to considering culpability 
or other mitigating factors post-sentencing) is not the province of the 
executive. Legislatures have the discretion to preserve death sentences 
post-repeal,295 and governors and boards of pardon have “virtually 
unfettered discretion” to commute those sentences post-repeal.296 
Executive officials’ decisions to exercise their discretion (by commuting 
sentences) do not render legislatures’ decisions to exercise their own 
discretion (by passing prospective-only laws) unconstitutional. For this 
reason, it is a mistake to conclude that consensus has evolved against 
prospective-only repeal based on the absence of people on death row in 
most abolitionist states. 
Atkins and its progeny support this reasoning. In determining whether 
there was a national consensus against the execution of people with 
intellectual disabilities, the Court did not scrutinize whether certain states 
abolished prospective-only, let alone whether the executive in certain states 
commuted sentences after prospective-only repeal.297 As Atkins 
demonstrates, it is the legislative act of prospective-only repeal that is of 
primary importance in determining consensus—not the subsequent actions 
of the executive. 
b.  Prospective-Only Repeal Furthers Retribution and Deterrence 
Both retribution and deterrence are served by prospective-only repeal, 
which leaves intact the sentences of those already on death row. That such 
repeals serve only one of these goals is all the Constitution requires.298  
As for retribution, consider again the words of Connecticut state 
                                                                                                                     
 295. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (“The deference we owe to the decisions 
of the state legislatures under our federal system is enhanced where the specification of punishments 
is concerned, for these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 465–70 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))). 
 296. See Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 292 (1998) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] State . . . unquestionably may allow the executive 
virtually unfettered discretion in determining the merits of appeals for mercy.”). 
 297. Compare Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–15 (compiling legislation abolishing the death penalty 
for people with intellectual disabilities), with id. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Not 18 States, but 
only 7—18% of death penalty jurisdictions—have legislation [forbidding all executions of 
individuals with intellectual disabilities]. Eleven of those that the Court counts enacted statutes 
prohibiting execution of mentally retarded defendants convicted after, or convicted of crimes 
committed after, the effective date of the legislation; those already on death row, or consigned there 
before the statute’s effective date, or even (in those States using the date of the crime as the criterion 
of retroactivity) tried in the future for murders committed many years ago, could be put to death.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 298. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (stating that the death penalty must “measurably contribute[] 
to one or both of these goals” (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982))). 
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Senator Edith Prague, who voted for prospective repeal in part to ensure 
that those responsible for the home invasion and triple murder in Cheshire, 
Connecticut would remain on death row. “They should bypass the trial,” 
Senator Prague stated, “and take that second animal and hang him by his 
penis from a tree out in the middle of Main Street.”299 Although the eleven 
offenders in Connecticut will not die in so cruel a fashion as envisaged by 
Senator Prague, the result will be the same—they will get their just deserts; 
they will be executed, or they will die of old age waiting for that fate. The 
same can be said for the five men who remain on Maryland’s death row 
and the two men who remain on New Mexico’s death row post-repeal. 
Culpability, moreover, has absolutely no role to play in this context. 
Unlike youth and disability, which render one less deserving of death, 
prospective-only repeal does not reduce an offender’s blameworthiness. 
“[T]he severity of the appropriate punishment,” the Supreme Court has 
stated, “necessarily depends on the culpability”—not the good fortune—
“of the offender.”300 Those who remain on death row post-repeal are 
unlucky, to be sure, but not less culpable. 
A counter-argument is that prospective-only repeal of the death penalty 
is somehow equivalent to a rejection of the retributive value of the death 
penalty. This argument has two significant faults. The first is the 
assumption that death penalty repeal necessarily calls into question the 
legitimacy of retribution. As the Court stated in the context of civil 
remedies in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, “Statutes are seldom crafted to 
pursue a single goal.”301 The reasons for legislative action are many and 
varied; they are a dense manifold. This is no less true in the death penalty 
context. There are many reasons to repeal the death penalty prospective-
only, such as avoiding cost,302 preventing false hopes for victims,303 and 
                                                                                                                     
 299. State v. Santiago, 49 A.3d 566, 696 (Conn. 2012) (Harper, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (quoting Sen. Prague) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 300. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. The Court gives no consideration to the fortuity of statutory 
changes. 
 301. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994).  
 302. Lawmakers may rationally seek to avoid the cost of procuring new death sentences while 
maintaining existing death sentences won at significant cost. See CT’s January 2013 Response, 
supra note 78, at 30 (noting “the enormous time, expense and consumption of state resources it 
takes to prosecute a capital case” as reason to repeal); NM’s January 2011 Response, supra note 3, 
at 11 (noting the “perceived high cost of death penalty litigation” as a “reason for repealing the 
death penalty”); cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 458–59 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(discussing state legislatures’ refusal to pass new capital child-rape laws because of “high 
associated costs” (quoting Tavia D. Green, Small Victory in Big Fight for Tougher Sex Abuse Laws, 
LEAF-CHRON. (May 8, 2008), available at 2008 WLNR 26988729) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Krent, supra note 106, at 83 (“[L]egislatures may reduce the penalties for particular 
crimes, not because of changed circumstances or views of the wrongfulness of the underlying 
conduct, but for instrumental reasons due to the rising cost of incarceration . . . . Such decisions to 
ameliorate punishment do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that those previously convicted 
also should have their punishments reduced. A rational legislature could conclude that the social or 
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eliminating the risk of executing the innocent.304 Such reasons do not call 
the legitimacy of retribution into question. Indeed, if a legislature believes 
that the death penalty serves no legitimate retributive purpose, it can 
amend the constitution or abolish the death penalty prospectively and 
retroactively. Legislatures that repeal prospective-only have deliberately 
chosen not to do either of these things. Prospective-only repeal is therefore 
not necessarily a rejection of the death penalty’s retributive value—a 
determination “that the death penalty is intolerable under any and all 
circumstances.”305 It is not, as Justice Scalia has stated, “a statement of 
absolute moral repugnance, but one of current preference between two 
[constitutionally] tolerable approaches”: to keep the death penalty for some 
or abolish it altogether.306 
The second fault is that, even assuming prospective-only death penalty 
repeal is equivalent to a rejection of the retributive value of the death 
penalty, it is not a complete rejection. It is constitutionally tolerable for a 
legislature to reject the retributive value of the death penalty going forward 
but not going backward. A legislature that has come to doubt the retributive 
value of the death penalty may repeal it for future offenders whose 
“unidentified and unidentifiable victims . . . live under an altered social 
contract.”307 At the same time, a legislature may retain it for those who 
stand outside this “veil of ignorance”—those offenders who were on notice 
at the time they committed their crimes that death was the punishment, and 
whose victims are known and now gone.308 
Although retribution seems clear enough in this context, deterrence is a 
                                                                                                                     
other benefits of the lightened punishment are more important with respect to those sentenced in the 
future than those sentenced in the past.”). 
 303. Lawmakers may rationally believe in the state’s capacity to keep its “promise” to victims 
in existing death penalty cases while doubting its capacity to do so in the future. 
 304. Lawmakers may rationally believe that no one currently on death row is innocent but seek 
to avoid the potential for error in the future. Cf. 2012 S. Sess. Transcript, supra note 33 (“[T]here is 
no one on death row [in Connecticut] who is innocent and . . . there is nothing that could ultimately 
ever prove their innocence.”). 
 305. State v. Rizzo, 31 A.3d 1094, 1167 n.88 (Conn. 2011). 
 306. Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); cf. 
Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 664 (1974) (rejecting argument that, by passing a prospective-
only statute removing parole ineligibility, Congress “jettison[ed] the retributive approach of the 
[repealed] law,” and finding no constitutional infirmity in the statute’s prospective-only 
application), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-481, 88 
Stat. 1455, 1455; Krent, supra note 106, at 81 (stating that, “in the Legislature's eyes,” crimes 
committed before passage of ameliorative legislation “may ‘merit’ different punishment” than 
identical crimes committed after such legislation because of changed factual circumstances as 
opposed to morality”). 
 307. CT’s January 2013 Response, supra note 78, at 31. 
 308.  Cf. Krent, supra note 106, at 79–80 (“The fact that norms later change in no way 
undermines the conclusion that the individual knowingly (depending on the mens rea required) 
violated a rule of the community. . . . Congress rationally could treat those who knowingly violated 
a social command differently from those who did not, even though the conduct was the same.”). 
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somewhat harder case. How, one might ask, can the death penalty deter 
future offenders if no future offender will ever be put to death? The answer 
is that by imposing the death penalty against those currently on death row, 
prospective-only repeal “communicate[s] to all criminals that they will be 
held to account for their crimes in the manner in which the law provides 
when they commit them.”309 Through prospective-only repeal, the 
legislature is making absolutely clear to future offenders that it means what 
it says—that they should be under no illusion that a change in law 
tomorrow will spare them the consequences of their actions today. 
Offenders sentenced to death will not benefit from the subsequent repeal of 
the death penalty, any more than future offenders sentenced to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole (LWOP) will benefit from some yet-to-be-
enacted repeal of LWOP down the road.310 “Future offenders beware,” the 
legislature is saying. “You get what we say you get, not what we say as 
modified by what we haven’t said yet (in future legislation).” 
c.  Cases Giving Retroactive Effect to Prospective-Only Repeal 
Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment or State Corollaries 
Few cases address the constitutionality of death sentences post-repeal 
under the Eighth Amendment or its state corollaries. As discussed above, 
upon finding that the legislature intended the repeal to be prospective-only, 
courts have overwhelmingly given effect to the legislature’s intent.311 In the 
few cases addressing the constitutionality of death sentences post-repeal, 
courts have generally upheld those sentences.312 
                                                                                                                     
 309. NM’s January 2011 Response, supra note 3, at 10 (emphasis added); cf. People v. 
Gilchrist, 133 Cal. App. 3d 38, 45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the “disparity created by 
rendering different sentences after an admittedly arbitrarily chosen date . . . does not violate equal 
protection principles because of the legitimate public purpose of assuring ‘that penal laws will 
maintain their desired deterrent effect by carrying out the original prescribed punishment as 
written’” (quoting In re Kapperman, 522 P.2d 657, 659 (Cal. 1974))). 
 310. Cf. David R. Dow, Life Without Parole: A Different Death Penalty, NATION (Oct. 26, 
2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/170852/life-without-parole-different-death-penalty (discussing 
the unfairness of LWOP). 
 311. See supra Subsection III.A.2.a; cf. Dillon v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2692 (2010) (“We are 
aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment to the benefit of subsequent . . . [ameliorative] amendments.”); Hunt v. Nuth, 57 
F.3d 1327, 1335 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that, by refusing to give retroactive effect to the 
prospective-only repeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had “implicitly held” that there was no 
constitutional violation). 
 312. See, e.g., State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 216–17 (Tenn. 2000) (rejecting Eighth 
Amendment challenge to death sentence based on prospective-only legislation requiring jury to 
consider sentencing option of life imprisonment without parole); Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506, 
515 (Ind. 1999) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to a death sentence based on a prospective-
only repeal of the death penalty for people with intellectual disabilities); id. (“We do not find today 
sufficient objective evidence of contemporary standards of decency which demonstrates that a 
categorical exemption of the mentally retarded from the death penalty is mandated by the Eighth 
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Importantly, two state supreme courts have declared the death sentences 
of those with intellectual disabilities unconstitutional after their legislatures 
repealed the death penalty prospective-only for such people. In 1989, in 
Fleming v. Zant,313 the Supreme Court of Georgia held that it was cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Georgia Constitution to execute death row 
prisoners with intellectual disabilities after Georgia repealed its death 
penalty prospective-only for people with such disabilities.314 While 
acknowledging the absence of a “national consensus” against the execution 
of people with intellectual disabilities, the Fleming Court found a 
consensus “among Georgians” based on the state’s (prospective-only) 
repeal, coupled with the subsequent passage of a Georgia Senate resolution 
“urging [its] Board of Pardons and Paroles to give special consideration to 
commuting the sentences of mentally retarded offenders.”315 In a vigorous 
dissent, Justice Smith argued that the majority’s retroactive application of a 
clearly prospective-only repeal “usurp[ed] legislative power,” upending an 
“express[ion of] the people’s legitimate concern for finality.”316 “Senate 
resolutions,” Justice Smith further argued, “do not express the will of the 
majority of the citizens of this State; they express the will of the Senator or 
Senators who introduced them” and therefore do not support retroactive 
                                                                                                                     
Amendment.”); see also Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 786 (Ind. 1997) (stating that there may be a 
moral argument for exempting “mentally retarded criminals from the death penalty,” but the 
legislature and the Governor specifically legislated “a statute of repose for claims of mental 
retardation in capital cases . . . rather than amending the Constitution or leaving the act open-ended 
for judicial interpretation”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; infra notes 358–
61 and accompanying text (discussing State v. Alcorn’s rejection of an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to a prospective-only law that allowed the jury to consider the sentencing option of 
LWOP); cf. United States v. Santana, 761 F. Supp. 2d 131, 162 n.28 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting 
argument that “there is an Eighth Amendment violation from sentences under the [repealed statute] 
because such sentences would no longer serve any of the permissible purposes of criminal 
punishment (retribution, deterrence, etc.). Simply put, the import of Marrero is that if Congress 
does not expressly provide that it intends the new law to be applied retroactively, then there is no 
frustration of the purposes behind the new law, or, therefore, anything improper, in not applying it 
retroactively” (citation omitted)). 
 313. 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989). 
 314. Id. at 343 (“[W]e conclude that the execution of mentally retarded offenders violates the 
Georgia constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.”); see id. (Smith, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he legislature specifically limited the applicability of the statute to ‘the trial of any 
case in which the death penalty is sought which commences on or after July 1, 1988 . . . .’” (second 
alteration in original) (quoting statute repealing death penalty for persons with intellectual 
disabilities)). The court’s decision in Fleming to apply a prospective-only repeal retroactively to 
people with intellectual disabilities is in striking contrast with its 1966 decision in Cobb v. State, 
152 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. 1966), in which it refused to give retroactive effect to a prospective-only 
repeal of the death penalty for people who were less than seventeen years of age at the time of their 
offense. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 315. Fleming, 386 S.E.2d. at 342. 
 316. Id. at 343–44 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“It is not this Court’s prerogative to determine social 
policies; the power to determine policy questions rests in the legislative branch, not the judicial 
branch.”). 
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application.317 
In 2001, in Van Tran v. State,318 the Tennessee Supreme Court went 
further, holding that it was cruel and unusual punishment under both the 
Tennessee and federal constitutions to execute death row prisoners with 
intellectual disabilities after Tennessee repealed the death penalty 
prospective-only for people with such disabilities.319 In that case, the court 
relied on a national consensus against the execution of people with 
intellectual disabilities, as evidenced by, among other things, Tennessee’s 
(prospective-only) repeal of the practice, other states’ repeals, public 
opinion polls, and jury sentencing data showing an opposition toward the 
practice.320 The court also relied on the lack of penological objectives 
served by the death penalty in this context, given the reduced culpability of 
people with intellectual disabilities.321 
Two other cases involving the retroactive application of prospective-
only death penalty repeals deserve mention. In 1989, in Cooper v. State,322 
the Indiana Supreme Court held that it was “inappropriate” to execute a 
death row prisoner who committed her crime at the age of fifteen after 
Indiana repealed the death penalty prospective-only for people who were 
minors at the time of the offense.323 Invoking the “more intensive level of 
scrutiny” demanded by its state constitution in capital sentencing 
decisions,324 the court concluded that the defendant “would be both the 
first and the last person ever to be executed in Indiana for a crime 
                                                                                                                     
 317. Id. at 344. 
 318. 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001). 
 319. Id. at 809 (“[W]e hold that the execution of mentally retarded individuals fails to achieve 
legitimate penological objectives for punishment as required by the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution.”). Unlike Fleming, the 
repeal statute at issue in Van Tran was silent as to retroactivity—not explicitly prospective-only. 
See id. at 797 (stating that the repeal statute “provided only an effective date of July 1, 1990, and it 
contained no other specific language requiring retroactive application”). 
 320. Id. at 801–04. The court also ostensibly relied on a consensus within Tennessee. Id. at 
804–05. 
 321. Id. at 806–09. 
 322. 540 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1989). 
 323. Id. at 1219 (“‘This act does not apply to a case in which a death sentence has been 
imposed before September 1, 1987.’” (quoting An Act to Amend the Indiana Code Concerning 
Children Accused of Murder, Pub. L. No. 332, § 3, 1987 Ind. Acts 3040, 3043)). Legislative history 
further clarified that the repeal was intended to be prospective-only. See id. (“The bill’s sponsors 
declared openly that [the prospective-only provision] was purposeful. . . . [I]t was apparent that the 
authors wished to enact a general policy without the passion that legislating on a particular case 
would arouse.”). The court’s decision in Cooper that it was “inappropriate” to execute a person who 
was a minor at the time of the crime is in striking contrast with its decision ten years later in Rondon 
v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506 (Ind. 1999), in which it refused to give retroactive effect to a prospective-
only repeal of the death penalty for people with intellectual disabilities. See supra note 151 and 
accompanying text. 
 324. Cooper, 540 N.E.2d at 1218; see id. (noting “[t]he thoroughness and relative 
independence of this Court’s review” of death sentences). 
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committed at the age of 15,” which “ma[de] her sentence unique and 
disproportionate to any other sentence for the same crime.”325 Significantly, 
the court did not find the sentence to be cruel and unusual under the state 
constitution; rather, its decision was based on its mandatory review of 
“whether the sentence of death is appropriate” in light of mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances.326  
In reliance on Cooper, the Indiana Supreme Court in Saylor v. 
Indiana327 held that it was “inappropriate” to execute a person who was 
sentenced to death by a judge over a unanimous jury recommendation 
against death after Indiana eliminated such overrides prospective-only.328 
Of particular importance to the court was the fact that the prisoner was 
“one of only three individuals currently under a death sentence despite a 
jury’s recommendation to the contrary.”329 
In Fleming, Van Tran, and Cooper, state legislatures repealed the death 
penalty prospective-only for those whose particular characteristic—
intellectual disability or age—reduced their culpability and susceptibility to 
deterrence.330 In Fleming and Van Tran, the courts held that a consensus—
either state or national—had emerged against execution of those who 
shared the characteristic, thereby making it cruel and unusual to execute 
them.331 In Cooper, the Indiana Supreme Court took a different tack, 
holding that it was “inappropriate” (but not cruel and unusual) under its 
state constitution’s heightened standard of review to execute a person who 
was fifteen at the time of the offense.332 Taken together, these cases stand 
for an unremarkable proposition: a characteristic that diminishes 
culpability and susceptibility to deterrence must diminish it for all who 
share that characteristic.333 This proposition has no traction here. 
                                                                                                                     
 325. Id. at 1219–20 (emphasis added). 
 326. Id. at 1218 (“The object of this review is to assure consistency in the evenhanded 
operation of the death penalty statute.”). The court also found the execution to be in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment, but grounded its analysis in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), which declared that it is unconstitutional to execute a 
person under a death penalty statute that, like Indiana’s, “specifies no minimum age at which the 
commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender’s execution.” Id. at 1220–21 (“We are 
persuaded that Indiana’s statute fits under Thompson v. Oklahoma and violates the eighth 
amendment of the United States Constitution.”). 
 327. 808 N.E.2d 646 (Ind. 2004). 
 328. Id. at 650–51; see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e) (West, Westlaw through 2013 
legislation) (“For a defendant sentenced after June 30, 2002, . . . if the hearing is by jury, the jury 
shall recommend to the court whether the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole, or 
neither, should be imposed. . . . If the jury reaches a sentencing recommendation, the court shall 
sentence the defendant accordingly.”). 
 329. See Saylor, 808 N.E.2d at 651. 
 330. See supra notes 313–26 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra notes 313–21 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra notes 322–26 and accompanying text. 
 333. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) (“Unless the imposition of the death 
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In the context of prospective-only repeal of the death penalty in toto, 
there simply is no shared characteristic that reduces offenders’ culpability 
or undermines the goal of deterrence. In fact, prospective-only repeal has 
nothing to with offenders’ characteristics at all. Rather, it has to do with the 
wisdom of the death penalty going forward—a “complex factual issue the 
resolution of which properly rests with the legislatures.”334 In sum, 
prospective-only repeal of the death penalty, unlike characteristics such as 
youth or intellectual disability, does not undermine offenders’ personal 
responsibility for their crimes or the deterrent impact of their punishment. 
The penological goals of retribution and deterrence are served by 
imposition of the death penalty against those sentenced to death, whether 
carried out before or after repeal. 
Among the cases in which courts have given retroactive effect to 
prospective-only repeals under the Eighth Amendment or its state 
corollaries, Saylor is perhaps the most difficult to distinguish. In that case, 
the statutory text was absolutely clear and there was no mitigating 
characteristic at issue like age or disability.335 What appears to have been at 
the heart of the court’s decision was fundamental fairness—that “common-
law principle [with a] . . . constitutional dimension,”336 which requires 
“that government minimize arbitrariness in its dealing with individual 
citizens.”337 Given the sympathetic facts of that case, which involved a 
unanimous jury recommendation against death and the defendant’s being 
one of just three people under a death sentence despite a jury 
recommendation to the contrary, the court relied on its “intensive” standard 
of appellate review to remedy the perceived unfairness.338 
3.  Unconstitutional as Applied: Furman Arbitrariness 
In addition to the Supreme Court’s Atkins line of cases, one might 
argue that, under Furman v. Georgia, prospective-only repeal is 
unconstitutional as applied to those currently on death row because of its 
                                                                                                                     
penalty on a mentally retarded person ‘measurably contributes to one or both of the[] goals [of 
retribution or deterrence], it is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain 
and suffering, and hence an unconstitutional punishment.’” (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782, 798 (1982))). 
 334. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976) (plurality opinion), quoted in Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008). 
 335. See supra notes 327–29 and accompanying text. 
 336. James R. Zazzali et al., Panel II: The Death Penalty on Appeal: Constitutionality, 
Equality, and Proportionality Review, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 95, 97–98 (2008). 
 337. State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 319 (N.J. 1987) (Handler, J., dissenting). 
 338. Saylor v. Indiana, 808 N.E.2d 646, 650–51 (Ind. 2004). For in-depth discussions of 
fundamental fairness in the context of prospective-only death penalty repeal, see generally Barry, 
From Wolves, Lambs (Part II), supra note 1, and ACLU-CT Brief, supra note 90, at 3–8; see also 
infra notes 377–80 and accompanying text; supra note 209 (discussing Judge Lumpkin’s dissents 
rejecting a fundamental fairness argument in the context of prospective-only repeal). 
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arbitrary and capricious selection of those to be executed.339 In Furman, 
five justices, each writing separately, agreed that, in the absence of 
standards to guide capital sentencing, the imposition of death is arbitrary 
and capricious in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel 
and unusual punishment.340 Justice Stewart stated:  
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same 
way that being struck by lightning is cruel and 
unusual. . . . [P]etitioners are among a capriciously selected 
random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact 
been imposed. . . . [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal 
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and 
so freakishly imposed.341  
Justice White likewise decried the lack of any “meaningful basis for 
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty was] imposed 
from the many cases in which it [was] not.”342 For Justice Brennan, “the 
conclusion [wa]s virtually inescapable that [the death penalty was] being 
inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smack[ed] of little more than a lottery 
system.”343 For this and other reasons, Justice Brennan concluded, the 
death penalty was unconstitutional per se.344 
Of particular concern to the two remaining justices in the majority was 
the complexion of the “random handful”345 on death row. According to 
Justices Douglas and Marshall, the death penalty was “pregnant with 
discrimination,” disproportionately targeting poor people and people of 
                                                                                                                     
 339. See 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam) (holding “the death penalty in these cases” 
unconstitutional), construed in CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 23–24 (recognizing the “dominant 
theme . . . [as] the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.”). 
 340. See id.; see also CARTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 23–24. Although this “arbitrary and 
capricious” rationale also sounds in due process, Furman was decided under the Eighth 
Amendment (as applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment). See Furman, 408 U.S. at 
240. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh’g granted and vacated on other grounds 
by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972), a case decided just one year before Furman, the Court 
held that standardless capital sentencing did not violate the Due Process Clause. See id. at 207 (“In 
light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite 
impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce 
life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution.”); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U.S. 586, 599 (1978) (plurality) (“Thus, what had been approved under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in McGautha became impermissible under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments by virtue of the judgment in Furman.”). 
 341. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 342. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). 
 343. Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 344. Id. at 305 (“The punishment of death is therefore ‘cruel and unusual,’ and the States may 
no longer inflict it as a punishment for crimes.”). 
 345. Id. at 248 n.11 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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color—an arbitrary and capricious criteria for death if ever there was 
one.346 “Regarding discrimination,” Justice Marshall wrote, “it has been 
said that ‘[i]t is usually the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the 
member of the minority group—the man who, because he is without 
means, and is defended by a court-appointed attorney—who becomes 
society’s sacrificial lamb.’”347 Like Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall 
concluded that the death penalty was therefore unconstitutional per se.348 
Given the majority’s concerns in Furman, one might reasonably argue 
that nothing could be more arbitrary and capricious than allowing 
eligibility for the death penalty to depend on the date of one’s crime. 
Despite its superficial appeal, this argument misunderstands Furman’s 
reach. At issue in Furman was whether the discretion of juries was 
adequately channeled, “thereby reduc[ing] the likelihood that it will 
impose a sentence that fairly can be called capricious or arbitrary.”349 As 
the Court subsequently explained in Gregg, a case in which it upheld the 
constitutionality of Georgia’s death penalty sentencing procedures: 
Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a 
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of 
whether a human life should be taken or spared, that 
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to 
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty 
of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner 
can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the 
sentencing authority is given adequate information and 
guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best 
met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at 
which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information 
relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with 
standards to guide its use of the information.350 
The operative term here is “sentencing authority.” The Furman Court was 
concerned that juries’ “unbridled discretion in determining the fates of 
those charged with capital offenses” created “a substantial risk that the 
                                                                                                                     
 346. Id. at 257; see id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 347. Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Hearings on S. 1760 Before the Subcomm. 
on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 11 (1968) 
(statement of Michael V. DiSalle, Chairman, Nat’l Comm. to Abolish the Death Penalty)). 
 348. Id. at 358–59 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]he death penalty is an excessive and 
unnecessary punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 349. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 194–95 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 350. Id. at 189, 195 (emphasis added). 
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punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.”351 
Importantly, the Court was not concerned with the discretion of 
legislatures to change their sentencing laws. And for good reason. As noted 
by one of Furman’s four dissenters, the legislature possesses a 
wide range of power . . . to adapt its penal laws to conditions 
as they may exist and punish the crimes of men according to 
their forms and frequency[.] 
. . . .  
. . . [L]egislative judgments as to the efficacy of particular 
punishments are presumptively rational and may not be struck 
down under the Eighth Amendment because this Court may 
think that some alternative sanction would be more 
appropriate. 
. . . .  
. . . To do so is to usurp a function committed to the 
Legislative Branch and beyond the power and competency of 
this Court.352 
This general warning applies with special force to prospective-only repeal, 
by which the legislature has decided to abolish the death penalty on a 
selective basis. Again, one of the Furman dissenters stated: 
The legislatures are free to eliminate capital punishment 
for specific crimes or to carve out limited exceptions to a 
general abolition of the penalty, without adherence to the 
conceptual strictures of the Eighth Amendment. . . . If 
legislatures come to doubt the efficacy of capital punishment, 
they can abolish it, either completely or on a selective 
basis. . . . An Eighth Amendment ruling by judges cannot be 
made with such flexibility or discriminating precision.353 
Because the legislature’s decision to repeal a law has nothing to do with a 
jury’s decision to sentence a person to death, and has everything to do with 
the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches, 
Furman is inapplicable to prospective-only repeal. As the Court in Gregg 
made clear, if “the sentencing authority is apprised of the information 
relevant to the imposition of [a] sentence and provided with standards to 
                                                                                                                     
 351. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (plurality 
opinion) and Furman, 408 U.S. 238); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (plurality 
opinion) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion) and Furman, 408 U.S. 238); see also id. 
at 428 (“It must channel the sentencer’s discretion by clear and objective standards that provide 
specific and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a 
sentence of death.” (footnotes omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted)). 
 352. Furman, 408 U.S. at 432, 456, 458 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 353. Id. at 403–04 (Burger, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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guide its use of the information,” the risk of an arbitrary and capricious 
sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment is removed.354 The 
sentence does not suddenly become arbitrary and capricious because the 
legislature decides to repeal the death penalty prospective-only at some 
later date. In short, Furman concerns whether a jury’s sentence of death 
was arbitrary and capricious, not whether a state’s eventually carrying out 
that sentence might be. 
The absurdity of applying Furman to prohibit execution post-repeal is 
clear when one considers the risks at stake. The risk that concerned the 
majority in Furman was that the procedures used to sentence a person to 
death were arbitrary and “pregnant with discrimination,” thereby rendering 
the sentence constitutionally defective.355 In the prospective-only repeal 
context, the risk is not that the death sentence is somehow defective, but 
that it will be carried out at all. This, of course, is not the kind of “risk” that 
bothered the Court in Furman. It is not arbitrary and capricious for a state 
to actually do what the jury has directed it to do; the fact that a state has 
abolished the death penalty going forward at the time it carries out a jury’s 
sentence does not change this determination. 
Indeed, it is no more arbitrary and capricious for a legislature to 
maintain its death row intact after prospective-only repeal than it is for one 
state to abolish and another to retain the death penalty. As Justice Burger 
stated in Furman, the fate of those on death row is “controlled by a 
fortuitous circumstance,” but “this element of fortuity” does not render the 
death penalty’s imposition arbitrary and capricious.356 These decisions are 
the exclusive prerogative of state legislatures and, while they may be 
inconsistent, they are not constitutionally defective, “for no human 
institution performs with perfect consistency.”357 Were the Eighth 
Amendment to require this kind of absolute consistency, the death penalty 
would not be permitted in any state under any circumstances. 
Furthermore, a determination that prospective-only repeal is arbitrary 
and capricious as applied to those on death row, when taken to its logical 
conclusion, would mean that every prospective-only change in sentencing 
law that reduces punishment for a particular crime necessarily violates the 
Eighth Amendment. This has never been the law. As discussed above, the 
rules of statutory construction suggest exactly the opposite.358 The case of 
State v. Alcorn is instructive on this point.359 In that case, the defendant 
argued that application of a savings clause “resulted in arbitrary or 
capricious application of the death penalty and thus cruel and unusual 
                                                                                                                     
 354. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion). 
 355. See supra notes 341–48 and accompanying text. 
 356. Furman, 408 U.S. at 389 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 357. Cf. id. (discussing consistency with regard to juries). 
 358. See supra Subsection III.A.1. 
 359. 638 N.E.2d 1242 (Ind. 1994). 
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punishment” because it denied him the benefit of “jury instructions on life 
imprisonment without parole . . . based simply on an arbitrary fact that the 
crime occurred before June 30, 1993.”360 The court rejected this claim, 
holding that “[t]he mere application of the saving clause will not result in 
cruel and unusual punishment.”361 
In the end, an Eighth Amendment challenge to prospective-only repeal on 
the grounds that it is arbitrary and capricious is really an equal protection claim 
in disguise, and should be analyzed as such.362 Indeed, “[the Court] h[as] never 
before held it to be cruel and unusual punishment to impose a sentence in 
violation of some other constitutional imperative.”363 Although the Eighth 
Amendment proves a limited vehicle for challenging prospective-only repeal, a 
companion article, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II): The Fourteenth Amendment 
Case for Gradual Abolition of the Death Penalty, concludes that the 
Fourteenth Amendment is weaker still.364 Prospective-only repeal is 
constitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 
4.  Policy Considerations Regarding the Eighth  
Amendment’s Reach 
Policy considerations undergirding the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
analysis also support prospective-only repeal. In its death penalty 
jurisprudence, both the Court’s majority and its dissenters have expressed 
dueling concerns over the reach of the Eighth Amendment. The dissenters 
warn that “[t]he Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet”; standards of decency 
do not necessarily evolve toward abolition, they may also evolve the other 
way.365 “[T]emporary consensus on leniency for a particular crime,” as 
Justice Scalia originally stated, does not “fix[] a permanent constitutional 
maximum, disabling the States from giving effect to altered beliefs and 
responding to changed social conditions.”366 Were that the case, the Court 
in Furman would have declared the death penalty unconstitutional per se 
after executions dramatically declined after World War II and ground to a 
                                                                                                                     
 360. Id. at 1246. 
 361. Id. 
 362. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 390 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“It must be noted that any equal 
protection claim is totally distinct from the Eighth Amendment question . . . . Evidence of a 
discriminatory pattern of enforcement does not imply that any use of a particular punishment is so 
morally repugnant as to violate the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 363. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 352 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
554 U.S. 407, 464 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment provides a poor vehicle for 
addressing problems regarding the admissibility or reliability of evidence . . . .”). 
 364. See Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II), supra note 1. 
 365. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 466 (Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, 
JJ., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990 (1991) (Scalia, 
J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same). 
 366. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 990 (Scalia, J.), quoted in Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 466 (Alito, J., 
joined by Roberts, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
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halt beginning in 1968.367 “The mistaken premise of the decision,” Justice 
O’Connor has stated, “would have been frozen into constitutional law, 
making it difficult to refute and even more difficult to reject.”368 
The majority, on the other hand, advances the opposite concern. When 
it comes to the death penalty, the Eighth Amendment is not too strong (a 
“ratchet” in the dissenter’s usage); rather, it can never be strong enough. 
Given its “unique . . . severity and irrevocability,”369 the Court must be 
“most hesitant before interpreting the Eighth Amendment to allow the 
extension of the death penalty. . . . [D]ecency, in its essence, presumes 
respect for the individual and thus moderation or restraint in the 
application of capital punishment.”370 Accordingly, the Court’s job, as the 
majority sees it, is to be a formidable gatekeeper, “confining the instances 
in which capital punishment may be imposed.”371 If the screw is to be 
turned away from abolition, it must be for a very good reason. 
Prospective-only repeal upsets neither the majority’s nor the dissenters’ 
view of the Eighth Amendment. Prospective-only repeal is not, after all, an 
“extension of the death penalty.”372 It is exactly the opposite—a retraction 
of the death penalty, albeit a measured one. Therefore, it would be strange 
for courts to object to prospective-only repeal on the same grounds that the 
Supreme Court in Kennedy objected to a law that made rape punishable by 
death.373 The former abolishes the death penalty while preserving the status 
quo for those on death row; the latter radically alters the status quo by 
expanding the list of crimes punishable by death. 
Striking down prospective-only repeal as applied to those on death row, 
moreover, would lead to the very result criticized by the dissenters. It 
would prevent states “from giving effect to altered beliefs”(that those on 
death row should die, but no one else should) and freeze into constitutional 
law a standard (“Complete repeal or no repeal”) that some states do not 
share.374 If prospective-only repeal is prospective in name only, these states 
may simply choose not to abolish the death penalty at all, thereby 
fossilizing their standard of decency rather than allowing it to evolve. As 
                                                                                                                     
 367. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 345 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 815, 854–55 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
 368. Id. (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 855 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
 369. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 437 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality 
opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 370. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 435 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 100 (1958)). 
 371. Id. at 437; see also id. at 420. 
 372. Id. at 435. 
 373. See id. at 437, 441 (“[T]he death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the victim’s 
life was not taken. . . . Evolving standards of decency are difficult to reconcile with a regime that seeks to 
expand the death penalty to an area where standards to confine its use are indefinite and obscure.”). 
 374. See id. at 466 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990 
(1991) (Scalia, J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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an en banc panel of the Sixth Circuit recently acknowledged in the non-
capital context, the “Eighth Amendment is not a ratchet that makes a 
harsher system of penalties unconstitutional the moment a more lenient one 
is (prospectively) adopted, a theory that would have the perverse effect of 
discouraging lawmakers from ever lowering criminal sentences.”375 
To further the dissenters’ analogy, prospective-only repeal will not 
loosen the screw one iota; it will not cause abolition’s frame to come 
tumbling down. It merely allows states to turn the screw at their own pace, 
and to gather more hands to do so. If prospective-only repeal is not 
permitted, courts will not only have required states to use a ratchet (in the 
sense that the screw must turn toward abolition, not away), but to ratchet 
with a zeal that outpaces the ratcheter (in the sense that the screw must turn 
toward prospective and retroactive abolition). Ironically, this may leave 
retentionist states without the hands needed to perform the task before 
them; they may forgo picking up their tools altogether, stunting progress 
that might otherwise have been made. The House of Abolition needs walls, 
and prospective-only repeal is one way to build them. 
5.  Summary of Eighth Amendment Analysis 
Prospective-only death penalty repeal does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment. Because the death penalty remains constitutional per se, the 
Eighth Amendment permits states to abolish the death penalty without 
wiping their death rows clean. Although the death penalty has been found 
unconstitutional as applied in a variety of circumstances, those 
circumstances do not apply here. First, unlike in Atkins, there is no national 
consensus against prospective-only repeal; in fact, recent repeals in New 
Mexico, Illinois, Connecticut, and Maryland suggest the opposite to be 
true. And because those remaining on death row post-repeal share no 
unifying characteristic that diminishes their culpability or susceptibility to 
deterrence, legitimate penological goals are served by preserving their 
death sentences intact. Second, unlike in Furman, the death sentences at 
issue are not “pregnant with discrimination”; they were arrived at under a 
constitutional scheme and they remain constitutional post-repeal. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Over the past five years, a new trend has emerged in death penalty 
abolition—that of gradual abolition. State legislatures in New Mexico, 
Connecticut, and Maryland have abolished the death penalty prospective-
only, that is, for everyone in the future, and the executive in each state has 
                                                                                                                     
 375. United States v. Blewett, Nos. 12-5226, 12-5582, 2013 WL 6231727, at *13 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 
2013) (“Withholding the benefits of a change from previously sentenced defendants at any rate is not 
‘unusual,’” the Sixth Circuit further noted, but rather “is the general practice in federal sentencing, as 
Dorsey and § 109 confirm.”). 
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been unwilling or unable to commute the sentences of those on death row. 
As a result, a total of eighteen men in New Mexico, Connecticut, and 
Maryland remain on death row post-repeal. 
This Article answers three fundamental questions raised by prospective-
only death penalty repeal. The first question is a pragmatic one that is 
being asked by advocates of abolition: Is prospective-only repeal helpful to 
abolition? This Article concludes that it is. Prospective-only repeal is a 
retraction of the death penalty, albeit a measured one. States like New 
Mexico, Connecticut, and Maryland are evolving, one might say; they are 
just doing it more slowly. Some advocates will say that supporting 
prospective-only repeal is equivalent to “betting against one’s own horse,” 
but this depends on how one characterizes the horse. If the horse is a 
prisoner who remains on death row post-repeal, it is true that prospective-
only repeal does not help him. But then again, prospective-only repeal does 
not hurt him either. It does not accelerate in the slightest his march to the 
death chamber; all it does is preserve the status quo. If, on the other hand, 
the horse is a Supreme Court decision declaring the death penalty 
unconstitutional per se, prospective-only abolition is a better bet. Thirty-
three states retain the death penalty and all of them have prisoners on death 
row.376 Odds are good that prospective-only repeal will be an enticing 
option for many of these states. While abolition’s principles may be at odds 
with prospective-only repeal, abolition’s progress may not be. 
The second question is a moral one, which has been advanced by 
legislators on both sides of the death penalty debate: Is prospective-only 
repeal morally coherent? In other words, is it moral to cast a vote that will 
prohibit the death penalty for some but not all? This Article concludes that 
while it may be immoral to punish people with death, prospective-only 
repeal is not about punishment; it is about ending punishment. By retaining 
the death penalty for some so that no others will ever face a similar fate, 
legislators arguably transform an immoral punishment into a moral 
sacrifice. This is the uneasy morality of gradual abolition; by dying, those 
on death row destroy the death penalty. 
The third and last question is a legal one to be decided by the courts: Is 
prospective-only repeal permissible under the law? This Article concludes 
that, as a matter of statutory construction, clearly prospective-only repeals 
are not given retroactive effect. Constitutional questions are admittedly less 
straightforward, especially given the novelty of legal challenges to 
prospective-only death penalty repeal. Nevertheless, the overwhelming 
weight of authority suggests that prospective-only repeal is on firm ground. 
Under the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty remains constitutional per 
se, and an “as-applied” challenge under Atkins or Furman fares no better. 
There simply is no national consensus against prospective-only repeal. 
                                                                                                                     
 376. Death Row Inmates by State, supra note 4. 
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Most legislatures have abolished the death penalty prospective-only. 
Although some executives have commuted the sentences of those 
remaining on death row post-repeal, others have kept their death rows 
intact. Furthermore, the “group” to which the death penalty is to be applied 
post-repeal has been sentenced under a constitutional, non-arbitrary 
scheme, and its members share no characteristic diminishing their 
culpability. A companion article, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II): The 
Fourteenth Amendment Case for Gradual Abolition of the Death Penalty, 
concludes that prospective-only repeal is likewise constitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 
The strongest basis for striking down prospective-only repeal is 
fundamental fairness—that “penumbral right reasonably extrapolated from 
other specific constitutional guarantees,”377 which is “at the heart of Anglo-
American law and . . . independently influence[s] the construction and 
application” of the law.378 For hundreds of years, courts have permitted the 
State to kill its killers; now courts will have to decide whether the State can 
sacrifice them. As Justice Thurgood Marshall observed in Furman, the 
Constitution does not look kindly on states that make “sacrificial lambs” of 
their citizenry.379 If fundamental fairness prohibits anything, it may well 
prohibit this.380 
And so Abolition’s eyes are now on Connecticut. As I have previously 
observed: 
If the Connecticut Supreme Court applies Connecticut’s death 
penalty repeal retroactively, it will be reason to rejoice. It 
means that the court has defied its own precedent and the 
precedent of other federal and state courts, and has discovered 
a ram in the thicket of death penalty jurisprudence, a better 
angel to avert the sacrifice. 
But if the Connecticut Supreme Court upholds the death 
penalty in this case, we should not lament. Instead, it is time 
for the gradualists to move. Bottle prospective repeal and sell 
it to every state with the death penalty. And as we use 
prospective repeal to win states to the abolitionist cause, let us 
use every tactic we can to delay to the executions of those 
who remain on death row. Delay them long enough to win 
over that magic number of states that will lead the U.S. 
Supreme Court to abolish the death penalty for good.381 
                                                                                                                     
 377. State v. Abbati, 493 A.2d 513, 519 (N.J. 1985). 
 378. Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948, 955 (1984) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., 
dissenting); see also supra notes 335–74 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental fairness). 
 379. See supra note 347 and accompanying text. 
 380. For an in-depth discussion of this argument, see Barry, From Wolves, Lambs (Part II), supra 
note 1. 
 381. Barry, supra note 91. 
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